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Abstract
Why do countries join environmental agreements? What determines the
success or failure of an environmental agreement? In this thesis we look at
the determinants of participation in environmental agreements, paying spe-
cial attention to the role played by domestic interest groups and the quality
of institutions. To answer our research questions, we assembled the largest
participation data set in the literature. This data set contains both global
and regional agreements. Unlike previous data sets, it identifies the poten-
tial members of every treaty. This allows us to correct the identification
bias subsisting in previous works. In this thesis we use a multilevel survival
model to study the determinants of participation in environmental agree-
ments. Our methodological approach introduces a number of improvements
over previous empirical works, in particular with reference to the treatment
of unobserved heterogeneity. It is also the first time a Bayesian technique
(MCMC) is used in the estimation of participation models.
We expand the traditional framework of analysis with a study of the im-
plementation stage of treaties. In this respect, we study five different vari-
ables that capture how a country fares in terms of environmental policies.
It is the first time a study of participation is conducted jointly with the
analysis of domestic policies. This framework yields interesting conclusions
on the determinants of international cooperation and their final impact on
environmental commitments. Our findings show that environmental lobby-
ing has a positive effect on participation in environmental agreements, while
the effect of industrial lobbying is statistically insignificant. This unexpec-
ted result is robust to changes in specification and proxies used. We reveal
that similar results for industrial lobbying had been obtained in previous
empirical studies. However, this relationship has never been investigated in
detail.
We advance an explanation based on the lobbying preferences of environ-
mental and industrial interest groups. The explanation is tested on domestic
policies; the results show that a dichotomy exists in the way environmental
and industrial pressure is exerted. Environmental influence focuses on treaty
participation choices and other normative governmental measures. On the
contrary, industrial lobbies prefer to target the implementation stage of en-
vironmental agreements, especially the measures that are more rewarding
in economic terms. We also find evidence that institutions play a vital role
in fostering participation in environmental agreements, and that interest
groups tend to be more influential when the quality of institutions is lower.
The study draws a number of policy suggestions. We stress the capa-
city of regional agreements to deliver higher participation rates than global
agreements. We also highlight the importance of securing the participation
of key players in the initial years to promote adherence to the agreement.
Finally, we illustrate how our model can be used to generate probabilities of
joining environmental agreements. The content of this thesis is relevant to
treaty negotiators and any entity that has an economic or private interest
in environmental agreements.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is apparent that international cooperation will soon be required to
solve some of the most serious environmental problems of our times.
Air pollution, contamination of lakes and rivers, global warming, biod-
iversity loss, deforestation, desertification, or overfishing are all prob-
lems that cross national borders and very seldom impact only one na-
tion. Environmental agreements are the primary instrument to address
these types of issues. To date we count more than 3000 environmental
agreements1. However, our current knowledge on the dynamics sur-
rounding international cooperation is limited. Why — despite the costs
associated with agreements — do sovereign nations voluntarily decide
to participate in environmental agreements and abide by their terms?
Why do some agreements succeed and others fail? Why do some coun-
tries participate in more agreements than others? Is there any factor
at the national level that systematically enhance participation rates?
If so, how can policy makers intervene to improve the likelihood of
solving transboundary and global environmental issues?
This thesis tackles a question which is at the core of the inter-
national governance of the sustainability debate. We investigate the
drivers behind countries decision to join environmental agreements.
Environmental economists have treated the subject chiefly from a game
theoretical perspective, focusing on the formation and the stability of
international coalitions. In this thesis, we employ a different approach.
We conduct an empirical investigation of the factors affecting particip-
1Mitchell (2017) identifies around 3300 environmental agreements. This number in-
cludes both bilateral and multilateral agreements.
1
ation in environmental agreements and test some of the main hypo-
theses of the economic literature. In order to conduct this analysis a
purpose-built data set has been collated from several sources.
This data shows that there is a considerable difference among coun-
tries in terms of participation in environmental agreements. Figure
1.1 shows that these differences are not random, rather, they seem to
be clustered geographically, suggesting that a number of geo-economic
factors are at play. The scope of our analysis is to gain a better under-
standing of the determinants of participation choices. More specifically,
our research focuses on the effect exerted by domestic pressure groups
on countries choice to participate in environmental agreements and ex-
plore the role that institutions play in this relationship.
The remaining part of this chapter provides some background in-
formation on environmental agreements, explains how they are formed
and introduces some terminology linked to international treaties. The
last section outlines the structure of the thesis.
What is an environmental agreement?
International environmental agreements are accords between interna-
tional entities, such as governments, with the objective of regulat-
ing matters related to the environment. Very often, in the field of
environmental economics they are referred to as international envir-
onmental agreements (IEA) or multilateral environmental agreements
(MEA). For clarity, the use of acronyms is minimised in this work, we
will prefer the nomenclature “environmental agreements” or “environ-
mental treaties”. Also, for convenience, we will often refer to interna-
tional environmental agreements simply as “agreements” or “treaties”.
Unless stated otherwise, the term “agreement” or “treaty” is referring
to an environmental agreement.
All multilateral agreements are governed by the principles of inter-
national law, and environmental agreements make no exception. In
general, they involve a text that is negotiated and then separately and
unilaterally approved by the international entities that are interested
in participating. The power of an agreement is entirely based on the
voluntary acceptance of its term by the individual countries. That is
to say, the agreement is binding for the country only if the country
accepts to be bound by the agreement. There is no superior force cap-
able of coercing a country into compliance with the agreement except
from its own voluntary participation in the agreement. As a result, the
participation to a treaty is fundamental for the success of the treaty it-
self. The approval of an agreement is generally expressed in two stages:
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first the signature and then the ratification. We will now provide an
explanation of how this mechanism works.
How environmental treaties take shape
According to Barrett (1998) there are 5 stages in the formation of
international environmental agreements: i) pre-negotiations, ii) ne-
gotiations, iii) ratification, iv) implementation, and v) renegotiations
(amendments and changes to the treaty following ratification). The
first two phases are conducted by national delegations. They culminate
with the consensus over a text that is then signed by the participants
to the negotiations. The signature signals approval of the agreement’s
content. Nonetheless, the treaty is not yet operational at this stage.
After the signature by the executive power, the treaty needs to be rat-
ified. Different countries have different procedures, but ratification is
normally a prerogative of the legislative body and entails the adoption,
at the national level, of the content of the international agreement.
Ratification is fundamental because it formally transforms the content
of the treaty into national law. The implementation of the treaty only
starts after the act of ratification. In this study, we will focus on rati-
fication because it is the legal act that renders the treaty operational.
In the course of our analysis, we use indiscriminately the term rat-
ification to indicate both the act of ratification sensu stricto and ac-
cession. Ratification is defined by the Art 2 of the Vienna Convention
(1969) as the act “whereby a State establishes on the international
plane its consent to be bound by a treaty”. For multilateral agreements
the procedure involves the deposition of a ratification document. On
the other hand, accession is the act of joining a treaty that has already
been negotiated (Art 2, Vienna Convention 1969). It has the same
value as ratification and the procedure is established in the text of the
agreement. Accession often happens for states that did not exist or
did not take part to the negotiations. For the purpose of this study,
the ratifiers of an agreement are the countries that submitted either
an act of ratification or of accession to the agreement. The ratifiers are
different from the signatories, because the latter term refers to the act
of signature, while the former to that of ratification. The ratifiers are
also called the members or parties to an agreement.
In this study we focus primarily on ratification because it is the
only act that formally binds the nation. In fact, the signature of an
environmental agreement signals willingness to cooperate, but it entails
no obligations for the signatory nor does it force the country to ratify
the agreement at a later point in time. For all these reasons, the
4
act of signature is essentially costless. In the economic literature, the
expression “participation” is the term most commonly used to express
the decision to comply with the terms of the agreement. In this study,
“participation” and “ratification” are used in the same way, however,
whenever possible we prefer the term “ratification” because it is less
vague and directly alludes to the ultimate act of participation in an
environmental agreement.
Structure of the thesis
In the next chapter we present the goals of our research, outlining the
main questions that we seek to answer and describing our main con-
tributions to the economic literature. Chapter 3 is a comprehensive
review of the empirical evidence on the determinants of ratification.
Chapter 4 presents the theoretical framework of analysis, setting our
research in the context of the existing theoretical literature. Moreover,
we define the key hypotheses that are tested in the following chapters.
Chapter 5 describes the methodological approach of this study, ex-
plaining and motivating both the modelling choices and the estimation
technique. The second part of chapter 5 is dedicated to presenting the
ratification data set and examining possible issues related to the data.
The results of the analysis are reported and discussed in chapter 6 and
7. Finally, chapter 8 summarises the main conclusions and expounds
on the policy implications and the main limitations of the empirical
study.
5

Chapter 2
Research questions
and motivation
The introduction chapter described how environmental agreements are
formed and details the successive stages in treaty participation. In this
section, we discuss how environmental problems that cross national
borders differ from local environmental issues and explain why this
type of problems calls for a different type of solution. Since traditional
policy tools are ineffective in a multilateral setting, often, the only
possible solution is to cooperate through environmental agreements.
Therefore, environmental agreements are crucial to solve most of the
large environmental issues of the 21st century. In this section we also
present our main research questions and explain how this thesis con-
tributes to the existing literature on the participation in environmental
agreements. The first part of the chapter stresses the importance of
environmental agreements and links our work to the existing fields of
research. The second part of the chapter highlights the key contribu-
tions of this thesis.
7
2.1 Scope and relevance of environmental
agreements
This section expounds on the differences between local and transbound-
ary environmental problems. We explain that the fundamental differ-
ence lies in the absence of a central authority, which ultimately makes
traditional policy tools inapplicable. Transboundary environmental is-
sues have to be resolved through international cooperation. This sec-
tion describes the central paradigms of the literature on international
agreements. Then, it introduces our research questions and discusses
the focus of the analysis. The last paragraph of the section examines
the relevance and implications of this research area.
2.1.1 Environmental problems and environmental
policy tools
Most environmental issues are linked to a failure of the first funda-
mental welfare theorem. In fact, most environmental problems derive
from externalities, missing markets or some form of non-rivalry and/or
non-excludability in consumption. From a normative perspective, en-
vironmental economics proposes a number of different policy tools to
correct market failures such as Pigouvian taxes, subsidies, cap and
trade mechanisms or emission standards. All these measures imply
the existence of a central authority capable of enforcing environmental
policies.
Unfortunately, nature obeys no borders. An environmental prob-
lem can affect many countries, or even all countries, at the same time.
In these cases, the enforcing power is missing and all the above men-
tioned measures are insufficient to correct the resource misallocations
caused by the market failures. The conventional framework of analysis
assumes a vertical system of laws whereby the policy maker possesses
the authority to allocate property rights, impose taxes and enforce
standards (Barrett, 2005). However, in transboundary environmental
problems, there is no single dominating power that possess the coer-
cive power needed to enforce environmental policies in all the countries
concerned. This decentralisation calls for a horizontal approach based
on cooperation (Barrett, 2005).
This question is of great relevance because a large number of envir-
onmental problems cross borders. If a company located in India releases
8
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC), the resulting damage to the Ozone
Layer is borne by the United States just as if the emission had origin-
ated on its soil. If a factory releases toxic wastes in large rivers, they
may contaminate waters in all countries downstream. Chernobyl ra-
dioactive fallout was quickly dispersed all over Europe by winds. The
methane released by thawing Siberian permafrost contributes to the
heating of the entire atmosphere. The deforestation of the Amazon
rainforest can be preempted by few countries alone, but any loss in
biodiversity and forest area impact all nations on Earth. In all these
examples, the impact of environmental damages affect multiple nations.
Moreover, the country — or entity — responsible for the damage to
the environment does not bear the full social cost associated with their
actions. Foreign nations have no way of intervening and, in the case
of shared resources, any measure taken unilaterally may be unable to
solve the problem and is unlikely to take into account international
externalities.
We have seen that many of the most pressing environmental prob-
lems often have transboundary impacts. If traditional policy tools fail,
what are the solutions for this type of problems? The heart of the
question lies in the absence of an international authority capable of
enforcing decisions in all countries concerned. The simplest solution
would be to merge all countries into a unique global state, then, the
same type of policies would be applicable. However, this solution is
highly implausible. Another option would be to bestow on a nation
the absolute authority on environmental issues or to constitute a form
of “world government” having the uncontested authority to enforce de-
cisions. Both these options seem equally unlikely, countries are often
averse to relinquishing their power and autonomy, and foreign interfer-
ence is rarely accepted without resistance. As a result, the only viable
solution is for countries to agree through negotiations on mutual and
voluntary restraints. This solution takes the form of international en-
vironmental agreements and is the most effective tool currently at our
disposal in a horizontal order (Barrett, 2005).
Environmental agreements are the primary tool for international
cooperation on environmental issues. The good news is that — in the-
ory — there is an incentive to cooperate because total welfare could
be increased by tackling the environmental issue in a multilateral man-
ner(Carraro & Siniscalco, 1998). Nevertheless, cooperation is not ob-
vious because there are also incentives to free ride when no central
authority is capable of enforcing an international agreement. That ex-
plains why the emphasis of the theoretical literature has been on the
need for self-enforcing characteristics in the treaty (Barrett, 2008). Re-
9
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Figure 2.1: Number of new agreements by year
Notes: For details on the data and sources refer to section 5.2.
cent trends show that environmental diplomacy seems to have gained
traction and multilateral environmental agreements are becoming an
increasingly popular tool to solve environmental problems (figure 2.2).
The end of the 20th century was a period of fertile and intense activity
in environmental diplomacy. The progress in science led to a gradual
surge in public awareness, ultimately prompting political action (Meyer
et al., 1997). Figure 2.1 shows how the number of environmental agree-
ments peaked in the 1980s and 1990s, which correspond to the estab-
lishment of the principal agreements and organisations dealing with
the environment (Mitchell, 2003). At present, and in the near future,
environmental policy and diplomacy will be a constant feature in gov-
ernment’s agendas. For all of these reasons — and because the particip-
ation in environmental agreements is a quintessentially voluntary act
— it is relevant and valuable to investigate the motivations that push
countries to participate in environmental agreements. By studying
the determinants of ratification, this study provides an evidence-based
insight into the mechanics of environmental diplomacy and forges a
better understanding of the tools available for solving transboundary
environmental issues.
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Figure 2.2: Annual number of ratifications
Notes: Ratifications refer to environmental agreements in out data set. Refer
to section 5.2 for more information on the data.
2.1.2 Main research questions
The growth in global population and fast economic development will
increasingly stress the natural resources and the global environment,
affecting the quality — if not even the sustainability — of life on Earth.
As a result, environmental issues will inevitably be a major concern
for decades to come. In this context, international agreements are
the leading tool in solving problems that cross national borders and
affect several nations at the same time. With this in mind, we aim at
providing a better understanding of the forces that drive international
cooperation on environmental issues, hoping to create knowledge that
could be useful to frame more effective environmental treaties in terms
of participation and objectives. In particular, our research focuses on
the following questions:
Do domestic pressure groups influence the ratification of en-
vironmental agreements? And how is this relationship af-
fected by the quality of institutions? Are good institutions
facilitating international cooperation?
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The decision to join an agreement is divided in two phases: signa-
ture and ratification. The reason why we study ratification is because
it is the final and definitive act marking participation in the agree-
ment. If the treaty does not correspond to the view or position of the
country it should not, in principle, sign the agreement, because signa-
ture signals the will to abide by the treaty. However, we remark that
such a signature is costless because it does not really entail any formal
commitment to ratify and does not legally bind the country to envir-
onmental actions. At the same time, there is a dichotomy between the
national bodies that have the mandate to negotiate and sign — nor-
mally the government — and the one that have the power to ratify —
normally the legislative body. As a consequence, the set of motivations
that drive signature and ratification may very well be significantly dif-
ferent. There is no reason why a country should behave as a monolithic
bloc when decisions depend on different internal bodies. Moreover, a
country that signed an agreement has no obligation to ratify, hence,
signature does not necessarily lead to the implementation of the agree-
ment. In conclusion, we prefer to look at ratification because signature
does not formally create obligations for the country. Ratification is the
legal act that truly marks the acceptance of the treaty.
In the traditional framework of theoretical analysis, ratification de-
cisions are made by a unitary welfare maximising entity. However, in
reality, they are the result of conflicting interests within the country.
For this reason, it makes sense to analyse ratification as the outcome of
two opposing tensions within the country: the so called environmental
and industrial lobbying. These two forces apply opposing pressure on
the decision to participate in environmental agreements. This frame-
work echoes the recent developments in the economic literature; in
recent years there was an attempt to integrate the public choice ap-
proach with the existing literature on participation in environmental
agreements (e.g. Marchiori et al. 2017, Habla & Winkler 2013, Ko¨ke &
Lange 2017 and Lui 2018). This body of literature formulates a num-
ber of predictions that we empirically test on how domestic pressure
groups impact participation in environmental agreements. As of now,
a comprehensive study of ratification and domestic pressure dynamics
based on a large sample of treaties and countries is missing. Our aim is
to fill this gap. Economic literature on participation in environmental
agreements is mainly based on game-theoretical models (Finus et al.,
2017). Our scope is to improve the understanding of ratification and
collect empirical evidence, so as to test the predictions of this branch
of economic literature.
In addition to environmental and industrial lobbying, we also in-
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vestigate the role played by institutions in the cooperation over en-
vironmental issues. Institutions are defined as the legal and social
constraints that structure the interactions between economic agents
(Acemoglu et al., 2005). They set the operational rules and shape the
incentives of agents, affecting the economic and social outcomes at dif-
ferent levels. The rule of law, political system, economic regulations,
social norms, bureaucracy and the administrative apparatus, are all ele-
ments of institutions. Our notion of quality of institutions is centred
upon the concepts of corruption, transparency and the effectiveness of
bureaucracy. These aspects are directly related to the success of certain
practices of lobbying. There are different ways interest groups can in-
fluence the decision to ratify international agreements. These include,
lobbying via political channels, the formation of civil society groups,
the provision of technical assistance, influencing public opinion, giving
economic support, creating personal networks, influencing legislators
and negotiators, or even bribery and other illicit means. Institutions
and interest groups are intricately related when it comes to affecting
international cooperation because any action aimed at international
agreements inevitably passes through institutions. As a consequence,
it makes sense to study institutions along side domestic interest groups.
In summary, the goal of this study is to understand the determinants
influencing the ratification of environmental agreements. In particular,
we focus on the action of domestic interest groups and on their effects
interact with the quality of institutions. In this thesis, environmental
lobbying refers to all the direct and indirect pressure exerted on policy-
makers aimed at promoting participation in environmental agreements.
Unlike in other studies (e.g. Besley & Coate 2001 or Felli & Merlo
2007), lobbying refers to the global influencing activity and does not
distinguish between pressure exerted through political representations
(direct voting, election of representative, etc...) and civil society pres-
sure (NGOs, demonstrations, lobbies, etc...). In addition, This thesis
does not consider the negotiation phase of agreements. That is to say,
we exclusively focus on the decision to ratify treaties that have been
agreed, and do not investigate whether or not a treaty is negotiated on
a given issue between certain countries. For the second type of analysis
the counterfactual is missing: one cannot observe the treaties that were
not negotiated. While — when dealing with ratification decisions — we
observe all the agreements that could but are not ratified. In essence,
a study of ratification answers to the following question: Given that
a treaty has been agreed, what leads countries to cooperate under the
terms of the treaty?
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2.1.3 Why does it matter?
We have just argued that international environmental agreements con-
stitute a fundamental tool to address environmental problems in the
21st century. According to Spilker & Koubi (2016, p.224); “In the
absence of supra-national institutions, voluntary cooperation between
countries in multilateral environmental agreements is probably the only
way to solve some of the most pressing environmental problems”. Des-
pite their relevance, the economic literature on treaty participation is
mainly based on the game-theoretical approach and scarcely any ob-
servational data has been used to confront theoretical predictions with
the patterns in ratification (Finus et al., 2017). We address this need
for empirical evidence in an unprecedented attempt to test some of the
main assertions of the literature on a large sample of countries and
treaties. This type of analysis can lead to a deeper understanding of
environmental agreements. In fact, a first look at the data already
reveals that there is more variability in ratification than what would
be expected by most of theoretical literature. In our treaty sample
(Figure 2.3), there are more than 220 agreements that have more than
20% ratification rate and around 80 agreements that have more than
80% ratification rate. Figure 2.3 and 2.4 show that not only there is a
wide variability in the ratification rate of treaties, but there is also a
large disparity in the number of countries’ ratifications.
What factors explain the difference in ratification between treaties,
and why do certain nations seem to be more propense to participating
in environmental agreements than others? The figures in this chapter
seem to point to some of the factors explaining ratification rates. For
example, the years of exposure affect the total number of treaties that
a country can ratify (figure 2.4). A country that ceases to exist in 1990
or becomes independent in 1990 is exposed to less agreements than
a country that has continuously existed and conducted international
relations. But, figure 2.4 also suggests that other factors are at play.
For example, the bottom five countries tend to be smaller nations and
usually have very specific political and institutional reason for not rati-
fying. South Sudan — beside being the youngest nation in the world —
is currently in the grips of civil war. Kosovo is politically unstable and
several countries do not recognise it internationally. The Holy See is
a very peculiar sovereign nation; being a religious state, it approaches
international agreements differently and often prefers to remain impar-
tial as shown by the fact that they renounced to their voting right at
the UN, opting for the observer status instead. We also notice that
the top ratifiers are all rich European nations. The fact that European
14
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Figure 2.3: Ratification rate of the environmental treaties in the data set
Notes: Every horizontal bar represents a treaty. The treaty ratification rate
is defined as the number of countries that ratified the agreement over the
total number of potential ratifiers. For more information on the data see
section 5.2 and 5.3.
countries can access a larger number of agreements (e.g. EU agree-
ments) only partially explains their higher propensity to ratify. As a
matter of fact, European countries do not just ratify a higher num-
ber of treaties, they also display some of the highest ratification rates
(table 2.1). What pushes some countries to engage more in environ-
mental cooperation? Is there some institutional, economic or cultural
motivation that systematically affect the likelihood of ratifying?
From table table 2.1 we observe that countries with lower ratifica-
tion rates are not necessarily the poorest, in general, political factors
seem to be decisive. San Marino and Andorra are two small countries
located in Europe. Although they are fully sovereign nations, with high
levels of income, they also heavily depend on their neighbours both eco-
nomically and diplomatically. These examples seem to suggest that a
number of institutional and political factors are implicated in particip-
ation choices. This argument connects with figure 1.1, the map in the
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Figure 2.4: Top five and bottom five ratifiers by number of ratifications
Notes: Data on ratification is collected for the period 1950-2017. “Years of
exposure” denotes the number of years the country exists in the data set.
The data set covers the period 1950-2017, therefore the maximum value for
“Years of exposure” is 67. For more information on the data see section 5.2
and 5.3.
introduction chapter depicting how the number of ratifications differ
across the world. Not only are ratification rates widely different among
nations, but they also seem to be clustered geographically rather than
distributed randomly. All of these elements give the impression that
there are country-specific factors explaining ratification rates, or even
that decisions have a spatial context.
As we have seen, international environmental agreements present a
series of interesting patterns that require deeper examination. So far,
we know relatively little about the fundamental determinants of ratific-
ation. This is an interesting area of research that has direct relevance
and concrete applications for policy makers. A better understanding of
the ratification process can help frame more effective agreements and
improve international cooperation on environmental issues. Given the
importance of treaties in solving environmental problems and the ever
more pressing need for international cooperation, it is fundamental that
16
Table 2.1: Top five and bottom five ratifiers by ratification rate
Country
Ratification Potential
rate (%) ratifications
Norway 83.89 118
France 82.10 162
Netherlands 81.54 130
Germany 81.48 135
Sweden 79.84 124
...
...
...
San Marino 11.76 102
Andorra 11.76 102
South Sudan 10.59 85
Holy See 3.75 80
Kosovo 0.00 80
Notes: Only countries existing in 2017 are in-
cluded in this table. For more information on the
identification of potential ratifiers see section 5.2.
agreements are used in the most effective way.
In summary, our study provides much needed empirical evidence
for the existing theoretical literature (Finus et al., 2017). We also test
some of the main conclusions of the recent game-theoretical literature
using the largest data set ever applied to the question of environment
treaty participation. Hence, we address an important gap in the lit-
erature. The scope of this research is to improve the understanding
of the factors underpinning ratification. Why do nations take part
to these agreements? What motivates them? What are the factors
affecting these decisions? A systematic organisation of the existing
theoretical and empirical literature has never been undertaken. Our
work can positively contribute to the field by furthering the knowledge
on the determinants of participation in environmental agreements. In
the next section, we illustrate in more detail the main contributions of
this thesis to the economic literature, and discuss how our findings can
be used by policy makers and negotiators.
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2.2 Contributions
This study brings a series of contributions to the literature on the par-
ticipation in environmental agreements and directly tackles an existing
gap in the extant body of research.
2.2.1 A new data set on ratifications
We confront the question of ratification with a new data set, comprising
of 263 environmental agreements and 198 countries between 1950 and
2017. Our data tracks the ratification decisions over time for almost
20000 treaty-country dyads. It is one of the largest data set applied
in this area; the only comparable in size is the BKKS (2010)1 data
set assembled by Bernauer et al. (2010) which covers 255 agreements
and 180 countries (see table 2.2). The BKKS data set found applic-
ation in most of the papers on environmental treaty ratification such
as Bernauer et al. (2013b), Bo¨hmelt et al. (2015), Spilker & Koubi
(2016) and Mohrenberg et al. (2016). Nonetheless, it has important
limitations that we seek to overcome.
Table 2.2: Ratification data sets
Data set Treaties Countries Years Regional treaties
Our data set 263 198 1950–2017 Yes
BKKS (2010) 255 180 1950–2000 No
Leinaweaver (2012) 55 193 1980–2010 Yes
Schulze & Tosun (2013) 21 25 1979–2010 Yes, all
Schulze (2014) 64 21 1971–2003 No
Cazals & Sauquet (2015) 41 99 1976–1999 No
First of all, they included a number of non-strictly environmental
agreements, such as agreements referring to nuclear energy. Their
sample also contains agreements more loosely related to the environ-
ment, some examples are the Moon Agreement (1979), the Convention
on Conditions for Registration of Ships (1986), the Convention on the
Law of the Sea (1982), and Disarmament Convention on Biological
1For convenience, in this paragraph we call “BKKS” the data set assembled by
Bernauer et al. (2010). Their data has been used in several other works: Bernauer et al.
(2013b), Bernauer et al. (2013a), Bo¨hmelt et al. (2015), Mohrenberg et al. (2016), Spilker
& Koubi (2016) and Hugh-Jones et al. (2018).
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Weapons (1972)2. Non-environmental agreements expand the size of
the data set, but is likely to distort results in studies claiming to focus
solely on environmental treaties. For this reason, our sample of treat-
ies includes exclusively agreements that have a direct connection with
environmental issues and that explicitly mention their environmental
scope either in the title or in the text of the treaty.
The second and most substantial flaw lies in the inclusion of regional
agreements without duly accounting for the different subset of countries
they are open to. BKKS data set, as well as all the previous works in
the area, implicitly assumed that all the countries that failed to ratify
could ratify. This works well for universal treaties, but the assumption
is violated if regional or less-than-global agreements are included in
the studied sample. In BKKS not all of the treaties are universal,
some of them — by their very nature — could only be ratified by a
subset of countries. We provide two examples of agreements that are in
different ways incorrectly included in their data set: i) the convention
on LRTAP (1979) which is only open to members of the Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE countries) according to the Article
15 of the same convention, and ii) the Convention for the Protection of
the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution (1976), which — for obvious
reasons — would never be ratified by distant nations such as Nicaragua
or South Korea. In their paper, Bernauer et al. (2010) admit that some
of the agreements could be de facto open just to a restricted number of
countries. In the appendix of the same paper, Bernauer et al. (2010)
decide to run their model on a reduced sub-sample of treaties keeping
only the agreements that have no obvious regional nature: the total
number of treaties is halved to just 113 environmental agreements. If
not addressed properly, this introduces a bias in the estimates, leading
to underestimated ratification probabilities. The scale of the impact is
hard to assess in previous works but it is potentially substantial.
We addressed this issue by identifying for every year, out of the 198
countries, all the potential ratifiers for each of the 263 treaties in our
data set. The identification procedure is based on the scope and text
of the agreements, a detailed explanation is provided in section 5.2.2.
This feature is fundamental because it allows us to include regional
treaties into our data set. This, in turn, leads to the third limitation
of previous works: since most of treaties are regional, studying only
global ones reveals only a small part of the picture. Our data set al-
lows us to make generalisable predictions because of its size and the
more representative sample of treaties on which it is based. Apart from
Leinaweaver (2012), this is the only study that covers regional treat-
2Cf. the bibliography for the full title of these agreements.
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Figure 2.5: Countries in the data set
ies, despite the fact that most of environmental treaties are regional.
Management of freshwater resources, protection of habitats and eco-
systems, pollution of seas and lakes, etc.. Most environmental issues
involve a limited number of countries, i.e. they are geographically nar-
row. Environmental agreements reflect this aspect, the largest part of
the international environmental cooperation takes place on a regional
scale.
In summary, not only does this thesis greatly expand the sample
size, but it also corrects the potential bias subsisting related to the
definition of the countries in the risk set. In fact, in order to produce
reliable estimates it is necessary to know both the countries that rat-
ified and those that could but failed to do so. The centrality of this
assumption has been gravely overlooked, leading to the misidentifica-
tion of several agreements and a general underestimation of the rati-
fication probability. Defining the potential ratifiers to a treaty allows
to correctly incorporate regional treaties in the analysis and produce
reliable results for a more representative sample of treaties. Our new
data set, allows us to produce an analysis based on a large number of
agreements, including regional ones, which reflect more accurately the
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dynamics of environmental diplomacy.
2.2.2 A refined methodological approach
This study employs a survival model to study the probability of rati-
fying environmental agreements. The advantage of survival models is
that they can measure ratification over an additional dimension, that of
time. As a matter of fact, the decision to ratify an agreement is charac-
terised by two dimensions: i) whether or not a treaty is ratified and ii)
the timing of ratification. Survival models are able to take advantage of
the heterogeneity in the time dimension, while a simple cross-sectional
or panel approach can only pickup differences in the first dimension.
Timing is crucial in the case of treaties that attain very high rates of
ratifications, because in those cases most of the heterogeneity lies in
the timing of ratification rather than its occurrence. Survival analysis
is also capable of dealing with right-censoring and thus is better suited
to the analysis of recent agreements that have ongoing ratifications. By
using only information up to the moment of censoring, survival analysis
does not conceptually preclude future ratification, therefore eliminat-
ing the problem of setting arbitrary cut-off dates that would otherwise
affect the final estimates.
This thesis differentiates itself from previous studies of single agree-
ments (e.g. Neumayer 2002b, Fredriksson et al. 2007 or von Stein 2008)
in that the ratification of a large number of environmental agreements
and countries are pooled together in order to build a general model
of ratification. Unlike studies of single agreements, this approach al-
lows the analyst to produce generalisable results instead of descriptive
models for single treaties. This modelling strategy benefits from the
large sample of regional and global treaties that we purposely collec-
ted, but also introduces a number of challenges. Arguably the biggest
challenge is the treatment of unobserved heterogeneity, an aspect that
has often been neglected in previous works (e.g. Bernauer et al. 2010,
Mohrenberg et al. 2016 or Spilker & Koubi 2016). We propose to use
multilevel modelling with cross-classified random effects to account for
unobserved factors, both at the country and at the treaty level. This
modelling approach accounts for unobserved idiosyncratic factors and
ultimately enables us to draw reliable conclusions on the effect of dif-
ferent determinants on ratification.
Furthermore, the model is estimated with Monte Carlo Markow
Chains (MCMC), a Bayesian estimator. This is the first time a Bayesian
estimation technique is applied in this field. This method is chosen be-
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cause it can produce precise estimates despite the complexity of the
model. Standard maximum likelihood algorithms do not work with
cross-classified multilevel survival models because of the structure of
the random effects. Alternative methods of estimation such as Lapla-
cian approximation or quasi-likelihood approaches (e.g. MQL, PQL)
with constraints on the parameters do exist, but in most of the cases
convergence is hard to reach because of the very large number of obser-
vations, the intrinsic low variability in survival data and the numerical
integrations entailed by the structure of the random effects. Another
advantage of MCMC is that it estimates the entire distribution instead
of just point estimates. And, if desired, could incorporate a priori
knowledge on the value of the parameters through the use of inform-
ative priors. With regard to the priors, we exclusively employ diffuse
definitions and run a high number of iterations to exclude any influ-
ence on the posterior distribution. Being a simulation technique, the
principal shortcoming of MCMC estimation is the very long estimation
time.
As mentioned in previous section, this study also corrects for a
misidentification bias existing in previous empirical studies. We en-
sured the regression is based solely on the potential ratifiers to the
agreements by identifying for every treaty the nations that are eligible
for ratification. This fundamental distinction not only corrects the bias
in the survival estimates but also allows us to explore the differences
in ratification between global and regional agreements. Compared to
previous studies, the incorporation of a wide spectrum of regional and
global environmental agreements makes our results more representative
of the population of treaties.
Lastly, in the second part of the study, the results on international
ratification are studied more in depth during their implementation
phase. This is the first time a ratification study is coupled with the
analysis of domestic environmental policies in order to draw conclu-
sions on the implementation mechanics of environmental agreements
and disentangle the effect of domestic pressure groups. At the national
level, different environmental policies and indicators are studied with
a methodological approach that accounts for idiosyncratic factors of
the country. This innovative framework of analysis allows more robust
results both on the participation in international agreements and the
success of environmental domestic policies.
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2.2.3 The gap in the literature
From the perspective of economics, an environmental agreement is an
international public good that deals with transboundary environmental
externalities (Beron et al., 2003). The prevailing theoretical framework
is the following. Nations are seen as unitary agents that maximise
the domestic social welfare. Environmental issues affecting a group
of countries could be solved by negotiation and participation in inter-
national environmental agreements. However, countries also have an
incentive to free-ride on environmental agreements to obtain environ-
mental benefits without the costs associated with the treaty (Pearson,
2011). This dynamic has been treated by several economic models,
mostly using game-theoretical approaches. These models predict op-
timal treaty design and participation levels. The conclusions are gen-
erally pessimistic on the capacity to solve the environmental problem
beyond the non-cooperation level (Wangler et al., 2013). This pre-
diction partly originates from the core assumptions of the models, in
particular how free-riding incentives are defined and whether or not
compensating mechanisms are included. In the traditional setting, the
model leads to a trade-off between participation and the strictness of
the agreement, which ultimately implies that abatement above the non-
cooperative solution is very unlikely.
This framework has two major weak points. The first is that it
assumes that ratification decisions are taken by a unitary and welfare
maximising policy maker; in reality, domestic actors and interests play
a major role in the decisions of the country (Marchiori et al., 2017).
In this study, we explain how public choice theories integrate with
the classic framework of economic analysis and empirically test some
of the main predictions. The second point is that it generalises the
incentive structure of treaties and over-simplifies the dynamics of rat-
ification. The empirical literature emphasises the importance of other
factors beyond those traditionally incorporated into economic models.
For example, the presence of “peer pressure” effects between countries,
as well as the impact of institutional and political factors are widely
accepted in the empirical literature. However, these are rarely acknow-
ledged in economic models of treaty participation. Hence, this study
bridges the two bodies of literature and offers a broader framework to
evaluate more realistically international environmental agreements.
This thesis addresses an existing gap in the literature and contrib-
utes in different ways to the research in the field. To start with, we test
a number of theoretical predictions regarding participation in environ-
mental agreements and the role of country and treaty characteristics.
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In particular, we focus on the impact that domestic pressure groups
and the quality of institutions have on the final decision and timing
of ratifications. It is the first time these effect are studied on a large
sample of treaties. The only comparable work by Fredriksson et al.
(2007) focuses on a single treaty — the Kyoto Protocol (1997) — thus,
it is not able to produce generalisable results.
As a matter of fact, some empirical studies on ratification have
already been undertaken in the area of international politics and polit-
ical science (e.g. Roberts et al. 2004, Schneider & Urpelainen 2013).
They often focus on few specific agreements and their methodological
approach does not allow to produce generalisable results on the mech-
anisms of ratification. There is some initial applied research in econom-
ics (e.g. Beron et al. 2003), however many important questions still
remain unanswered. The analysis in this thesis noticeably expands the
scope of previous studies and improves upon the methodological ap-
proach that has been used so far. Our empirical analysis introduces
important new elements. For example, we seek to correct the treatment
of potential ratifiers and of unobserved heterogeneity, two particularly
delicate points. It is also the first time a wide study of regional en-
vironmental agreements is conducted. Furthermore, we also shed light
on how the lobbying process operates both at the international and
domestic level. We link our findings to the results in other studies and
investigate how the relationship works during the implementation stage
of treaties.
Furthermore, we also evaluate the incongruities between theoretical
predictions and evidence of empirical works. To this end, we organise
and review all the existing empirical literature on the subject. A sys-
tematic and comprehensive review of ratification studies was lacking.
We believe this can help improve the understanding of the dynamics
underpinning participation in environmental agreements and ease the
communication between the game-theoretical and empirical fields of
enquiry.
In summary, this work combines the existing evidences and theor-
ies with a new data set, a broader framework of analysis and a refined
methodological approach. This research fits in the area of political
economy, public choice and institutional economics. It is an attempt
to bridge with the existing literature in international politics and ad-
dress a gap in the economic literature. This research addresses aspects
mostly — and surprisingly — overlooked, that considerably enrich the
debate surrounding environmental sustainability and the political tools
to achieve it.
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2.2.4 Applications of the results
The model of ratification we build is intentionally general. It is used
not only to derive conclusions on the role of institutions and pressure
groups, but also to understand the forces that push and hinder the
ratification of environmental treaties. However, the model can also be
employed to generate predictions for specific countries or specific treat-
ies. In the second part of our analysis we use our model to simulate
ratification probabilities in different scenarios. We predict the probab-
ilities for several countries of joining a hypothetical regional protocol
and a global framework agreement. We also apply it to simulate out-
of-sample ratification probabilities for a real agreement, the Minamata
Convention on Mercury. These examples illustrate some concrete ap-
plications of the study.
The topic treated in this thesis has practical implications for treaty-
makers and negotiators. Our findings can inform a more effective way
of framing treaties in order to help building successful participation.
Furthermore, the model developed here can be used to predict the
probability of ratification and, if necessary, its structure could be ex-
panded to accommodate more complex interactions. This thesis also
sheds lights on the mechanisms that link domestic interest groups with
environmental policies and the international actions of governments.
The work is relevant to any entity that bears economic or private in-
terest on environmental agreements. For governments, the results could
be used to identify different areas of intervention at a national level and
select the best strategy for the success of international environmental
cooperation.
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Chapter 3
Review of the empirical
literature
This study is not the first to tackle the question of ratification, there
are some precedents. Interest first arose in the domain of political
science and slowly permeated into economics. Economics grew increas-
ingly interested in political phenomena, partly because of the growing
importance and recognition of institutional economics. Despite all this,
international environmental agreements and their ratification only re-
ceived marginal attention if compared to other political processes, and
the field remains a young, yet dynamic, area of research. The first
examples of empirical studies on ratification date from the 1990s, but
significant development came in more recent times. In the course of the
last 10 years a great progress has been made in terms of methodology
and generalisability of results. However, the question of ratification
remains mostly unexplored and with large opportunities for improve-
ment.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the state of the art and
to take stock of the main results of the existing body of literature, with
an eye to the questions that remain on the table. This chapter exclus-
ively deals with the empirical literature; the theoretical background is
treated separately, in the next chapter. This literature review repres-
ents the first comprehensive survey of the empirical literature on the
ratification of environmental agreements. In the following sections, we
review the works along the lines of their results, their methodological
approach, and the questions they seek to answer. The chapter covers
27
a broad number of articles and papers, which — to the best of our
knowledge — represent the totality of the works published on the topic
of environmental agreement ratification.
3.1 What did we learn about ratification?
The first thing that becomes apparent is that ratification is a com-
plex event. There are many potential reasons for a country to ratify
a specific treaty: economic, political, cultural, strategic, and of course
environmental. Under the banner of ratification we group the act of
adhesion to treaties that are structured differently, created by diverse
group of countries under different circumstances and deal with dis-
parate environmental problems on a very dissimilar geographic scale.
In essence, ratifications are quite diverse, they all go under the same
name, but the individual acts of ratification are heterogeneous and of-
ten motivated by different forces. However, despite all this diversity,
there are some common threads that are recurrently linked to ratific-
ation. The empirical research has sought to dissect and understand
these common threads, with interests ranging from the role of electoral
rules and political systems to the incentives provided by trade open-
ness and economic partnership. In this section, we will survey the main
results of this strand of literature.
3.1.1 Political system
The ratification of environmental treaties is the outcome of a political
decision. Therefore, a common thesis is that the political character-
istics of a country have a bearing on their ratification behaviour. The
literature in political science has been particularly keen on emphasising
the role played by political factors. Then in more recent years, under
the impulse of constitutional economics, a number of studies explored
the link between political features and ratification behaviour. The in-
fluential works of Persson & Tabellini (2003) and Persson et al. (2007)
highlight the link between constitutional features such as electoral rules
(majoritarian vs proportional) or political systems (parliamentary or
presidential) and their impact on economic development and other eco-
nomic variables. These same features are tested with reference to rat-
ification.
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The role of democracy
One of the initial areas of interest is the link between the system of gov-
ernment and environmental diplomacy. Bernauer et al. (2010) states
that democratic nations are expected to be more inclined to ratify be-
cause their leaders are accountable to the public. Democratic regimes
offer higher access to information, and complete civil liberties, includ-
ing freedom of speech, press and association. This pushes for higher
transparency and accountability of the politicians in office. Neumayer
(2002a) reiterates the argument, in his opinion, citizens of democratic
states have better access to information on environmental problems and
can exert more effectively political pressure on the government thanks
to well functioning civil liberties. Democratic states allow to channel
the ideas and preferences of citizens more effectively and increase the
likelihood of joining international treaties (Recchia, 2002).
Congleton (1992) is the first to build a theoretical model for the
selection of environmental policies in authoritarian and democratic
states. The decisions in democracies depend on the median voter while
in authoritarian regimes they are assumed to depend on the vote of the
dictator or the median voter of a ruling class. All other agents or pres-
sure groups are ignored. The model postulates that the authoritarian
states have a higher price for the abatement than democracies. As a
consequence, it predicts that authoritarian states are less likely to im-
plement environmental policy and to sign environmental agreements.
The difference in abatement price offshoots from the assumption that
the median voter has a lower income share of the country and a longer
planning horizon than the authoritarian regime because the turnover of
dictators or the ruling class is faster according to Congleton (1992). In
essence, the model states that in authoritarian regimes the ruling class
is able to capture a higher share (compared to the median voter) of the
economic benefits of having less stringent environmental regulations.
Hence, they will be less likely to sign environmental agreements.
The empirical evidence seems to corroborate the link between demo-
craty and participation in environmental agreements. Congleton (1992)
formally tests his hypothesis on two treaties on Ozone Depleting Sub-
stances (ODS), he finds that democracies are more likely to sign than
autocratic nations. Neumayer (2002a) explores the link between demo-
cracy and environmental commitment, measured by different indicat-
ors, one of which is ratification. Democracies tend to engage in envir-
onmental agreements consistently more than non-democracies. With
a similar scope, Fredriksson & Gaston (2000) focus on the speed of
ratification of the UNFCCC. They find that civil liberties and CO2
emissions are strong determinants of ratification delay. There is a gen-
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eral consensus that democracy — in particular when measured by the
degree of civil liberties and political rights — is an important factor
behind ratification. In all the studies that followed, with no exception,
the researchers have always controlled for the democratic characteristic
of states (e.g. von Stein 2008, Perrin & Bernauer 2010, Seelarbokus
2014, Mohrenberg et al. 2016). The most common measures for the
democratic extent of the government form are the two indices by Free-
dom House (2017) and Marshall et al. (2016).
Electoral dynamics and veto players
According to Nordhaus (1975), attention to environment is seen pos-
itively by electors, hence political leaders should show more environ-
mental commitment before election. The argument is developed further
by Cazals & Sauquet (2015). The authors posit that environmental
treaties are unpopular in developed nations because they are seen as
being onerous, hence they should be ratified shortly after elections.
In contrast, developing nations are more prone to ratification during
pre-electoral periods because they often have access to less stringent ob-
ligation or are granted financial assistance. In order to analyse the con-
nection between electoral cycles and the timing of ratification, Cazals
& Sauquet (2015) use a Cox PH model with time measured daily, to
distinguish the pre- and post-electoral period. The sample covers the
ratification of 41 global environmental agreements by 99 nations from
1976 to 1999. Their findings show that developing countries ratify just
before elections to boost electoral results, while developed countries
just after elections because treaties are seen as costly commitments.
In addition to influencing the timing of ratification, Schulze (2014)
advances the hypothesis that the political alignment of the government
influences the outcome of ratification. Schulze (2014) puts forward a
series of arguments to explain the effect that party alignment has on
ratification decisions. In order to enhance electoral success, political
parties promote policies that correspond to the preference of the their
electors. From this, Schulze (2014) concludes that government which
are predominantly to the “left” should be more propense to ratify envir-
onmental agreements because environmental problems are more closely
associated to the “left”. However, the strength of this relation is ques-
tionable. There is a substantial lack of evidence to support the claim
that environmentalism has any clear link to the “left/right” divide, and
Schulze (2014) does not provide any justification for this assumption.
Overall his study finds no significant effect of “left/right” divide on
treaty ratification.
The process leading to the act of ratification often goes through
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several institutional bodies within the state. A veto player is an en-
tity that has the power to block the act of ratification. It can be an
individual, such as the head of state, or a group of individuals, such
as the upper house of parliament. Given the fundamental role in the
approval of ratification, the political alignment of veto players could
affect ratification. Fredriksson & Ujhelyi (2006) find that the higher
the number of veto players, the less likely is a country to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol. Contrasting results are obtained by Cortez & Gut-
mann (2017), on a mixed sample of treaties — which includes several
non-environmental treaties — in their study the number of veto players
is not associated to a significant effect on ratification. Schulze (2014)
formulates a second set of implications on the role of veto players; he
postulates that what matters is the least “environmentalist” of the veto
players and the orientation of the minister of the environment. With a
sample covering 21 OECD countries and 64 treaties, he finds that in-
deed the “left/right” alignment of veto players has a significant effect
on the chances of ratifying environmental agreements.
The constitutional side of ratification
The signature of the agreements is done by the executive, normally
all or most of the negotiating countries end-up signing if the bargain-
ing phase is successful. Most of the environmental agreements also
require ratification, that is to say approval by the legislative branch.
In most of the cases this requires going through the parliament but
some countries consent ratification by the head of government (e.g. Is-
rael and Bangladesh). Different countries have different procedures for
the ratification of treaties. A number of studies enquire on whether
the constitutional provisions on ratification can affect the likelihood of
joining a treaty. This strand of research is influenced by the work in
constitutional economics, which find that the characteristics of a polit-
ical systems, notably electoral rules and government type, can have an
influence on the provision of public goods (Persson & Tabellini, 2003).
Bo¨hmelt et al. (2015) conceives treaty ratification as a process of
public good provision. Their paper focuses on the effect of Environ-
mental NGOs (ENGOs) lobbying on the ratification of environmental
treaties. The effect is studied in the context of different electoral rules
and government systems. In total the sample covers 75 democracies
and 250 treaties from 1973 to 2002. Persson & Tabellini (2003) argue
that there is a connection between the electoral rule and the number
of political parties. Majoritarian systems, tend to have less parties
than proportional systems. As a result, proportional systems are more
prone to coalition governments (Persson et al., 2007). Bo¨hmelt et al.
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(2015) concludes that presidential systems with majoritarian electoral
rule provide more public goods because the government represents a
larger share of the population since they are characterised by a lower
number of parties. The final conclusion is that presidential systems
with majority rules increase likelihood of ratification. Bo¨hmelt et al.
(2015) also find that the lobbying of ENGOs is more effective in par-
liamentary systems with proportional rule.
Spilker & Koubi (2016) are interested to see whether parliamentary
voting rules affect the ratification decisions of the country. Or, more
precisely, if constitutional requirements for a supermajority instead of
simple majority affect ratification probability. The study is conducted
on a large sample of 220 treaties and 162 countries originally assembled
by Bernauer et al. (2010). The results support the idea that “harder”
agreements deter participation and that nations with constitutions re-
quiring a supermajority vote by the parliament are less likely to ratify
because they make the internal approval process significantly harder.
A very recent paper on the subject is authored by Cortez & Gutmann
(2017). They study the effect of different constitutional features on
the number of ratifications by 99 democracies. Their main findings are
that majoritarian systems and nations with independent judiciary are
less likely to ratify international agreements. However, the robustness
of their results is debatable. Cortez & Gutmann (2017) do not deal ex-
clusively with environmental agreements, the article covers also other
types of treaties but the empirical strategy lumps all the ratifications
together and ignores any heterogeneity among treaties.
3.1.2 Economic factors
According to the prevailing framework, the characteristics of the coun-
try shape their set of incentives. The main factors affecting ratification
are the income level and the trade structure. In this section we explore
the link with economic fundamentals as well as the free-ride incentives
predicted by economic theory.
Economic development
Income is a prominent factor influencing the participation in environ-
mental agreements. Environmental agreements come with an economic
cost that less developed nations are less eager to accept. The argument
invoked to explain this thesis is the well known Environmental Kuznet
Curve (EKC). The EKC identifies a bell-shaped relationship between
the degradation of the environment and the level of per capita income.
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The growth in income is first associated with a degradation of the
environment which ultimately peaks and improves at higher levels of
development. Empirical findings show that the bell-shaped relationship
is not valid for all forms of environmental degradation and may vary
considerably between countries and pollutants (Pearson, 2011). The
theory behind the EKC postulates that at higher levels of income cor-
respond a stronger preference for environmental improvements. Given
that environmental agreements are a necessary — yet not a sufficient
— condition for the resolution of transboundary environmental issues,
economic development is associated with an increase in the likelihood
of ratification (Bernauer et al., 2010).
The relevance of income differences is recognised by negotiators of
environmental treaties. In order to reduce the effect of income, devel-
oping nations often push for systems that mitigate the costs borne by
less developed countries, advancing that developing countries face other
urgent priorities as — among other things — eradication of poverty
and sustainable economic development. This is often recognised as as
the “principle of common but differentiated responsibilities”. Mechan-
isms such as economic and technical transfers, flexible deadlines or less
stringent objectives are examples of clauses that aim at mitigating the
impact of income on the participation in treaties.
Roberts (1996) stresses that developing nations, lacking infrastruc-
tures and with poor institutions, are less likely to ratify environmental
agreements. The author argues that the development of a country
mainly depends on its colonial past. Extraction colonies tend to turn
into peripheral countries even after their independence because the
political institutions and economic structure of the country were based
on the extraction of raw materials to the benefit of the metropolitan
power. History creates a persistent disadvantage. This thesis is fur-
ther explored in Roberts et al. (2004) where the authors posit that
extractive colonialism leads to a narrow base of exports that make
countries more dependent on natural resources and less likely to rat-
ify environmental agreements. By using diversification of exports as
a measure for extraction colonialism, they predict that a narrow base
of export goods is negatively related to participation in environmental
agreements. Both Roberts (1996) and Roberts et al. (2004) are cross-
sectional studies and cannot account for treaty characteristics nor con-
trol for unobserved country factors.The article establishes an original
connection between the resource curse and participation in environ-
mental agreements, however we believe that the final results might be
affected by the omissions of important variables, such as GDP per cap-
ita, which is likely to influence the ratification decision and potentially
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correlates to their measure for extraction colonialism. The authors
should have at least tried different indicators for the variables in order
to assess the stability of the estimates. Indeed, the importance of in-
come has been stressed in multiple occasions. Several studies confirm
that richer nations tend to participate to a larger number of agreements
(e.g. Seelarbokus 2014, Davies & Naughton 2014, Egger et al. 2011).
Pollution havens, trade and the incentive to free ride
When a group of countries — such as the Annex I countries of the
Kyoto Protocol — commit to a reduction in carbon emissions, the
uncommitted countries have an incentive to increase their emissions.
This phenomenon is known as carbon leakage (Pearson, 2011). Carbon
leakage occurs when stringent environmental regulations create a com-
parative advantage to the benefit of nations with more forgiving and
lenient standards, to the extent that it is preferable for some compan-
ies to relocate in pollution havens or to substitute local production of
carbon-intensive goods with import (Copeland & Taylor, 2004). An-
other possible explanation is that if a nation voluntarily engages into
emission abatement, it will reduce the marginal damage everywhere
else and, as such, will weaken the incentives of other nations to carry
out similar policies (Felder & Rutherford, 1993). Basically, this ar-
gument posits that carbon leakage is a consequence of free riding on
carbon commitments. Last, but not least, if a sufficiently large coun-
try decides to reduce its emissions, the demand and the international
price of fossil fuels will decrease. This creates an incentive to use more
carbon-intensive sources of energy in other countries (Pearson, 2011).
Carbon leakage is a special case of the pollution haven hypothesis,
according to which, pollution activity tends to concentrate in develop-
ing countries with more permissive environmental rules. The pollution
haven effect is the fact that, at the margin, weaker rules on pollution,
offer comparative advantage capable of inducing investment in pollu-
tion havens and changes in trade flows or trade composition (Copeland
& Taylor, 2004).
There is an extensive economic literature on the relationship between
environmental regulation and trade. The focus has been on the follow-
ing two questions: does trade lead to lower environmental standards?
And, does international competition create an incentive for lower envir-
onmental standards? As stated above, the pollution haven hypothesis
advances a strong theoretical case for the link between environmental
regulation and trade competitiveness. Nevertheless, the empirical find-
ings are mixed. Although the majority of studies find no significant
link between environmental regulation and trade, no consensus has
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been reached on whether asymmetric environmental regulation influ-
ences in a positive or negative way competitiveness of firms or whether
trade has a systematic negative impact on the environment.
Grossman & Krueger (1995) investigate the relationship of several
economic and environmental indicators to test the theory of the Envir-
onmental Kuznet Curve. In this context, Grossman & Krueger (1995)
find no evidence that trade openness has a positive or negative effect
on the environment. Antweiler et al. (2001) find that trade tended to
reduce SO2 concentrations in a sample covering 108 cities in 43 coun-
tries (mostly developed nations). This reduction is chiefly explained
by the benefits derived from economic development, which stimulate
technological innovation and efficiency in production. Similar results
are found in several empirical studies, such as McAusland & Milli-
met (2013) for US-Canada trade and Dietzenbacher & Mukhopadhyay
(2007) for India. Even on the pollution haven hypothesis the results
are essentially mixed (Levinson 1996, Keller & Levinson 2002, Eder-
ington & Minier 2003, Dean et al. 2009, Mulatu et al. 2010). A series
of empirical complexities make it hard to assess unambiguously the im-
pact of environmental regulation of trade flows. According to Millimet
& Roy (2016), the empirical literature on pollution haven is inconclus-
ive because of unobserved heterogeneity. Millimet & List (2004) posit
that pollution haven effect has a heterogeneous effect within a country.
Hence, it is hard to capture statistically. With intranational data on
US’ states they find that environmental regulation has a significative
effect on the competitiveness of some states while others are mostly
unaffected.
While the literature on environmental regulation is abundant, only
a small subset of this body of literature has focused on the relationship
between trade and multilateral environmental agreements. Kim (2016)
builds a gravity model with a test for structural break to assess whether
the Kyoto protocol induced a change in trade flows. With data on
trade between G20 countries, Kim (2016) finds that a structural break
has probably occurred in 2003. However, their model only controls
for income level, distance and exchange rate. Hence, it is not clear if
the breakpoint is linked to the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
(1997). Aichele & Felbermayr (2013) estimates the impact of com-
mitment to the Kyoto Protocol (1997) on bilateral trade flows. They
use matching variables with difference-in-difference estimation and find
that the protocol induces a reduction of around 10% in the exports of
Annex I countries, with energy-intensive industrial sectors being the
most affected. The result is found by comparing average exports in
the period 1999–2003 with the corresponding level in the 2004–2007
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period. Difference-in-difference allows to control for time-invariant un-
observed heterogeneity but not for varying unobserved factors. We
suspect that the results could be inflated by a set of time-varying un-
observed factors. First of all, the end of the second period corresponds
to the an initial slow-down in world trade. Secondly, the study period
also coincides with a major shift of industrial production towards de-
veloping countries and notably the surge of China in the world supply
chain (after WTO accession in 2001). As an illustration, total exports
of India grew from 60 billions USD in 2001 to 250 billions in 2007, and
China exports exploded from 250 billions USD to 1250 billions USD
over the same period1. In a subsequent paper, the same authors find
that the Kyoto Protocol has an effect on trade composition. Aichele &
Felbermayr (2015) employ a gravity model to calculate the embodied
carbon in trade flows. They find that the embodied carbon in im-
port of annex I countries increased by 8% and emission intensity by
3%. The changes in trade volume and trade composition suggest that
environmental treaties may be able to influence trade flows. Neverthe-
less, results for international environmental agreements are mixed too.
For instance, De Santis (2012) studies the link between three environ-
mental agreements and trade with a gravity model. She finds that more
stringent environmental policies tend to reduce exports. However, par-
ticipation in environmental has the opposite effect: it increases exports.
De Santis (2012) observes that bilateral trade among EU-15 countries
increases in a significant way after the adoption of the Montreal Pro-
tocol (1987), UNFCCC (1992) and Kyoto Protocol (1997).
It has been suggested that the pollution haven effect partly contrib-
utes to the non-linear relationship between income and environmental
quality of the EKC (Cole, 2004). This relationship is relevant also
in another way. The choice of adhering to an environmental treaty
cannot be considered separately from its economic implications. If
the pollution haven effect holds, it could be advanced that a country
that does not ratify an environmental agreement for strategic reasons
may accrue an economic advantage in trade and foreign demand for
pollution-intensive goods. The strength of this motivation can vary
as a reflection of the environmental Kuznets curve. While this in-
centive may be appealing to poorer nations that value income growth
more than environmental quality, it is not as attractive for rich coun-
tries with stronger preference for environmental quality. According to
Bernauer et al. (2010), countries more focused on trade are expected
to be less likely to ratify environmental agreements because they are
more affected by a loss in comparative advantage. On the opposite,
1Data from World Bank (2017a).
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Neumayer (2002a) argues that more intense trade leads to higher in-
ternational integration and higher chances of participating to treaties.
A similar argument is advanced by Egger et al. (2011) who posit that
participation in environmental agreements increases with more liberal
trade and investment policies. Sauquet (2014) states that the free-ride
incentive in the Kyoto Protocol (1997) is mitigated by other types of
relationships between countries such as trade partnership and proxim-
ity. There is a limited evidence on this. Beron et al. (2003) finds weak
free-riding incentives for the Montreal Protocol (1987). On the con-
trary, Murdoch et al. (2003) observes that the abatement cost plays
an important part in explaining the adhesion to the Helsinki Protocol
(1985). The sample of Neumayer (2002a) covers 6 treaties and 175
countries and his results show that the level of imports and exports is
important for the agreements that have trade restrictions, namely the
Rotterdam Convention (1998), Montreal Protocol (1987) and CITES
(1973). For the other treaties in the sample the results are not as
significant. Furthermore, exporters of fossil fuels are less likely to rat-
ify the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and GMOs exporters less prone to join
the Cartagena Proctocol (2000). On a similar line, Wagner (2016) finds
that trade relationships imply an acceleration of ratification time of the
Montreal Protocol by 11%. However, the effect is likely to be stronger
for the Montreal Protocol than for other treaties because it contains an
explicit trade ban on CFCs commerce with non-ratifiers. The sample
in these studies covers only a limited number of environmental agree-
ments, but it seems to corroborate the interest-based explanation of
Bernauer et al. (2010) and Murdoch et al. (2003).
Overall, there is no consensus on the relationship between trade
and environmental agreements. According to the World Trade Or-
ganisation, there are currently around 20 international environmental
agreements whose provision may have an impact on trade2. This may
suggest that only a subset of treaties bears direct implications for trade
flows.
3.1.3 Treaty design
One of the main reasons for the success or failure of a treaty is of course
the content of the treaty itself. Stricter agreements impose higher costs
on the parties and, all else equal, should attract fewer ratifications. The
research on this subject is not well developed, the main limitation is
the availability of data. This type of studies requires data that clas-
2https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_mea_e.htm
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sifies environmental treaties on their characteristics. At the moment,
the main sources of information on the ratification of environmental
agreements are either the text of the treaties or legal databases such
as Mitchell (2017) and CIESIN (2013). Neither of these sources has
a detailed classification of the characteristics of the agreements. As a
result, the studies tend to be either on few agreements or on a lim-
ited number of features. In the second case there is often a problem
of objectivity and consistency in the classification of agreements: some
parameters can be classified in a clear-cut manner but many notions are
more nuanced. Fundamentally, the research effort has focused on the
depth vs participation trade-off, the main results will be summarised in
the rest of this section.
There is evidence of a trade-off between strictness and participation
in climate change agreements (von Stein, 2008). An early contribution
is made by von Stein (2008), who analyses how the design of treaties
affect participation levels. The author defines the strictness of envir-
onmental agreements on the basis of a number of characteristics. The
main ones are whether or not the treaty entails obligations for the
parties, the institution of decision bodies, flexibility mechanisms and
the precision of environmental targets. They conclude that flexibil-
ity mechanisms are effective means to facilitate ratification and can
be used to mitigate the dissuasive effect of tighter obligations. The
problem of this study is that it is based solely on the UNFCCC (1992)
and the Kyoto Protocol (1997), two large treaties on climate change,
thus it is hard to generalise the results to environmental agreements
as a group. Leinaweaver (2012) expands the sample of the analysis
to a total of 55 regional and global environmental agreements. Ac-
cording to Leinaweaver (2012), the cost of committing to a treaty is
mainly captured by three aspects: the presence of binding obligations,
the acceptance of reservations and the existence of monitoring provi-
sions. These are very similar to the factors discussed by Bernauer et al.
(2010), and both derive from the concept of legalisation described by
Abbott et al. (2000). The suggestion of Leinaweaver (2012) is that pre-
cise targets and agreements with participation thresholds for the entry
into force tend to attract more ratifications.
With 200 environmental agreements, Bernauer et al. (2013a) is the
largest cross-sectional study on this topic. They argue that “depth” is
a complex concept that is reflected in several design features of an en-
vironmental treaty. The existence of formal obligations for the parties,
monitoring, enforcement mechanisms, dispute settlement mechanisms,
assistance mechanisms, and organisational apparatus are all factors
that define the “depth” of an agreement according to the authors.
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Their findings indicate that tighter obligations do reduce participa-
tion to agreements, but, contrary to expectations, stricter monitoring
and enforcement do not reduce the likelihood of ratification. Finally,
Spilker & Koubi (2016) consider different treaty designs and control
for internal voting requirements for the approval of ratification. Their
data is derived from Bernauer et al. (2010) and unlike Bernauer et al.
(2013a) they use a survival approach. A treaty is considered “hard” if
any two of the following dummies from Bernauer et al. (2013b) equals
1: i) the treaty states a precise target or standard, ii) includes monitor-
ing and enforcement provisions, iii) includes dispute settlement provi-
sions. Spilker & Koubi (2016) results strengthen the idea that stricter
agreements deter participation. They also find that treaties that grant
financial or technical assistance to developing countries have a higher
chance of being ratified. This result echoes Mohrenberg et al. (2016),
who observe that the institution or participation of a fund in the treaty
reduces commitment costs and increases the likelihood of ratification.
3.1.4 International interactions
Foreign interactions are probably the most studied element in the rat-
ification literature. Ratification is seen as a strategic move which does
not only depend on the characteristic of the country and treaty, but
also on the behaviour of foreign nations. Research focused on under-
standing the influence of global integration between countries at the
economic and diplomatic level. The models also allow to break down
the interdependence between different countries in order to see how
the behaviour of other nations influence the outcome of ratification. A
series of conclusions are derived on the linkage of nations.
Global integration
Political science literature brings the attention on the concept of in-
tegration between nations. This theory, called world-society (Frank,
1999) or constructivist theory (Yamagata et al., 2013), advocates that
the more a country is linked to the international community through
trade and diplomatic activity, the more likely it is to join environ-
mental agreements. Recchia (2002) and Frank (1999) find that linkage
to the world-society has a positive effect on ratification. The linkage
is often proxied by the number of memberships to international or-
ganisations, international NGOs and international intergovernmental
associations. Bernauer et al. (2010) explain that memberships to inter-
national organisations indicate openness to international cooperation,
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moreover, international organisations should increase information and
reduce costs for the formation of multilateral agreements. According to
Frank (1999) this is the main determinant of ratification, with an effect
stronger than economic development, democratic government, natural
degradation or scientific capacity. A similar conclusion is reached by
Egger et al. (2013) who find that the size of the economy and previous
treaty participation are the best predictors for the number of ratific-
ations. Bernauer et al. (2010) compare domestic and international
factors for ratification. International factors such as involvement in
international organisations and ratification by foreign countries have
a stronger impact on national ratification than individual domestic
factors. Their study is conducted on a sample of 225 environmental
agreements and 180 countries, which makes it the largest of all the
existing studies in the literature.
Yamagata et al. (2017) illustrate a more complex relationship. The
authors posit that before the fall of the Soviet Union countries would
ratify following United States and USSR’s ratification. As the inter-
national paradigm changed, the central factor for ratification became
the integration in international relations (or proximity to world-society)
and only weaker countries would follow the ratification of other nations.
After 1991, weaker countries emulate the United States, or some other
powerful neighbouring nation, while stronger countries ratify more in-
dependently. To sum up the interaction between ratifications of differ-
ent countries changed with the shift in the geopolitical system.
The world-society theory predicts that the more a country is open
to trade and the bigger its volume of exports, the more likely it is to
ratify environmental agreements. However, the results of Neumayer
(2002a) stress the economic side of integration and show that trading
nations join environmental agreements because of the economic cost
associated to trade restrictions rather than the “world-society effect”.
In addition to that, fossil fuel exporters tend to free-ride agreements on
the abatement of fossil emissions (von Stein 2008, (Neumayer, 2002a)).
All in all, it is possible that the effect of the memberships to inter-
national organisations is explained by other factors. For example, it
has been suggested that when a country linked to the international
community does not ratify a treaty, it suffers a loss in reputation and
expects other nations to refuse cooperation in other areas (Bernauer
et al., 2010).
Foreign influence
The ratification of a foreign country should create a free-riding incent-
ive because it allows other nations to enjoy the environmental benefits
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without bearing the costs of ratification. Nevertheless, empirical evid-
ence shows that often the ratification of a country, especially of power-
ful nations, has a positive impact on the ratification of other nations.
This domino effect is partly explained by the existence of economic and
political ties between countries (Sauquet, 2014); many authors have ar-
gued that these ties create interdependence.
The authors build a theoretical model of pollution tax competi-
tion with transboundary pollution spillovers. The model yields the
following two predictions: i) when spillovers are between neighbours,
countries have an incentive to lower environmental taxes to partially
offset the environmental damage by attracting FDI. ii) At the same
time, when spillover increase, countries also a stronger incentive to co-
operate because mutual restraints (through environmental agreements)
could yield larger gains in welfare. In the second part of their paper,
the authors test whether participation in environmental agreements is
responsive to the number of environmental treaties ratified by neigh-
bouring nations. They provide evidence that neighbouring countries
tend to cooperate more on environmental issues. Moreover, countries
respond differently to OECD and non-OECD countries: the number of
ratifications of OECD is found to be a significant determinant of the
domestic number of ratifications, while for non-OECD countries it is
not — except in regional agreement.
A nation is more likely to ratify if other countries already ratified
the treaty (Bernauer et al., 2010). Bernauer et al. (2010) and Perrin &
Bernauer (2010) posit that this is particularly true in the case of “peer
nations”, that are in the same geographical area or income bracket.
These findings show that ratification by a country increases the like-
lihood of ratification by other countries, this is an encouraging effect
which shows that the free-riding logic does not always apply. Sauquet
(2014) reports that the likelihood of ratification for the Kyoto Protocol
(1997) is affected by the behaviour of trade partners and partners in
green investment projects, while neighbouring countries do not have a
significant influence. His results are in contrast with Beron et al. (2003)
who find that proximity and the volume of imports did not influence
the way the Montreal Protocol (1987) is ratified. Probably, the free-
ride incentives were weak for this particular treaty because of the trade
restriction that it imposes to countries that do not ratify; hence the
interdependence factor did not play a significant role in the ratification
of the protocol.
Schneider & Urpelainen (2013) adopt a different approach to study
the influence of foreign nations on ratification. The interest of the
paper is focused on the soft power of the United States and European
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Union. They wish to assess how the US and EU exert their influence
over the ratification of environmental treaties. The study exclusively
looks at the Cartagena Proctocol (2000) on biosafety regulation, where
the United States opposed the EU because the treaty promoted the
precautionary principle on GMOs which would have damaged United
States’ exports. According to Schneider & Urpelainen (2013), the two
powers competed to influence the ratification of the treaty by third
nations. Hence, the paper looks at how the strength of the ties with
the US and EU affect the decision of joining the protocol. The more
a country depends economically or diplomatically on one of the two
powers, the more it should align its international policy with the great
power. The analysis unveils that countries that are military allies or
share strong economic bonds with the US have lower probability of
ratifying the Cartagena Protocol, an agreement which advocates the
European stance on GMOs.
Yamagata et al. (2013) and Yamagata et al. (2017) use a spatial
lag model to explore the correlation in the ratification of countries. A
weight matrix is applied to the ratification of other countries in or-
der to aggregate their overall effect. They devise different matrices of
weights to depict the ties between nations, based on: i) the number
of international organisations to which both countries participate, ii)
the presence of diplomatic representatives accredited between the two
countries, iii) whether or not the countries belong to the same category
of income group, iv) whether the countries have at least 50% of their
population of the same religion, v) or share the same language (among
English, Russian, Spanish, German, French, Portuguese, Arabic and
Dutch). Only two climate change agreements are studied in Yamagata
et al. (2013), but Yamagata et al. (2017) expands the analysis to 8
treaties. Yamagata et al. (2013) find that the ratification of the UN-
FCCC (1992) is dominated by constructivist theory: global integration
is found to be the leading factor for ratification. On the other hand,
foreign ratification seems to explain better the behaviour with relation
to the Kyoto Protocol (1997). In Yamagata et al. (2017) foreign rati-
fications by the United States and USSR are pivotal before 1991, after
the fall of the Soviet Union only the ratification of weaker nations is
influenced by powerful nations, economic partners and neighbouring
countries.
A last contribution on this topic comes from Wagner (2016). In
the first part of the paper, Wagner (2016) builds a game theoretical
model of treaty participation. In the second part the framework is
tested empirically with data on the ratification of the Montreal Pro-
tocol (1987), preferential trade agreements and bilateral investment
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treaties. We will focus on the results related to the Montreal Protocol.
The model essentially describes the delay in ratification, which depends
on whether there is complementarity or substitutability in ratifications.
In the long-run, the assumptions of the model imply that treaty rat-
ification is inevitable. This theoretical framework can be transposed
econometrically with an accelerated failure time survival model. Given
that ratification is a certain outcome, this type of modelling is better
suited to fit treaties that achieved universal ratification rather than
predicting ratification outcomes.
The result of Wagner (2016) indicates that the ratifications of the
Montreal Protocol exhibit strong complementarity. Wagner (2016) fur-
ther estimates that, on average, the complementarity effect accelerated
ratification time by 12% (208 days). The author argues that comple-
mentarity is mainly explained by 3 factors: i) Economic dependency,
ii) Issue linkage and reputation costs, and iii) Fairness. The first point
is particularly important for the Montreal Protocol because it entails
trade restrictions on CFCs with non-ratifiers. The importance of bi-
lateral trade relationships is embedded in the model through a weight-
ing matrix that multiplies foreign ratification (in a similar fashion to
Yamagata et al. (2013) or Murdoch et al. (2003)). In a second specific-
ation, Wagner (2016) accounts for reputational costs and issue linkage
by recalibrating the above-mentioned matrix of weights with inform-
ation regarding the participation of country dyads in 11 other major
international treaties. Finally, concerns with fairness and equity are
tested in a last specification that considers a treaty to be more equit-
able when a greater number of large polluters have decided to join the
agreement. Again, this criteria of fairness is embedded by modifying
the weights of the foreign ratification matrix. The results show that
all these factors contribute to accelerating ratification compared to a
model with no foreign interaction. Among the three factors, economic
dependency seems to have the strongest acceleration effect on ratific-
ation timings. Bilateral trade relationships imply an acceleration of
Montreal Protocol’s average ratification time by 11%, and 7% if only
trade in Ozone Depleting Substances are considered.
Signalling
Some researchers emphasise that the act of ratification signals about
the feasibility of the environmental project and is used as a signalling
tool to foreign and domestic actors. Perrin & Bernauer (2010) study
the ratification behaviour of European countries for 9 long-range trans-
boundary air pollution agreements (LRTAP). The focus is on the in-
terdependence in ratification decisions. Their arguments are based on
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the literature on policy diffusion that stipulates that the adoption of
a policy by a country conveys signals about reputation costs, com-
petitiveness and implementation costs. These signals influence foreign
countries in adopting the same policy. For example, in the optic of
public choice economics, the government has an incomplete informa-
tion on how the parliament or the electors react to certain policies.
The adoption by another nation prompts national implementation be-
cause the consequences and costs are better known by the government.
The results of Perrin & Bernauer (2010) suggest that the ratification
choices of foreign countries or groups of countries influence domestic
ratification process.
Schulze & Tosun (2013) hold that some countries are willing to rat-
ify agreements and align their environmental standards with the EU
because they anticipate potential returns in the form of aid, assist-
ance, access to the EU market and even EU membership. Hence, some
countries use the ratification of environmental agreement mainly as a
signalling tool. The sample includes 25 non-EU members and 21 envir-
onmental agreements negotiated under the UN Economic Commission
for Europe (UNECE). The results support the thesis of an European ex-
ternal influence in the area of environmental cooperation; the UNECE
members located geographically more distant (e.g.Israel or Tajikistan)
exhibit a lower propensity to ratify the agreements. On the contrary,
the countries that aspire to join the EU and are economically dependent
on the EU are significantly more likely to ratify environmental agree-
ments. A similar analysis is conducted by Milewicz & Elsig (2014) cov-
ering 76 multilateral agreements, not exclusively environmental, and
using survival analysis. They claim that new democracies in Europe
ratify treaties to please the EU, signal political autonomy and gain in-
ternational recognition. The findings are echoed by Cortez & Gutmann
(2017), again with a sample not just limited to environmental agree-
ments, who find that recent democracies are more likely to ratify all
types of treaties. The higher rate of ratification strongly substantiates
the quest for international recognition by young democracies.
According to Hugh-Jones et al. (2018), the signature of treaties is
also used as a signalling device. More specifically, the authors argue
that signature is used by the executive power to signal the importance
of the issue to domestic and foreign veto players. Depending on na-
tional legislation, the ratification of an agreement might require the
majority or super-majority and passes through different veto players
(one or two chambers, courts, commissions, presidents, ...etc). The
main argument of the authors is that these veto players see a high
rate of signature as a signal summarising the importance and feasib-
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ility of the agreement. Their main conclusion is that the signature of
a treaty increases the chances of ratification by the country.The em-
pirical strategy of Hugh-Jones et al. (2018) suffers from a number of
weaknesses. Firstly, they do not identify the potential ratifiers of every
treaty. Since signatories are all potential ratifiers of the treaty while
the group of non-signatories also contains countries that are not po-
tential ratifiers to the agreement, it is very likely that signature could
pickup the effect of this misidentification of the countries at risk. This
has the result of biasing the effect of signature upward. In addition,
Hugh-Jones et al. (2018) do not consider the fact that signatories are
the most likely to ratify also because they were able to negotiate the
treaty and are likely to be the countries that are the most interested
in the agreement.
3.1.5 Results on lobbying and the quality of insti-
tutions
According to Putnam (1988) and Barrett (1998), ratification is the out-
come of a two-stage game. The first is played internationally during the
negotiation phase by national representatives. The second, domestic-
ally by the political institutions and interest groups. In this framework,
ratification decisions boil down to the contrast between domestic act-
ors. The effect of environmental and industrial lobbying on ratification
has been studied mainly in 4 separate articles. The first two are Fre-
driksson & Ujhelyi (2006) and Fredriksson et al. (2007). These articles
are almost identical and are the closest to our main research question,
their main limitation is that they model exclusively the ratification of
the Kyoto Protocol (1997). The effect of Environmental NGOs (EN-
GOs) on ratification is first studied on a broad sample by Bernauer
et al. (2013a). The second article is Bo¨hmelt et al. (2015); it studies
how the number of ENGOs influences ratification decision under differ-
ent electoral rules and government forms. Unfortunately, the latter two
articles completely omit industrial lobbying. They are solely interested
in the activity of ENGOs. The importance of domestic pressure groups
is acknowledged more broadly. As a matter of fact, lobbying by either
environmental or industrial groups is is included as a control variable
in: Roberts et al. (2004), von Stein (2008), Yamagata et al. (2017),
and incidentally also by Frank (1999) and Mohrenberg et al. (2016). In
this section, we review in detail the findings and implications of these
works.
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Main findings on pressure groups
The main focus of Fredriksson & Ujhelyi (2006) is on lobbying and veto
players. Veto players are defined as the political entities or individuals
whose approval is required for the ratification of the treaties. In the
first part of their article, a two-stage game is built to derive the equi-
librium implications that are tested empirically. The theoretical model
is based on the ability of firms and environmental lobbies to affect veto
players through campaign contributions. In order to ensure ratifica-
tion, environmental lobbies have to convince all veto players to ratify.
Conversely, firms can secure non-ratification by simply gaining the sup-
port of a single veto player. As a result, ratification probabilities are
lower when there is a larger number of veto players.
Fredriksson & Ujhelyi (2006) use data on the ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol by 170 countries to test their assertion. They build a
logit model as a benchmark and then a Cox PH model stratified on
annex I/non-annex I countries with time measured in days. The data
on ratification is censored less than 5 years after the signature; at that
time only 51.7% of the countries had ratified. The early censoring could
cast some doubts on the validity of the logit approach, because many
ratifications are left out. The study only covers the Kyoto Protocol
(1997), thus the generalisability of the results could be questioned. In
addition to that, the empirical approach does not take into account
international interdependence in ratification and, apart from the strat-
ification of the survival model, lacks a strategy to control for country
unobserved heterogeneity.
Fredriksson & Ujhelyi (2006) find that environmental lobbying, as
proxied by the number of ENGOs, is a significant determinant of rat-
ification, but the effectiveness is weaker for a higher number of veto
players. On the opposite, lobbying by firms is unaffected by the number
of veto players: this confirms that there is an asymmetry in the lobby-
ing effect. However, industrial lobbying is not significantly linked to a
lower ratification probability. The authors experiment different meas-
ures for industrial lobbying, such as the number of vehicles per capita,
the intensity of CO2 in commercial energy use, a dummy for “fuel”
exporting countries, the presence of a national chamber of commerce
or the membership to the World Business Council for Sustainable De-
velopment. In contrast with their predictions, the results consistently
show no effect from industrial lobbying.
Fredriksson et al. (2007) mirror Fredriksson & Ujhelyi (2006) in
the methodology, sample and results. This time, the number of veto
players is replaced by the “integrity” of the government, the other
variables in the model remain essentially the same. The ratification
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decision of a corruptible policy maker takes into account the welfare
gains from improvements in the quality of environment, but it is also
affected by the contributions, bribes and pressure of environmental and
industry lobbies. Fredriksson et al. (2007) define the corruption level
as the intensity of preference of the state for the contributions instead
of the gains in social welfare. Given this definition, more corrupted
governments should be more sensible to lobbying activity. The results
indeed show that the ratification probability increases with environ-
mental lobbying, and the more the government is prone to corruption
the stronger is this effect. Again, industrial pressure does not seem
to affect the outcome of ratification despite trying two new measures
for industrial lobbying: the share of labour employed in the industrial
sector and the share of fossil fuels in the exports of goods.
Additional results on the number of ENGOs
In the two papers presented in this paragraph, the authors focus on
the number of ENGOs but unfortunately do not control for industrial
pressure.
Bernauer et al. (2013a) analyse how the effectiveness of ENGOs’ ac-
tion varies in different democratic contexts. They argue that in more
democratic nations the ENGOs can exert a weaker effect. Their first
argument is that in democratic states the public demand for environ-
mental cooperation is better channelled through the political system.
As a result, the role of ENGOs diminishes. Political leaders of demo-
cratic states are more accountable and are more likely to satisfy the
environmental demand. This argument mainly leads to the conclu-
sion that political representation is more effective in democracies, but
it does not necessarily downgrade the impact that ENGOs have on
ratification. The two activities are not substitutes, it could be ar-
gued that ENGOs are more effective because of the more complete set
of freedoms available in democracies. Then, they posit that in more
democratic states ENGOs face higher competition for political influ-
ence. Regrettably, they offer no evidence justifying the crowding-out
effect in democracies.
Bernauer et al. (2013a) use a Cox PH model, focusing on the time
elapsing between signature and ratification for a large sample of envir-
onmental agreements. The results indicate that ENGOs have a positive
effect on ratification, and in more democratic states the effect of EN-
GOs is reduced as predicted by the authors. Bo¨hmelt et al. (2015)
investigate more deeply the relationship outlined by Bernauer et al.
(2013a). Their work focuses on the effect of ENGOs’ lobbying on the
ratification of environmental treaties in the context of different elect-
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oral rules and government systems. The sample covers 75 democracies
and 250 treaties from 1973 to 2002. The findings show that the presid-
ential systems with majority rule tend to provide more environmental
public goods. According to the authors, this reduces the potential
contribution of ENGOs’ lobbying. On the opposite, ENGOs have a
larger margin for action in parliamentary systems with proportional
rule. Again, the results are in line with their contention. Bernauer
et al. (2013a) and Bo¨hmelt et al. (2015) share the same data and use
a similar empirical strategy. Their main limitation is that they do not
control for unobserved heterogeneity. Given the relatively frail theoret-
ical backing for the relationships explored, it is possible that the main
variables of the analysis capture the effect of some omitted variable.
Other interesting results
Mohrenberg et al. (2016) focus on the effect played by the participation
of ENGOs (later defined more broadly as trans-national actors) during
the negotiation of environmental agreements. This work differs from
the previous ones because the emphasis is not on the pressure action of
ENGOs, but rather on the degree of access that ENGOs enjoy during
the development phase of the agreements. Mohrenberg et al. (2016)
state that civil society access increases the transparency of negotiations
and induces an improvement in the ratification of the treaty. Overall,
they find a significant effect on the ratification outcome.
Yamagata et al. (2017) estimate a ratification model on a pre- and
a post-1991 sample to highlight the effects that the fall of the Soviet
Union had on environmental diplomacy; they include controls for envir-
onmental and industrial lobbying. The number of ENGOs per capita is
used to proxy for environmental lobbying. It is found to have a signific-
ant effect on the ratification of 8 treaties in the period 1981-1990, but
is never significant after 1991. On the other hand, industrial lobbying,
measured by industrial production as share of GDP, is not significant
before 1991, but reaches significance in a small number of specifications
for the period 1991-2008. Industrial lobbying does not seem to have a
strong effect on ratification also in their earlier article (Yamagata et al.,
2013), in which they study the ratification of the UNFCCC (1992) and
Kyoto Protocol (1997). In fact, their control variable for industrial lob-
bying never reaches the 5% significance level, whereas environmental
lobbying does. Similarly, a measure for industrial lobbying measure is
included in Sauquet (2014), but again, the relationship is not found to
be significant for the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
While the effect of industrial lobbying seems perplexingly tenuous,
the evidence for the quality of institutions is widely acknowledged.
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Fredriksson & Gaston (2000) notice that developing countries tend to
have slower ratifications, and link the delay to the inferior quality of
institutions. Roberts (1996) and Roberts et al. (2004) maintain that
peripheric countries and countries that experienced extractive coloni-
alism are characterised by worse institutions; these institutions induce
lower chances of ratifying environmental treaties. Good institutions
foster ratification while aspects linked to bad institutions deter parti-
cipation (Sauquet, 2014). In particular, corruption is often associated
to lower chances of ratification (Seelarbokus, 2014; Fredriksson et al.,
2007). As a further point, several aspects of the quality of institutions
have been shown to interact with lobbying (Fredriksson & Ujhelyi,
2006; Fredriksson et al., 2007).
3.1.6 Conclusion
To sum up, we have presented all the main factors that are associated
with the ratification of environmental agreements. For each factor we
described the findings in the empirical literature. The determinants of
ratification can be broadly grouped in 3 categories: i) domestic factors,
ii) treaty characteristics and iii) international interactions. Domestic
factors, such as the political system, the income level, the interests of
dominant pressure groups, the quality of the environment, or the ex-
port structure of a country strongly shape the set of incentives and
costs associated to ratification. The traits of a country play a fun-
damental role in explaining national interests, but they only partially
explain the decision to ratify. The characteristics of the treaty are
arguably even more important; agreements that promote stricter en-
vironmental regulations are relatively more onerous for the parties and,
as such, are joined more reluctantly. Since there is no entity capable
of enforcing a treaty internationally, the ratification of a country is en-
tirely on a voluntary basis. All else equal, if the treaty entails costly
commitments, countries are less likely to join also because of stronger
free-ride incentives. Nonetheless, many authors have argued that this
effect is mitigated by the strong interdependence between nations. Not
only will ratifiers try to influence other nations to join, but economic
and diplomatic partners might use the ratification of environmental
agreements to reinforce partnerships and showcase their willingness to
cooperate. As a result, a country is expected to be more likely to par-
ticipate when it has stronger ties and connections with other ratifying
nations.
In the next section, we discuss how the methodological approach
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evolved over time and review the strengths and weaknesses associated
to each approach. The understanding of the different methodologies
applied in the literature is used to assess the robustness of the find-
ings and to guide us in the selection of the most appropriate research
approach for the present study.
3.2 Evolution in the methodological ap-
proach
The act of ratification refers to a specific agreement, originates by a
distinct country and occurs at a fixed point in time. In essence, it is
qualified by three dimensions: country, treaty, and year. According to
their methodology, the empirical research emphasised different combin-
ations of these dimensions, looking from different angles at the same
phenomenon. The methodological approaches followed a process of
refinement and evolution, gradually attempting to include all 3 dimen-
sions. The methodological shift entailed a change in the type of models
and data, but also in the generalisability of the results and questions
asked. We distinguish between 3 approaches: i) cross-sectional and
count data, ii) survival analysis for single agreements, and iii) survival
analysis for a panel of treaties. In this section we describe each of these
approaches, their applications, limitations, characteristics and results.
3.2.1 Cross-sectional studies and count data
The cross-sectional approach is extensively used. It is the method
used in the early studies dealing with the participation in environ-
mental agreements, such as: Congleton (1992), Roberts (1996) and
Frank (1999). The approach consists in looking at the status of rat-
ification of one or more treaties, at a specific moment in time. The
evolution through time is ignored and the focus is on the differences
in ratification among countries. Ratification can be described in two
different ways, the first is to concentrate on a single treaty and look at
what country ratified the treaty, the second is to take the number of
treaties ratified by each nation. In the first case a link can be estab-
lished between the treaty and the country that ratifies. In contrast, the
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second measurement lumps together all the ratifications, thus losing all
information on the specific treaties that have been ratified.
In both cases the first problem encountered by the researcher is to
choose the right cut-off date. Since data is right-censored by construc-
tion, ratifications that fall beyond the observation date are ignored. For
more recent treaties this could lead to misleading results because the
selection of the observation point can arbitrarily influence the results.
Beron et al. (2003) allow only 3 years for the ratification of the Montreal
Protocol (1987), while in Murdoch et al. (2003) the observations on the
Helsinki Protocol (1985) are taken after 5 years: In both cases a large
number of the ratifications were not yet deposited by the time of the
analysis. Congleton (1992), Neumayer (2002a) and Neumayer (2002b)
study recent environmental agreements but mitigate the problem by
focusing on the act of signature — which is typically concentrated in
the first year of the treaty — instead of the act of ratification. The
problem is particularly serious for studies that use the number of rat-
ifications as dependent variable because different treaties are exposed
to ratification for different amounts of time. All the studies mentioned
in this section fail to address this issue, the only exception is Bernauer
et al. (2013b) who account for the exposition factor by using a negative
binomial model.
Table 3.1: Cross-sectional studies
Paper Sample Dependent variable Model
Congleton
(1992)
118 countries,
Vienna Conven-
tion (1985) and
Montreal Protocol
(1987) on ODS.
Signature by 1989, binary
variable.
Logistic regression.
Roberts
(1996)
145 countries, 9 en-
vironmental agree-
ments.
Weighted number of rat-
ifications between 1963-
1987.
Linear regression.
Frank (1999) Total number of
treaties is unspe-
cified, number of
countries ranges
from 41 to 114
depending on time
period.
Total number of treaties
ratified by a country in the
time period.
4 separate latent vari-
able regressions for 4
time periods.
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Cross-sectional studies (continued)
Paper Sample Dependent variable Model
Neumayer
(2002a)
6 agreements, max-
imum of 175 coun-
tries.
i) Survival data for rati-
fication of 3 agreements.
ii) Binary variable for the
signature of 3 other agree-
ments by 2000.
i) 3 Cox PH models
for 3 treaties with high
ratification rate. ii) 3
separate probit models
are used for the signa-
ture of 3 more recent
agreements for which
ratification process is
at its beginning.
Neumayer
(2002b)
4 agreements with
non-universal rati-
fication, maximum
of 175 countries.
Binary variable for the sig-
nature by 2000. The de-
pendent variable is based
on the signature of the
treaties except for the
Montreal Protocol (1987)
for which ratification is
considered.
i) Probit for signa-
ture dummy of indi-
vidual treaties. ii)
ordered probit for the
sum of signature of
agreements (from 0 to
4).
Recchia
(2002)
15 global environ-
mental agreements,
19 democracies.
Dependent is a score cal-
culated by assigning a
country 3 points for each
ratified agreements and 1
point for treaties that are
just signed.
Linear regression.
Beron et al.
(2003)
Montreal Protocol
(1987), 89 coun-
tries.
Binary variable for the
ratification by 1990.
Probit with a matrix
of weights based on
trade volume to ac-
count for the interde-
pendence in ratifica-
tion between countries.
Murdoch
et al. (2003)
Helsinki Protocol
(1985) on sul-
phur emissions, 25
European coun-
tries.
Binary variable for the
ratification by 1990.
Probit model.
Roberts
et al. (2004)
22 agreements, 192
countries.
Index based on the
number of ratifications
between 1947-1999.
Linear regression.
Fredriksson
& Ujhelyi
(2006)
Kyoto Protocol
(1997), 170 coun-
tries.
i) Survival data ii) bin-
ary variable for the rati-
fication of the treaty by
2002.
i) Cox PH model with
annual observations
stratified on annex I/
non-annex I countries.
ii) logit model.
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Cross-sectional studies (continued)
Paper Sample Dependent variable Model
Almer &
Winkler
(2010)
Kyoto Protocol
(1997), 165 coun-
tries.
i) Binary variable for the
signature and ii) ordered
variable for the ratifica-
tion of the protocol.
A latent variable
approach is used for
the binary variable
(signature yes/no) and
an ordered response
model for ratification
(ratified in period 1, 2
or 3).
Egger et al.
(2011)
number of rati-
fications of 105
countries among
353 agreements
signed between
1960 and 2006
Number of agreements in
which a country is parti-
cipating.
Panel approach. Lin-
ear feedback model for
count data, estimated
with GMM. The model
includes a lagged de-
pendent variable.
Egger et al.
(2013)
number of rati-
fications of 110
countries among
more than 212
agreements signed
between 1960 and
2006
Number of agreements
in which a country is
participating. A model is
estimated for every cluster
of environmental treaties
(atmosphere, land, sea,
biodiversity protection,
hazardous waste).
Panel approach. Lin-
ear feedback model for
count data, estimated
with GMM. The model
includes a lagged de-
pendent variable. The
control variables are
the same as in Egger
et al. (2011).
Bernauer
et al. (2013b)
200 agreements. Total number of ratific-
ations received by each
agreement by 2006.
Negative binomial re-
gression.
Davies &
Naughton
(2014)
110 environmental
agreements, 139
countries over
1980-1999.
Number of agreements
ratified during the year.
Panel count data. Spa-
tial model: a matrix
of weights based on the
distance between the
two countries is ap-
plied to the number of
ratifications of foreign
countries. The model
includes a country and
year fixed effect. In-
strumental variable is
used to address en-
dogeneity in one of
the variables. Es-
timated with GMM-IV
and 2SLS.
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Cross-sectional studies (continued)
Paper Sample Dependent variable Model
Seelarbokus
(2014)
110 environmental
agreements, 108
countries.
Probably the dependent is
the number of treaties rat-
ified or signed by each
country, not clearly spe-
cified by author.
Linear regression.
As mentioned earlier, the simplest way to “measure” ratification is
to assign to every country a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 if it ratified and 0 otherwise. The ratification choice can then be
modelled with a binomial regression to analyse how differences among
countries affect the odds of ratifying. This approach has been imple-
mented in numerous instances. Congleton (1992), Almer & Winkler
(2010) and Neumayer (2002b) use it to model the signature of envir-
onmental agreements. Murdoch et al. (2003) and Beron et al. (2003)
study the ratification of two different protocols by respectively 25 and
89 countries. Additional work is conducted by Almer & Winkler (2010)
and Fredriksson & Ujhelyi (2006), both investigating the ratification
of the Kyoto Protocol by circa 170 countries. These papers study ex-
clusively one agreement, raising the question of how the results can be
generalised beyond the single case. They fulfil a descriptive purpose,
but offer little insight into the general process of ratification. Frank
(1999) and Neumayer (2002a and 2002b) attempt to expand their res-
ults by including more than one agreement in their analysis but they
limit themselves to very few of them because they still build individual
models for each treaty. In principle, the approach could be extended
to several agreements by using ratification dummies for treaty-country
dyads (or pairs); even so, this strategy has never been implemented.
There is a second way to “measure” ratification for various agree-
ments at the same time, which is by counting how many are ratified
by each country. Then, it becomes straightforward to fit a linear or
count model to evaluate the impact of country characteristics on the
number of ratifications. Using a ratification count as dependent allows
to easily expand the base of treaties included in the analysis because
less information is required. Recchia (2002) covers 15 environmental
treaties, Roberts et al. (2004) 22 and Seelarbokus (2014) reaches 110
agreements. This is considerably more than any other cross-sectional
study using dummies. Nonetheless, using the number of ratifications
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is misleading. Do more treaties lead to stronger environmental com-
mitment? Environmental agreements are profoundly different among
them: adding treaties up is like summing grapes and melons. The
number of agreements that are ratified is not necessarily proportional
with the environmental commitment of the country or its level of inter-
national cooperation. To a large extent, the number of ratified treaties
is just a reflection of the number of treaties the country is able to ac-
cess. To this end, it is critical to know the number of neighbours and
environmental issues in which a country could be involved. As an illus-
tration, Kiribati is an insular state in the pacific, despite its interest in
preserving the environment, it undoubtedly ratifies fewer agreements
than Indonesia, a big state with several neighbours and a rich natural
asset. Neither Seelarbokus (2014) nor Roberts et al. (2004) controlled
for these factors.
We suggest that ratification rate would be a better measure than
the number of ratifications, of course, this would entail identifying the
potential ratifiers of each treaty, a practice that we are the first to
implement. There has also been some attempts to use a system of scores
instead of ratification counts. They usually work by assigning points
for signatures and ratifications (Recchia, 2002) or by weighting the
number of ratifications by the total number of ratifiers (Roberts, 1996).
It is not clear what these indices could teach about the ratification of
environmental agreements. In general, score systems tend to obfuscate
the results, making the relationship between variables less clear.
A less obvious consequence of using ratification counts is that the
connection between the ratifying country and the ratified treaty can be
maintained only if each agreement is studied individually. That is to
say, if we sum all the ratifications of a country, we would not be able to
tell which treaty it has ratified, except in the trivial cases in which it has
ratified none or all of them. This feature is a serious limitation to using
a counting variable because it does not consent to tackle how the design
of the treaty influences ratification. The characteristics of a treaty
can be accounted for only by studying a cross-section of treaties and
counting the number of ratifications it has received, just as in Bernauer
et al. (2013b). However, this would imply that it would no longer be
possible to know what country ratified, and consequentially investigate
the role of country characteristics. With this type of dependent variable
a trade-off exists between studying country or treaty characteristics.
An additional problem of cross-sectional studies is that they do not
take into account the dynamics of ratification. As a matter of fact,
many domestic characteristics are likely to influence the timing rather
than the happening of ratification. The sequence and timing also mat-
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ter for understanding the factors that affect ratification. For example,
Spilker & Koubi (2016) analyse how different voting requirements for
the ratification of international treaties influence the likelihood of rati-
fication. It is reasonable to expect that complex or strict requirements
should make the adoption of a treaty not just harder, but also slower.
Their results support this view, countries that require supermajority
for the approval of treaties are slower and less likely to ratify environ-
mental agreements. Moreover, if time is ignored, it is also impossible
to discern the order in which different countries decide to join a treaty,
which in some cases provide strong evidence of the diplomatic interac-
tions at play (Almer & Winkler, 2010).
The obvious solution to the omission of time is to use stacked cross-
sections to create a panel data; this approach has been attempted by
Davies & Naughton (2014) and Egger et al. (2011 and 2013). Davies &
Naughton (2014) study participation in 110 environmental agreements
by 139 countries over 20 years (1980-1999). The dependent is a count
of ratifications. The study has a very robust methodological approach;
the only weakness of the paper relates to the use of count data. Dav-
ies & Naughton (2014) build a spatial model and experiment different
estimators (notably 2SLS and GMM-IV). They use instrumental vari-
able approach to address endogeneity in one of the variables (FDI)
and the model includes a country and year fixed effect to account for
unobserved heterogeneity. Unfortunately, the use of count data inval-
idates the effort of Davies & Naughton (2014). Their objective is to
determine whether ratification is sensible to the participation by neigh-
bouring countries and to assess the link between FDI inflows and envir-
onmental policies. The problem with choosing the count of ratifications
as dependent is that does not really consent to understand interactions
between countries. Does the fact that foreign nations ratified a higher
number of agreements mean that they had an impact on the domestic
ratification choices? How do we know they ratified the same agree-
ment? Could it not reflect the fact that a larger number of agreements
have been agreed and are open to ratification? The research question
cannot be properly answered because ratification count data does not
allow to compare ratification choices within the same agreements. As
with the previous study, the dependent variable in Egger et al. (2011)
and Egger et al. (2013) is the number of agreements in which a country
participates at any given point in time. The definition of “particip-
ation” is not clear in the 2011’s paper: it appears that a country is
considered to be a participant if it, indifferently, signs or ratifies an
agreement. However, in Egger et al. (2013) reference is made to the
act of ratification. Their data covers the ratification status of around
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350 treaties for 105 countries — of which only 17 LDCs, suggesting that
there could be sampling bias. The same control variables and method-
ological approach are used in both papers. In both Egger et al. (2011)
and Egger et al. (2013) a dynamic feedback model for count data with
lagged dependent variable is used to model the number of ratifications.
The main difference is that in Egger et al. (2013) a separate model is
estimated for different clusters of environmental treaties (atmosphere,
land, sea, biodiversity protection and hazardous waste).
Egger et al. (2011 and 2013) and Davies & Naughton (2014) are
the only studies attempting a panel approach with count data. The
main downside of a panel approach with count data is that it does not
allow the analyst to escape the trade-off between country and treaty
characteristics. If the dependent variable is the number of ratified
treaties by the country at time t, then we are not able to know what
treaty the country has ratified, and as a result, the characteristics of
the treaties cannot be used to explain its ratification. In the same way,
if we tracked the number of ratifications that the treaty received at
time t, then we are not able to discern which country ratified and take
into account the characteristics of the country in ratification choices.
In summary, cross-sectional studies ignore the precious information
conveyed by the timing of ratification. If, on the one hand, this consti-
tutes the core of its weaknesses, on the other hand, it makes the data
assembly and analysis noticeably easier. The papers adopting this ap-
proach study only a small number of treaties, many focus exclusively
on an individual treaty (e.g. Murdoch et al. 2003, Beron et al. 2003
and Fredriksson & Ujhelyi 2006). We have observed that it is more of
a convention than a necessity, because the approach could be extended
to a larger number of treaties. We have also described the two cases
in which count data had been used in a panel setting. The main is-
sues with this strategy are the aggregation of treaties and the fact that
treaty and country characteristics cannot be studied at the same time.
These two aspects make the approach unsuitable to most research ques-
tions. The opposite to counting ratifications consists in focusing on a
single agreements. Concentrating on single agreements allows for very
specific models, tailored to the individual characteristics of the treaty,
but this comes at the cost of generalisability. These models fulfil mostly
a descriptive role. It is hard to infer any general advice from them. In
the present literature, cross-sectional studies have limited themselves
to studying only one dimension, either countries or treaties. However,
the consensus is that both these dimensions concur in determining rat-
ification with equal importance, and that time also has a central role
in the equation.
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3.2.2 Survival analysis
The awareness that timing is as relevant as the occurrence of ratific-
ation prompted for a revision in the methodology. The revision came
under the form of survival analysis. In this section, we only review
the studies that concentrate on single treaties, but this methodology
can be extended to a plurality of agreements as described in the next
section. Survival analysis is used to study the probability of an event
at a specific point in time, and derives its name from the epidemiolo-
gical background of the technique. Instead of just considering whether
or not a country has ratified, we also look at when ratification takes
place. From the moment the treaty is agreed, the country is at risk of
ratifying it. The characteristics of the treaty and of the country are
implicated in determining the chances of “surviving” to ratification.
The observation period starts when the treaty is opened for rati-
fication; this usually occurs right after agreeing the text. From that
moment, the country is at risk of ratification. Ratification by different
nations is then tracked throughout time until the cut-off (censoring)
year. For completeness, we report the final observation year in the
second column of table 3.2. Ratifications taking place after the censor-
ing year are not taken into account. Nevertheless, survival analysis is
designed to cope with right-censoring. Results are unbiased as long as
the assumption of non-informative censoring is satisfied.
The first application of survival modelling to ratification is in Fre-
driksson & Gaston (2000). They argue that a quicker ratification is
linked to stronger environmental commitment on behalf of the coun-
try. This relationship is fallacious because the timing of ratification
equally depends on frictions encountered during the internal proced-
ures of ratification. Fredriksson & Gaston (2000) fail to account for the
institutional aspect of ratification timing. In subsequent research, it is
realised that time to ratification is a better dependent variable than
the simple occurrence of ratification, because many factors result in
changes in timing rather than occurrence. This notion is particularly
important for studies focusing on political and economic variables. In
fact, at the margin, a slightly more complex bureaucratic system or a
small increment in the pressure of environmental groups are more likely
to affect the timing rather than completely reversing the outcome of
ratification.
The advantage of survival approach is that it can measure ratifica-
tion over an additional dimension: that of time. Neumayer (2002b) uses
this approach to his advantage when he notices that the cross-sectional
approach is unable to detect variability within almost-universally rati-
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fied treaties. He applies the technique to the Montreal Protocol (1987),
CITES (1973) and the Biodiversity Convention (1992), which by the
time of the analysis had already been ratified by a very large number of
nations. In general, survival analysis is a superior approach for univer-
sally ratified treaties because it takes advantage of the heterogeneity
in the time dimension, while a cross-sectional approach fails to capture
any differences in the ratifications when almost all countries have rat-
ified. Survival analysis is also capable of dealing with right-censoring
and thus it is better suited to the analysis of recent agreements with
ongoing ratification.
In table 3.2 we have grouped all the studies modelling single envir-
onmental treaties with survival analysis. In total we count 8 different
papers although most of them concentrate on the same two agreements,
namely the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the UNFCCC (1992). Climate
change agreements received meticulous coverage because of the high
media exposure, but also because of the rich anecdotal political literat-
ure surrounding the negotiation and participation to climate treaties.
The COP3 meetings are scrutinised by political scientist (Roger & Bel-
liethathan 2016, Dimitrov 2016) and negotiation dynamics (Brandt &
Svendsen 2004, Babiker et al. 2002), rules (Nasiritousi & Linner, 2016)
and balances (Afionis 2011, Kasa et al. 2007) are carefully studied to
explain countries’ order of ratification (e.g.Andresen & Agrawala 2002,
Lund 2013, Chin-Yee 2016). Survival analysis suits this branch of lit-
erature because it permits to test the ratification sequence. Neumayer
(2002b), Wagner (2016) and Schneider & Urpelainen (2013) are the
only papers on different agreements. The latter is an interesting case
study of the Cartagena Proctocol (2000), an agreement regulating the
use of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs). The protocol puts forward
the “precautionary principle” endorsed by the EU, which would have
damaged the agricultural exports of United States by setting unfavour-
able international standards on LMOs. The United States strongly
opposed the agreement and advocated the “sound science principle”.
Hence the Cartagena Protocol is seen by the author as a natural ex-
periment to test the extent to which foreign influence and international
bonds with the Unites States and EU affect the ratification behaviour
of third states. Again, the choice of survival modelling is linked to the
need of studying the order of ratification in time by different countries,
3Conference of the Parties (COP) is the annual meeting of the members to the UN-
FCCC (1992), Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the Paris Agreement (2015). National deleg-
ations gather to “keep under regular review the implementation of the Convention and
any related legal instrument” (Art.7, UNFCCC 1992). COP meetings are attended by
thousands of participants from NGOs, scientific organisations, universities, government
bodies, industry representatives, media, and civil society in general.
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something that is easily performed with survival analysis.
Time is treated as continuous despite the fact that models are based
on yearly or monthly observations of ratification. Furthermore, the ex-
planatory variables are always measured yearly, so a common assump-
tion is to take their values as constant throughout the year, if the model
is specified for monthly (von Stein 2008 and Schneider & Urpelainen
2013) or daily ratification (Fredriksson & Gaston 2000 and Fredriksson
et al. 2007). The distinction between continuous and discrete observa-
tions often is a nuanced one. The ratification of an international agree-
ment is per se a continuous process, however it is registered on more or
less narrow time intervals (years, months, weeks or days). Technically,
it is a grouped survival data because an underlying continuous process
is observed discretely, hence the observations are grouped over an inter-
val. Despite the discreteness of the data, the variable could be assumed
as continuous depending on the granularity of the analysis. Shorter
observation intervals, such as days or weeks, over a long enough time
period could easily be considered a continuous representation of the
ratification process. For annual observations the assumption is harder
to justify (Neumayer, 2002a). Yamagata et al. (2013) and Sauquet
(2014) are the only papers opting for a discrete approach.
The Cox proportional hazard model is the model of choice in the
majority of the cases (Fredriksson & Gaston 2000, Neumayer 2002a,
Fredriksson & Ujhelyi 2006, Fredriksson et al. 2007, von Stein 2008 and
Schneider & Urpelainen 2013). Cox PH is a popular semi-parametric
survival model that does not assume any particular distribution for
the survival times. The shape of the baseline hazard remains unspe-
cified, unlike in the Weibull and the Gompertz models used by Sauquet
(2014). In proportional hazard models, the explanatory variables af-
fect the hazard rate of ratification in a multiplicative fashion. For
instance, being a fossil fuel exporter may halve the hazard of ratifying
a given environmental agreement. Furthermore, the hazard ratio is as-
sumed constant over time, implying that the relationship between the
explanatory variable and the hazard ratio never changes. Proportional
hazard models are different from accelerated failure time models which
describe the speeding up process of an event. Wagner (2016) is the only
ratification study that uses an accelerated failure time model. In AFT
models, the dependent variable is the ratification time instead of the
hazard of ratification (probability of ratification at time t given no pre-
vious ratification). With the exception of Wagner (2016), all the models
presented in this section are proportional hazard models and assume
a baseline hazard shared among all the units of the analysis. It is a
simplifying assumption that could clash with the structural diversity in
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ratification behaviours of nations. The samples contain diverse groups
of nations but, save for Fredriksson & Ujhelyi (2006) and Fredriksson
et al. (2007) that stratify their models on annex I and non-annex I
countries, there is no attempt to address the unobserved heterogeneity
at the country level.
In summary, the survival approach unlocks the third dimension:
time. Survival analysis is also more suitable to right-censoring and
treaties with high ratification rate. The studies presented in this sec-
tion focus exclusively on single agreements. As a consequence, the
conclusions of these models still do not generalise well beyond their
sample, but they offer precious insight into the dynamics of treaty par-
ticipation. The Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC have been extensively
studied, while other environmental agreements have been generally neg-
lected. In the next section we will show how the survival approach is
extended to treat several agreements at the same time.
Table 3.2: Survival analysis for single treaties
Paper Sample Dependent variable Model
Fredriksson
& Gaston
(2000)
UNFCCC (1992),
184 countries until
1997.
Ratification survival time,
daily observations.
Cox PH, the explan-
atory variables are as-
sumed constant over
the year (also modelled
as cross-sectional lo-
gistic regression in ap-
pendix).
Neumayer
(2002a)
6 agreements, max-
imum of 175 coun-
tries until 2001.
i) Annual survival data
for ratification of 3 agree-
ments ii) Binary variable
for the signature of 3 other
agreements by 2000.
i) 3 Cox PH models
for 3 treaties with high
ratification rate. ii) 3
separate probit models
are used for the signa-
ture of 3 more recent
agreements for which
ratification process is
at its beginning.
Fredriksson
& Ujhelyi
(2006)
Kyoto Protocol
(1997), 170 coun-
tries until 2002.
i) Daily survival data
on ratification ii) Binary
variable for the ratifica-
tion of the treaty by 2002.
i) Cox PH model strat-
ified on a dummy for
annex I countries. ii)
Logit model.
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Survival analysis for single treaties (continued)
Paper Sample Dependent variable Model
Fredriksson
et al. (2007)
Kyoto Protocol
(1997), 170 coun-
tries until 2002.
Ratification survival time,
daily observations.
Cox PH model strat-
ified on a dummy
for annex I countries
(robustness checks are
performed also with
a Weibull model and
a logit cross-sectional
regression).
von Stein
(2008)
Kyoto Protocol
(1997) and UN-
FCCC (1992),
maximum of 140
countries until
2003.
Ratification survival time,
monthly observations.
Separate models are
built for each treaty, in
both cases a Cox PH
and a Weibull specific-
ation are used.
Schneider &
Urpelainen
(2013)
Cartagena Proc-
tocol (2000), 182
countries until
2006.
Ratification survival time,
monthly observations.
Cox model with
monthly observations
allowing for non-
proportional hazard.
(Cross-sectional logit
model in robustness
checks).
Yamagata
et al. (2013)
Kyoto Protocol
(1997) and UN-
FCCC (1992),
maximum of 166
countries until
2008.
Ratification survival time,
annual observations.
Logistic regression for
discrete survival data,
with weight matrix
to account for the
network relationships
between countries
(spatial regression).
Sauquet
(2014)
Kyoto Protocol
(1997), 164 coun-
tries until 2009.
Ratification survival time,
annual observations.
Gompertz survival
model for grouped
observations with
lagged spatial variable
for foreign ratification.
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Survival analysis for single treaties (continued)
Paper Sample Dependent variable Model
Wagner
(2016)
Montreal Pro-
tocol, Preferential
Trade Agreements
(PTA) and Bilat-
eral Investment
treaties (BIT). 140
countries for the
Montreal Protocol,
until 2015.
Ratification survival time,
daily observations.
Accelerated failure
time model estimated
with the method of
simulated momemnts
(MSM). The model
includes lagged spatial
variable for foreign
ratifications. The
baseline ratification
payoff increases expo-
nentially over time.
Hence, by assumption,
ratification is certain
in the long-run.
3.2.3 Pooled survival analysis
The survival approach can be extended to several treaties simply by
pooling together the survival information of more than one treaty.
Strictly speaking, the techniques used here are the same as in the
previous section; the only difference is that, instead of dealing with
countries, the unit of analysis is the country-treaty dyad. Bernauer
et al. (2010) is the first study that pools together various treaties in
a single survival model. In the following years the same approach has
been applied multiple times. In fact, most of the recent studies choose
to adopt this method over the ones described in previous sections. This
approach yields coefficients that are general; they do not fit the specific
treaty, instead they are intended to represent the process of ratification
as a whole. This quality makes survival approach particularly suitable
to our analysis. From a methodological point of view, pooled survival
models are more complex because they need to account also for the
heterogeneity at the treaty level.
The first advantage of pooling different treaties together is that
the number of observations is remarkably larger. The total size of the
sample can be extended in any of the 3 dimensions of the analysis, by
including more treaties, covering more countries or by increasing the
time frame. For each treaty-country dyad the beginning of the obser-
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vation period corresponds to the signature year of the agreement and
ends either with ratification by the country or on the last observed
year. The second column of table 3.3 reports both the final observa-
tion year and the earliest signature year for each study. Most of the
studies presented here use the ratification data collected by Bernauer
et al. (2010)4. Their data set is notably larger than all previous ones; it
covers 180 countries and over 250 treaties. While the works described
in the previous two sections mostly focus on big environmental agree-
ments, the data collected by Bernauer et al. (2010) allowed to diver-
sify and expand the analysis to a profusion of smaller and less famous
agreements, considerably enriching the debate on ratification. In com-
parison, other data sets are relatively narrow in terms of countries and
treaties. For example, Schulze (2014) just focuses on OECD countries
and Leinaweaver (2012) cover 198 countries, but only 55 agreements.
The downside of pooling together many treaties is that it introduces
the risk of sampling bias. In order to obtain valid general ratification
estimates, the sample needs not just to guarantee unbiasedness with
respect to the exclusion of countries, but also to be representative of
the whole population of environmental treaties. Regrettably, the risks
associated to sampling bias have not been thoroughly analysed in the
context of previous studies. In the bigger studies we find no evaluation
of the potential distortions deriving from the exclusion of countries
with missing observations in the explanatory variables5. And in the
same way, the constitution of the treaty sample has rarely been as-
sessed. Generally, regional environmental agreements have been either
neglected or incorrectly handled in previous works.
Most of the ratification studies concentrate on global agreements
(Bernauer et al. 2013a, Cazals & Sauquet 2015, Yamagata et al. 2017).
These are the ones that are open to all nations and to which every
nation is de facto a potential ratifier. The trouble is that, except for
the studies focusing on specific treaties or group of countries (Per-
rin & Bernauer 2010, Schulze & Tosun 2013, Schulze 2014, Yamagata
et al. 2017), many less-than-global agreements have inadvertently been
mixed with global ones. We call regional all the treaties that are not
strictly global, with no distinction for their scale. The real problem is
not that regional agreements have been included in the analysis, but
rather that they were not correctly handled. After all, most of envir-
4Their data set is used in the following works: Bernauer et al. (2010), Bernauer et al.
(2013b), Bernauer et al. (2013a), Bo¨hmelt et al. (2015), Mohrenberg et al. (2016), Spilker
& Koubi (2016) and Hugh-Jones et al. (2018)
5Missing observations occur among the explanatory variables rather than in the de-
pendent. By construction, survival data on ratification has no discontinuity and is never
left-censored. For more on the characteristics of ratification data see section 5.2.
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onmental diplomacy takes places at the regional level, therefore it is
only partially interesting to look exclusively at large global agreements
(Leinaweaver, 2012). However, regional agreements have, by definition,
a different set of potential ratifiers than global treaties. Unfortunately,
it has always implicitly been assumed that all the countries that did
not ratify an agreement were eligible or potentially capable of rati-
fying. While this assumption holds for global treaties, it is deceitful
when applied to regional agreements. In econometric terms it equates
to incorrectly identifying the countries in the risk set. More specific-
ally, it assumes that all existing countries are at risk of ratifying while
just a portion of them truly are; the resulting survival estimates are
inevitably biased upward.
The data set assembled by Bernauer et al. (2010), and used in most
of the studies, seems to be affected by the problem related to regional
agreements. There are good reasons to believe that a large fraction
of their sample is indeed composed by regional agreements. Bernauer
et al. (2010) are aware that some of the agreements could be de facto
open just to a restricted number of countries. Hence, in appendix they
estimate a model exclusively on provenly global agreements, which res-
ults in their sample size being halved. The limitations of their data
set have already been exposed in section 2.2.1, where we also explain
how we tackled the issue by identifying the potential ratifiers of every
agreement. The only study that explicitly models regional and global
agreements jointly is Leinaweaver (2012). Leinaweaver (2012) controls
for the regionality of the treaty by including dummies for the geo-
graphic regions of the ratifiers, however this method is not sufficient to
deal with the potential bias resulting from the erroneous specification
of the risk set. Fortunately, the bias we have just described does not
engulf all of the studies, some are unaffected thanks to the more limited
sample of treaties or countries that they use. Perrin & Bernauer (2010)
and Schulze & Tosun (2013) exclusively focus on agreements negotiated
under the UNECE6. The analysis is confined to UNECE members be-
cause they perceive that non-UNECE nations are not potential ratifiers
to these treaties. Schulze (2014) is interested exclusively in the rati-
fication by OECD nations even if the agreements in their samples are
open to other countries. Finally, the last paper that does not exper-
ience the regionality problem is Yamagata et al. (2017) because they
solely study 8 agreements and all of them are global.
In terms of modelling choices the studies differ mostly in how time
is defined and in the way they deal with unobserved heterogeneity at
the treaty and country levels. The observations are taken annually,
6United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
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except in Cazals & Sauquet (2015) who track ratification on a daily
basis and assume the explanatory variables are constant over the year
period. A discrete treatment of time is more frequent. This approach
involves expanding the survival data into a binary format in order to
fit a binary regression. Then, the baseline hazard is generally paramet-
erised with splines or cubic polynomials. The estimates approximate
the ones obtained with a continuous survival model. For continuous
specifications of time the preferred modelling choice is Cox PH mod-
els (Bernauer et al. 2013a, Schulze 2014, Cazals & Sauquet 2015 and
Hugh-Jones et al. 2018). With regards to unobserved heterogeneity, it
can lie essentially on two levels, at the country and at the treaty level.
It is concerning to notice that most of the studies with large samples
account for neither of those (Bernauer et al. 2010, Perrin & Bernauer
2010, Bo¨hmelt et al. 2015, Mohrenberg et al. 2016, Spilker & Koubi
2016); this is a factor that could cast doubts on the consistency of the
estimates. There are some exceptions. Cazals & Sauquet (2015) ac-
count for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level by including a
shared frailty term in a continuous survival model. A shared frailty is
the survival analysis equivalent of a country random effect. Yamagata
et al. 2017 include treaty dummies. Instead, Schulze (2014) and Hugh-
Jones et al. (2018) account for heterogeneity subsisting between treaties
by stratifying their models on the basis of the environmental subject
of the treaties (Hugh-Jones et al., 2018) or on each individual treaty
(Schulze, 2014). The problem with stratification is that it roughly
corresponds to modelling each treaty (or group of treaties) separately.
This type of solution rules out heterogeneity but has many limitations
for large data sets and for limits the ability to produce general infer-
ences. Last but not least, Leinaweaver (2012) and Schulze & Tosun
(2013) are the only works that deal with the heterogeneity that could
arise both at the country and at the treaty level. These are modelled
with random effects in a multilevel structure.
In conclusion, the common goal of these studies is to understand
the process of ratification instead of producing a model that describes
the ratification of a single treaty. Pooling agreements together does
not allow for the same level of detail but greatly increases the size and
power of the analysis. The works we presented in this section produced
many interesting results and expanded the analysis to a large number
of smaller agreements that had been previously ignored. Nonetheless,
the benefits of pooling several agreements in a single analysis come
together with some methodological complications, the first of which is
heterogeneity at the treaty level. Since several treaties are modelled
jointly, special attention must be devoted to ensure the consistency
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of the results. Unfortunately, the treatment of unobserved heterogen-
eity has globally been unsatisfactory in the literature and the risk of
sampling bias has not been properly investigated. To make matter
worse, for several studies there is also the suspicion that survival es-
timates could be biased upward due to an incorrect definition of the
risk set. All things considered, these works richly contributed to the
findings on ratification, but from a methodological perspective, there
is room for improvement especially in large studies of pooled treaties.
Table 3.3: Pooled survival analysis
Paper Sample Dependent variable Model
Bernauer
et al. (2010)
255 environ-
mental agreements
between 1950 and
2000, 180 countries.
Survival data on ratifica-
tion recorded annually.
Logistic regression for
grouped survival data
with standard errors
clustered on countries.
In the appendix the
cloglog specification is
experimented and a
cross-sectional logistic
regression is also used
to validate the results.
Perrin &
Bernauer
(2010)
9 Long-Range
Transboundary Air
Pollution (LRTAP)
agreements, 47
Eurasian countries
that ratified the
1979 convention.
Between 1979 an
2007.
Survival data on ratifica-
tion recorded annually.
Logistic regression for
grouped survival data
with clustered robust
standard errors (condi-
tional logit with fixed
effect for each treaty in
robustness checks).
Leinaweaver
(2012)
55 environmental
agreements (in-
cluding regional)
and 193 countries
between 1980 and
2000.
Survival data on ratifica-
tion recorded annually.
Logit model for sur-
vival data with 2 ran-
dom effects respect-
ively for countries and
treaties.
Bernauer
et al. (2013a)
286 agreements,
153 countries
between 1973 and
2006.
Survival data on ratifica-
tion recorded annually.
Cox PH model.
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Pooled survival analysis (continued)
Paper Sample Dependent variable Model
Schulze &
Tosun (2013)
21 agreements ne-
gotiated under the
UNECE. Ratifica-
tion of 25 non-EU
countries between
1979 and 2010.
Survival data on ratifica-
tion recorded annually.
Multilevel binary re-
gression for discrete
survival model with
cross-classified random
effects (Cox and lo-
gistic regression in ap-
pendix).
Schulze
(2014)
64 treaties, 21
OECD countries
from 1971 to 2003.
Survival data on ratifica-
tion recorded annually.
Cox PH model with
different baseline haz-
ards for each treaty
(a shared frailty model
is built in robustness
checks).
Cazals &
Sauquet
(2015)
41 environmental
agreements ratifica-
tion by 99 countries
from 1976 to 1999.
Survival data on ratifica-
tion recorded daily.
Cox PH model with
frailty term shared at
country level.
Bo¨hmelt
et al. (2015)
250 agreements,
75 democracies
between 1973 and
2002. Data from
Bernauer et al.
(2010).
Survival data on ratifica-
tion recorded annually.
Logistic regression
for survival data with
clustered standard er-
ror on country-treaty
dyads
Mohrenberg
et al. (2016)
219 agreements,
160 countries
between 1950 and
2000. Data from
Bernauer et al.
(2010).
Survival data on ratifica-
tion recorded annually.
Logistic regression
for survival data
with standard errors
clustered on countries.
Spilker &
Koubi (2016)
220 agreements,
162 countries
between 1950 and
2000. Data from
Bernauer et al.
(2010).
Survival data on ratifica-
tion recorded annually.
Logistic regression
for survival data
with standard errors
clustered on countries.
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Pooled survival analysis (continued)
Paper Sample Dependent variable Model
Yamagata
et al. (2017)
8 agreements and
166 countries
between 1981 and
2006.
Survival data on ratifica-
tion recorded annually.
Two separate logit
regressions (pre- and
post-1991) for dis-
crete survival analysis
with standard errors
clustered on countries.
The models include
a matrix of weights
to account for the
interaction between
countries (spatial
regression).
Hugh-Jones
et al. (2018)
126 agreements
and 157 countries
between 1972 and
2000. Bernauer
et al. (2010).
Survival data on ratifica-
tion recorded annually.
Cox PH model strati-
fied on different areas
of regulation, stand-
ard errors clustered on
countries.
3.2.4 Conclusion
In the second half of this chapter, we traced the evolution of the meth-
odological approach in the ratification literature. At first, empirical
studies use mostly a cross-sectional approach with ratification count
data. This approach has a series of limitations. For instance, estim-
ates may be influenced by the cut-off date, count data does not allow
to study or control for treaty characteristics, and lumping treaties to-
gether does not allow to know which agreement has been ratified, just
the total number of ratifications. The number of ratification is not
a very meaningful measure: does participation in more treaties imply
stronger environmental commitments? The number of ratified agree-
ments largely depend on the number of agreements the country can
potentially ratify, a factor that has never been accounted for. The fun-
damental problem of count data is that it does not allow to distinguish
how countries differ in their ratification choices for a same agreement.
Moreover, this approach does not allow to study how the choice of a
country interacts with choices of other countries because cross-sectional
studies have no information regarding the timing of ratifications.
Gradually, the approach shifted towards the use of survival models
because they allow to study both the occurrence and timing of rati-
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fication. We distinguish between studies studying single agreements
and the ones studying a sample of treaties. Survival approach tackles
most of the shortcomings of previous the methodology. Survival ana-
lysis can easily cope with right-censoring. Ratifications can be traced
to the treaty and country, therefore treaty and country variables can
be studied jointly. And finally, survival analysis allows to study the
differences in ratification timing, consequently giving the opportunity
to study how ratifications interact with each other. However, survival
models for large samples of agreements face methodological complex-
ities which are not always appropriately tackled. Above all, pooled
survival models are faced with problems related to unobserved hetero-
geneity and the identification of potential ratifiers. Unfortunately, both
these issues have not been adequately addressed in the literature.
Overall, the methodological differences between count and survival
studies make it complicated to compare their findings. For example,
models using count data are unable to account jointly for treaty and
country characteristics, and differ substantially from survival studies
in terms of treaty and country samples, thus they cannot be compared
with survival models. Similarly, studies of single agreements are hard
to generalise. Their results apply to single treaties and control for very
specific aspects relating to the environmental issue treated in the agree-
ment. They cannot be compared to studies of large samples of treaties.
As a result, different approaches generally emphasise different variables
and questions. Earlier contributions using count data — because of
their limitations — study mainly country variables, in particular they
emphasise the role of economic development, trade and democracy (e.g.
Congleton 1992, Roberts 1996, Frank 1999, Seelarbokus 2014). Later
studies employing survival data confirm most of the findings regarding
these variables, especially the role played by political variables (e.g.
Neumayer 2002a, Bernauer et al. 2013a, Bo¨hmelt et al. 2015). The
evidence for economic development and trade is not equally strong.
Nevertheless, it is usually found that trade and diplomatic relationships
influence the way ratifications interact with each other. In fact, peer
nations exhibit interdependence in ratification choices: participation in
a treaty by one country prompts participation by its peer nations (e.g.
Bernauer et al. 2010, Schulze & Tosun 2013, Yamagata et al. 2017).
This sort of analysis is simply not possible in cross-sectional studies
because they lack information on the timing of ratification. Pooled
survival studies focus mainly on international interactions and occa-
sionally on studying how treaty characteristics affect participation. In
essence, the evolution in the approach allowed to answer a progressively
larger set of questions.
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Chapter 4
A theoretical framework
to analyse the determinants of
ratification
In the previous chapter we reviewed the empirical studies on the ratific-
ation of environmental agreements. We outlined the main conclusions
and implications drawn from this body of research. We discussed the
data, as well as the methodological choices and approaches that have
been used to study ratification. A critical review of the literature would
be incomplete if it did not touch on the large existing theoretical literat-
ure on the topic of environmental agreements. This branch of economic
literature is mainly concerned with applying game theory to the forma-
tion, participation and the subsequent compliance with environmental
agreements. As of now, there is a substantial lack of communication
between the empirical studies of the previous chapter and the theoret-
ical literature discussed in this chapter. Despite being two proximate
fields of enquiry, they are mostly working in parallel, with very limited
interconnection and reciprocal influence. On one side, the theoretical
literature would benefit from empirical evidence to test its assump-
tions and corroborate its predictions. On the other side, the empirical
studies discussed in the previous chapter would benefit from a more rig-
orous theoretical framework. The goal of this chapter is to introduce
the game-theoretical literature on treaty participation and attempt to
build a unifying framework for analysing ratification choices.
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4.1 Transboundary externalities and in-
ternational environmental treaties
Most environmental issues are linked to a failure in the first funda-
mental welfare theorem. Environmental resources share many attrib-
utes of a public good: they frequently present missing or incomplete
markets and environmental problems often qualify as externalities of
production (Kolstad, 2010). All these characteristics lead to an ineffi-
cient use of environmental resources and — quite critically — to a sys-
tematic under-provision of environmental goods. Under some circum-
stances, governmental interventions can solve the failures at the source.
Typical tools proposed by environmental economics include Pigouvian
taxes, subsidies, cap and trade mechanisms or emission standards. If
well calibrated, and with sufficient information, these tools could cor-
rect the market failure and lead to an efficient use of resources (Kolstad,
2010).
The tragedy of transboundary environmental issues is that a central
enforcing power is missing (Perman et al., 2003). Hence, the forms of
intervention discussed above lack the central authority needed for im-
plementation of environmental polices over two or more jurisdictions.
In the case of domestic environmental problems, the policy maker pos-
sesses the authority to allocate property rights, impose taxes and en-
force standards (Barrett, 2005). In contrast, environmental policies
cannot be enforced beyond national borders in the case of transbound-
ary problems. If domestic agents try to free-ride on environmental
policies, the policy maker has the legal power to coerce them into act-
ing accordingly to their policies. However, if foreign nations or entities
shirk their obligations, national policy makers have no coercive power
to force compliance.
When environmental damages affect multiple nations, the country
— or entity — responsible for the damage to the environment does not
fully bear the costs associated to their actions (Pearson, 2011). Foreign
nations have no way of intervening and, in the case of shared resources,
any measure taken unilaterally may be unable to solve the problem or
is unlikely to take into account international externalities (Pearson,
2011). Traditional policy tools are ineffective to solve international en-
vironmental problems since there is no single dominating power with
the authority to enforce environmental policies in all concerned coun-
tries. The discrepancy between the scale of the environmental issue
and competent political authorities calls for an approach based on co-
operation. As of now, international agreements are undoubtedly the
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primary tool for multilateral cooperation (Perman et al., 2003).
Cooperation has the potential to unite the enforcing power of coun-
tries and coordinate domestic actions in such a way as to obtain an
efficient use of resources. Through negotiations, countries can agree
on mutual and voluntary restraints to be implemented domestically
(Finus, 2008). Environmental agreements are the formal embodiment
of these restraints and constitute the legal basis for all subsequent gov-
ernmental action. In principle, environmental agreements can enhance
the welfare of nations because they coordinate nations that would oth-
erwise engage unilaterally until the marginal cost equals the national
marginal benefit, without taking into account the benefit of their ac-
tions on other countries (Barrett, 1994). Essentially, environmental
agreements have the potential to internalise international externalities.
Nevertheless, cooperation is not easy and the potential of environ-
mental agreements often fails to materialise. The main challenge faced
by environmental agreements is the incentive to free ride (Finus, 2008).
International agreements are quintessential voluntary acts: their power
is entirely based on the voluntary acceptance of its terms by the indi-
vidual countries. Non-rivalry in the benefits of environmental agree-
ments means that non-ratifiers can still benefit from the action that
other countries take (Marrouch & Chaudhuri, 2015). This forms an in-
centive to free-ride and capture the benefits of the agreement without
bearing its costs. Not only that, since there is no force capable of mak-
ing a country comply with the agreement, even ratifiers could in prin-
ciple decide to free-ride on their commitments (Perman et al., 2003).
And to make matters worse, transboundary environmental goods are
often non-excludable, thus the agreement could be plagued by ineffi-
cient levels of provision because countries do not take into account the
positive externality of their abatement effort on other nations (Wag-
ner, 2001). All of these elements cast doubts on the incentives to join
agreements and on their effectiveness in promoting environmental pro-
tection.
In economic theory the challenges faced by environmental agree-
ments have mainly been treated with a game-theoretical approach.
These models rest on the duality in the incentives faced by nations
(Carraro & Siniscalco, 1993). On the one hand, welfare could be in-
creased by cooperating on environmental issues. On the other hand,
the non-rival benefits of the agreement imply strong incentives to free-
ride. In transboundary environmental problems the environmental cost
of a nation does not depend exclusively on its action but also on what
other nations do (Finus, 2008). Hence, countries’ decisions are not
taken in isolation — they interact in several way. Game theory is the
73
preferred tool used to model the trade-offs and strategic choices faced
by nations. The standard framework studies at the same time the level
of participation and the environmental commitment to the treaty. In
the next section we provide an overview of the economic literature on
environmental agreements, highlighting the main implications for the
ratification of agreements.
4.2 Theoretical literature on the parti-
cipation in environmental treaties
A complete review of this vast area of research is beyond the scope of
this thesis. The goal here is to provide a general overview of the ap-
proaches, predictions, conclusions and topics of the theoretical literat-
ure on participation in International Environmental Agreements (IEA).
An exhaustive review of the game-theoretical research on formation and
participation in environmental agreements is provided by Marrouch &
Chaudhuri (2015). Wangler et al. (2013) also offers a good section on
the political economy side of treaty participation. For a broader intro-
duction to the area, Wagner (2001) provides a thorough overview of the
main issues surrounding treaty formation and participation in a non-
cooperative setting. A more detailed treatment of the main challenges
and assumptions underpinning the game-theoretical analysis of multi-
lateral environmental agreements can be found in Finus (2008), who
also integrates the standard membership game with payoffs generated
by an Integrated Assessment Model (IAM)1.
In general, participation in environmental agreements is modelled
in two different ways. The first is to use a two-stage game where the
first stage corresponds to the signature/ratification and the second to
the abatement/implementation phase. The second type of approach
involves dynamic membership where countries can choose their mem-
bership status in every time period. The two-stage game is the predom-
inant approach in the literature. Differences among games are mainly
based on whether the nations are assumed to be homogeneous (with
1IAMs are computable general equilibrium (CGE) models that combine both economic
and geophysical modelling. IAMs are very common in the analysis of climate change; some
examples of IAMs of climate change include the RICE model by Nordhaus & Yang (1996)
or the WITCH (Bosetti et al., 2006) model developed by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
(FEEM) and Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici (CMCC).
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symmetric pay-offs) or heterogeneous; or whether the abatement de-
cisions are taken simultaneously or first by the ratifiers. Games also
differ in whether full information is assumed or on how uncertainty is
modelled. The remainder of the section presents a typical two-stage
game that is used as reference for later discussions. Then, we present
the main conclusions of the theoretical studies on environmental agree-
ments. In the last part of the section we expound on recent devel-
opments and illustrate how public choice theories conciliate with the
classic framework of analysis. From this literature different implica-
tions are drawn on the impact of domestic interest groups and the
determinants of ratification.
4.2.1 Set-up of a typical game
In this section we present a typical game of ratification similar to the
one in Carraro & Siniscalco (1993). The notation and structure of
the model are derived from Marrouch & Chaudhuri (2015). We ad-
vise the reader to refer to the source for a more extensive discussion
of alternative assumptions and structures of environmental agreement
participation games.
Environmental agreement participation game
Consider the case of the emissions of a hypothetical pollutant gener-
ated as by-product of industrial production. The pollutant is regarded
as a pure public bad. Let ei be the emissions of pollutant from coun-
try i. The total emissions, E, for a set of N countries is equal to
E =
∑N
i=1 ei. The pollutant has a negative effect on a country’s wel-
fare, which is summarised by a damage function Di(E). Di(E) is an
increasing function linking global emissions E with the damage to a
country i. However, emissions are also associated with some benefits
for the emitting country. The function Bi(ei) represents the benefits of
emissions for country i associated with industrial production. In this
set-up we consider symmetric countries, hence the benefit and dam-
age functions are identical for all nations. The welfare of a country i
corresponds to the reduced-form pay-off function:
Wi = Bi(ei)−Di(E) ∀i ∈ N (4.2.1)
Both linear and convex functions are commonly used to model the
damage and benefit functions. The exact curvature properties have
implications for the conclusions of the model. For instance, when both
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the damage and benefit functions are linear, the emission choice for
the country is binary: either it pollutes or it abates. If one or both
of the functions are non-linear, the level of emissions is defined over a
continuous interval and ultimately depends on the parameters of the
model. Given the sensibility of predictions, some empirical guidance
would be helpful in the parametrisation of theoretical models.
The typical participation game has two stages. In the first stage,
countries decide if they want to form and ratify an environmental
treaty; while in the second stage, countries decide their emission levels.
The structure of the game is common knowledge, meaning that coun-
tries have complete information of other players’ strategy space and
payoff functions. The game is solved by backward induction. We de-
note the subset of ratifying countries in the first stage as R ⊂ N . In
the second stage the ratifiers and non-ratifiers simultaneously choose
their emission levels by taking the strategies of the other players as
given. In equilibrium, the welfare of the ratifiers and non-ratifiers is
defined respectively as W ∗r and W
∗
nr in correspondence of the optimal
emission levels.
Whether or not a country decides to join the coalition of ratifiers
in the agreement depends on whether it is beneficial to do so. Hence,
the treaty needs to be self-enforcing because of the absence of a central
authority capable of enforcing the agreement. The self-enforcement
of an agreement for non-cooperating countries is normally assumed to
rely on the cartel stability criterion identified by D’Aspremont et al.
(1983), which implies that a self-enforcing agreement yields a stable
coalition if it is externally and internally stable. A coalition is internally
stable if it is less beneficial for a member to leave the coalition rather
than unilaterally maximising its welfare; that is to say, for all i ∈ R,
W ∗r (r) ≥ W ∗nr(r−1) where r is the number of ratifying countries and nr
of non ratifying countries. The coalition is externally stable if it is less
beneficial for a non-member to join the coalition instead of unilaterally
maximising its welfare; that is to say, W ∗nr(r) ≥ W ∗r (r+1) for all i /∈ R.
A stable coalition can be achieved with this set-up, but the size of
the coalition — and consequentially the number of ratifiers — is rather
small. Ultimately, the exact value of r depends on the curvature of
the benefit and damage functions. When both functions are linear two
outcomes are possible: either a grand coalition or no coalition at all.
The first outcome is achievable only with a shallow agreement entailing
abatement levels no higher than the unilateral non-cooperative equilib-
rium (Barrett, 1994). According to Carraro & Siniscalco (1993), when
the benefit function is quadratic and the damage function is linear, the
best response function is orthogonal and the largest stable number of
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parties to the agreement is 3. When the marginal benefit of emission
is constant but the damage function is quadratic, a stable coalition of
two countries is achievable. Finally, when both functions are quad-
ratic, the largest stable coalition comprises only one country. As it is
evident from these examples, environmental agreement participation
games generally predict very dire ratification and abatement scenarios.
More complex games
The game presented in this section represents the simplest case of a
static cooperation problem. More complex types of games, with differ-
ent assumptions and structures, imply varying levels of participation.
For example, dynamic games allow choices to be protracted in time
instead of being a one-off simultaneous decision. In dynamic games,
countries can decide at each period whether they want to participate in
the agreement and/or how much to abate. This type of games supports
sequential ratification decisions. Calvo & Rubio (2013) review a large
number of applications for this type of modelling. The games can also
be made more realistic by defining heterogeneous countries. Countries
often have different incentives to participate, hence symmetry in the
pay-offs is a simplifying assumption. The first paper considering het-
erogeneous countries is by Hoel (1992). In Hoel (1992) every country
has a different (constant) marginal benefit of abatement, while the mar-
ginal cost is assumed to be equal for all countries. Heterogeneity does
not alter the pessimistic conclusions on treaty participation. In fact,
Hoel (1992) finds that the largest stable coalition that a treaty can sus-
tain has only two players. Nevertheless, evidence is mixed in the case
of heterogeneous countries; recent works have shown that strong asym-
metric distributions in the benefits and costs of a treaty may induce
higher gains from cooperation and could sustain the grand coalition if
transfers are allowed (Finus & McGinty, 2015).
Another branch of the literature developed games that do not as-
sume perfect information. Uncertainty mainly regards the abatement
performance of foreign nations as well as the benefits of the agreement
and how they are distributed (e.g. Na & Shin 1998 or Kolstad & Ulph
2011). Generally, the participation level increases compared to the full
information case, however some types of uncertainty — such as un-
certainty over environmental damages or a country’s commitment —
increase shirking risks and lead to even more pessimistic conclusions.
A fundamental assumption in game theory regards how country
decisions are taken, and consequentially, the criteria for the stability
of coalitions. Marrouch & Chaudhuri (2015) distinguish mainly three
criteria: non-cooperative, cooperative and farsighted stability. In non-
77
cooperative games a country that decides to leave the coalition does
not affect the participation of the other members of the coalition be-
cause every nation takes decisions based solely on its self-interest. Con-
versely, cooperative games maximise the welfare of the coalition and
imply that the participation of all the countries is necessary for a stable
coalition. If a country decides to defect, the entire coalition shatters in
response (Marrouch & Chaudhuri, 2015). Between these two extremes,
farsighted stability assumes that a country behaves non-cooperatively,
but the country also takes into consideration the impact of its par-
ticipation status on the participation of other countries and accounts
for all possible chain reactions (Finus, 2008). The implications for the
stability and size of coalitions vary considerably depending on how de-
cisions are taken. For example, Diamantoudi & Sartzetakis (2006) find
that under farsighted stability, stable coalitions are attained with lar-
ger sizes than under classic non-cooperative assumption (e.g. Barrett
1994). This result is confirmed by Biancardi & Villani (2010) in a two-
stage game, which also shows that stronger environmental awareness
can sustain larger coalitions.
4.2.2 Emerging conclusions
Participation vs depth
To summarise the main results of participation games, Barrett (1994)
states 3 stylised points about the effectiveness of environmental agree-
ments and the level of participation:
• Agreements codify commitments that countries would undertake
unilaterally even without the agreement;
• when the number of participants to the agreement is large, the
agreement brings few obligations and implies a low abatement
effort;
• international cooperation is harder to attain when it is most
needed.
These conclusions constitute the “paradox of cooperation” (Barrett,
1994). The implications for ratification are straightforward: high rates
of ratification should be achieved only when the commitment level is
low, whereas stringent agreements should hardly receive any ratifica-
tion. Later works have corroborated the trade-off at the basis of the
paradox, with some improvement in the views expressed in the latest
contributions (Finus et al., 2017).
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The pessimistic conclusions originate from the theoretical frame-
work adopted. Transboundary environmental issues are analysed with
games framed as prisoner’s dilemmas, where the Nash equilibrium lies
in a non-cooperative solution. The only case in which the parties decide
to undertake positive abatement commitments beyond their unilateral
levels is when they decide to cooperate. However, cooperation leads to
unstable coalitions. Very much like cartels, members to the agreement
have the incentive to free-ride, hence game theory ultimately predicts
that the agreement does not deliver any environmental gain beyond
the non-cooperative solution.
The only exception to this outcome is when agreements are self-
enforcing — that is to say, the incentive structure is such as to induce
a stable cooperating coalition. But these cases are traditionally deemed
rare and not occurring for the most pressing environmental issues (Bar-
rett, 2008). According to the literature, one of the most effective ways
of building self-enforcing agreements is to include penalties for defect-
ing nations (Barrett & Stavins, 2003). Nonetheless, this mechanism
raises a series of issues. In the first place, parties need to be able to
monitor the activity of other nations because they have an incentive
to overestimate their abatement action in a situation of imperfect in-
formation. Furthermore, countries cannot be forced to pay their fines
or keep their promises because of the absence of an enforcing authority.
Finally, penalties increase the cost of participating in the agreement;
and the more stringent the agreement, the less likely it is to attract par-
ticipants (Perman et al., 2003). In essence, this framework of analysis
depicts an impossible impasse based on a trade-off between depth of
cooperation and breadth of participation in the agreement (Bernauer
et al., 2013a). Perman et al. (2003, p.310) summarise it as follows:
“The larger are the potential gains to cooperation, the greater are the
benefits of free-riding and so the larger are the incentives to defect. But
the larger are the incentives to defect, the smaller will be the number
of signatories”.
Mitigating factors
Subsequent works introduced additional mechanisms that mitigate in
part the pessimistic predictions of game-theoretical models. First, if
ratifiers offer side payments other countries have a stronger incent-
ive to join (Barrett & Stavins, 2003). Countries that do not ratify
the environmental agreement renounce to side payments associated to
the agreement. The missed opportunity on side payments acts as a
negative externality generated by the ratifiers, parallel to the positive
externality deriving from pollution abatement (Wagner, 2001). This
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type of transfers is quite common in reality, in fact a large number of
environmental agreement include some form of support to developing
nations. There is also empirical evidence that this type of mechanisms
tangibly boost participation (von Stein 2008, Bernauer et al. 2013b).
From a theoretical perspective, a number of contributions have shown
that side payments modify the conclusions on the size and stability
of coalitions. For example, Carraro & Siniscalco (1993) expand their
model to include side payments among members of the agreement.
They demonstrate that, even under non-cooperative assumption, side
payments can increase participation in the agreement. Side payments
are found to be particularly effective when heterogeneous countries are
considered (Barrett 2001; Fuentes-Albero & Rubio 2010). Carraro &
Siniscalco (1993) suggest that side payments do not need to be strictly
monetary. For example they could take the form of technological trans-
fers or concessions to the country. Nevertheless, in order to induce
non-participants to ratify it is important that ratifiers’ commitment to
remain in the coalition is credible.
Another mitigating mechanism is to link environmental agreements
to other forms of cooperation. For example, it is often found that free-
riding incentives are greatly reduced if the environmental agreement in-
cludes some form of trade restriction (Barrett, 1997). However, trade
sanctions are not the only possible form of linkage. Communication
and parallel negotiations between environmental agreements also con-
tribute to higher participation levels (Carraro & Siniscalco 1998, Bloch
& Gomes 2006). Biancardi & Villani (2015) develop a model of treaty
participation with two groups of heterogeneous countries that also have
the possibility of cooperating in environmental R&D. Ratification of
the agreement creates a positive externality for the coordination of re-
search. In the end, Biancardi & Villani (2015) find that participation
in environmental agreements increases compared to the model without
linkage to environmental research. Furthermore, environmental agree-
ments could be linked with other forms of cooperation through “repu-
tation effects”. Hoel & Schneider (1997) are among the few papers
modelling this form of interaction. Hoel & Schneider (1997) define a
reputational cost for non-ratifiers that increases with the number of
participants in the agreement. Reputational costs augment particip-
ation by offsetting the free-ride incentives. The connection between
treaties and other forms of cooperation has been explored in more de-
tail by the empirical literature on ratification (e.g. Neumayer 2002b,
Bernauer et al. 2010, Schneider & Urpelainen 2013, Yamagata et al.
2013)2.
2For more on the treatment of this subject in the empirical literature see section 3.1.4
80
Thirdly, depending on how games are set, the game-theoretical ap-
proach could still predict more optimistic scenarios. For example, if, in-
stead of framing the problem as a one-off decision, countries — through
repeated games — are allowed to start participating in different peri-
ods, outcomes are generally more encouraging. In fact, higher parti-
cipation rates are attained especially when communication is allowed
(Marrouch & Chaudhuri, 2015). For instance, Wagner (2016) elabor-
ates a model that is casted as a repeated game with infinite horizon. In
every stage the countries can decide either to ratify or to abstain from
ratifying. Unlike other models of treaty participation Wagner (2016)
assumes that the payoff of countries increases over time. As a result of
this assumption, all nations are bound to ratify the treaty on the long-
run. Moreover, the model accommodates interactions among country
ratifications which can either be positive (complements) or negative
(substitute). Since the ratification outcome is guaranteed by the core
assumptions, the model essentially describes the delay in ratification,
which depends on whether there is complementarity or substitutability
in ratifications. Eventually all countries will ratify, and the ratification
order will reflect the relative benefits of cooperation.
Finally, specific design features of the treaty could boost participa-
tion and commitment under the agreement. For instance, Carraro et al.
(2009) and Rubio & Casino (2005) find that treaties with minimum par-
ticipation rules — that is to say a minimum number of ratifiers before
the agreement enters into force — lead to large stable coalitions. It is
generally found that a minimum participation rule leads to coalitions
of size corresponding to the minimum number of countries required for
the entry into force of the agreement. This result derives from the fact
that any coalition smaller than the minimum induces unilateral abate-
ment levels which are less desirable for all countries. The models of
Carraro et al. (2009) and Rubio & Casino (2005) are based on simpli-
fying assumptions; for example, they assume homogeneous countries
and complete information. A stable coalition is no longer sustainable
when uncertainties over the benefits of abatement are taken into ac-
count (Wagner, 2001). To a lesser extent, other treaty features receive
treatment too. For example, Karp & Zhao (2010) explore the effects
of agreements with penalties and permit trading schemes on the de-
gree of participation and effectiveness of the treaty. They find that
an agreement with trading schemes entails lower levels of participation
but higher abatement commitments.
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4.2.3 Public choice theory and environmental agree-
ments
We have presented the classic game-theoretical model used to analyse
participation in environmental agreement. This model produces dire
conclusions for the attractiveness and usefulness of treaties. To a cer-
tain degree, the dire conclusions are mitigated by elements such as side
payments, linkage of issues, or specific treaty features and modelling
choices. This part of the chapter explores how public choice theory in-
teracts with the classic model and investigates the influence of domestic
agents in the political process of ratification.
Public choice perspective on environmental policies
Up to this point the models presented in this chapter portray policy
makers as benevolent tyrants that act strategically to maximise the
welfare of their countries. Public choice theory breaks this assumption
and states that policy makers are motivated by self-interest. Under this
assumption, individual incentives can influence the outcome of govern-
mental policies. Buchanan & Tullock (1975) is one of the first studies
explaining the selection of environmental policy instruments based on
the interests of domestic agents. Their work spurred a vast research
work that solidified the understanding of the political processes in-
volved in governmental actions.
Pressure groups appear in Damania (1999), who builds a theor-
etical model of political lobbying to explain the selection of environ-
mental policy instruments. In his model emission taxes are proposed by
parties that represent environmental pressure groups. Most of the time
environmental pressure groups do not have sufficient political strength,
so less costly environmental policies are adopted — such as emission
standards. Even when environmental taxes or charges are introduced,
they are not strong enough to entail sufficient reduction in emissions
because of the strong industrial lobbying influence. Similarly, Dijkstra
(1998) uses a game-theoretical approach to explore the choice between
two environmental policy instruments (market instruments and direct
regulation) when government decisions are open to the influence of
industrial pressure groups. They conclude that market instruments,
such as tradeable emission caps, are implemented less often because of
the impact of lobbying activity. These results are echoed in a separ-
ate paper on market-based policies by Kollmann & Schneider (2010).
The work of Dijkstra (1998) is expanded by Beard et al. (2007) in a
two-stage game of political lobbying for environmental policies in which
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government has imperfect monitoring capacities. And in a similar fash-
ion, Glachant (2008) builds a model in which the government selects
between three environmental policy instruments (emission standard,
tax on emission, tradeable emission permits) under the influence of
pressure groups representing polluting industries. The model implies
that tradeable permits dominate the other policy instruments because
free allocation of trading permits makes it the preferable outcome for
lobbying industries. The equilibrium does not represent a social op-
timum because instruments such as emission taxes generate a financial
influx to the government while free allocation only fixes an emission
cap.
In summary, public choice theory widely recognises that the interest
of domestic interest groups may affect the formation and implement-
ation of environmental policies. However, study of the implications of
domestic dynamics for international policies — in particular the parti-
cipation in environmental agreements — is a recent development in the
literature. The existing work mainly focuses on the impact of elections
over the choice of environmental policies. For example, Buchholz et al.
(2005) investigate how participation in environmental agreements is af-
fected by government’s electoral incentives. In a similar paper, Roelf-
sma (2007) builds a model articulating the response of the level of
environmental commitment to the preferences of electors. The author
argues that when the preferences of electors are taken into account,
the abatement is higher than the non-cooperative level predicted by
conventional game-theoretical approach.
The use of median voter models is another method to incorporate
electoral incentives in governments’ choices. The median voter the-
orem states that a government needs to meet the preferences of the
median voter in order to get elected. This idea can be used to examine
how ratification decisions are influenced by the preferences of electors
and other domestic actors. These models are usually framed in two
stages. The first one corresponds to the election of the government,
the second to the negotiation (and ratification) of the agreement. It
is generally concluded that electors choose governments with differ-
ent environmental preferences from their own (Roelfsma 2007, Hattori
2010); government’s penchant for environmental protection depends
on the specific design of the model and on the fundamental assump-
tion of whether countries behave cooperatively or non-cooperatively.
According to these models, when electors have strong preferences for
environmental protection, participation in agreements tends to be very
likely. If environmental preferences are strong enough, the effect man-
ages to overturn the pessimistic predictions of classic game-theoretical
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literature on the participation and effectiveness of environmental agree-
ments (Wangler et al., 2013). This is in line with the scenario described
by Kirchga¨ssner & Schneider (2003) which describes how the increasing
demand for environmental protection led to the formulation of environ-
mental policies that were initially opposed by industrial lobbies. Thus,
the indirect pressure of voters acts as a competing force of lobbying of
special interest groups.
In a representative democracy, the outcome of government’s de-
cisions is not solely based on electoral preferences. Very often, interests
of strong domestic groups are able to influence political outcomes. In a
seminal contribution, Grossman & Helpman (1994) develop a model in
which interest groups and elector’s preferences affect trade policies; a
similar framework is also applied to free-trade agreements (Grossman
& Helpman, 1996) and trade policies Grossman & Helpman (1995).
Policy makers maximise a political support function that encompasses
both electoral support and contributions by interest groups3. This has
implications also for ratification decisions. Policy makers might take
into consideration the contributions of industrial and environmental
lobbies when deciding on their participation in environmental agree-
ments. In reference to this idea, Fredriksson (1997) and Aidt (2010)
explore the influence of interest groups on environmental tax rates.
Their models predict a negative effect of industrial lobbying on en-
vironmental taxes. These examples describe the influence of interest
groups on general environmental polices, but in addition to these ef-
forts, a growing body of research attempted in recent years to merge
the effects of domestic interest groups with the theory on participa-
tion in international environmental agreements. This body of research
is directly pertinent to our research questions; it will be reviewed in
detail in the next paragraph.
Interest groups in models of treaty participation
In essence, public choice theory promotes an atomistic view of policy in-
tervention. Environmental policies are described as the outcome of ten-
sions between different domestic interests. Kirchga¨ssner & Schneider
(2003) and Kollmann & Schneider (2010) state that decisions over en-
vironmental policies are influenced by the following domestic agents: i)
electors, ii) public institutions and administration, iii) interest groups
and iv) politicians. A broad body of literature sought to incorporate
the tensions between these agents into endogenous models of “environ-
3Contributions from lobby groups are not necessarily monetary; e.g. media coverage,
logistic support, personal contacts or information for policy making.
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mental policy selection”. In recent years this effort has been extended
from environmental policies to environmental agreement. Research fo-
cuses on embedding the effects of lobbying practices and electoral in-
centives into the classic game-theoretical framework of treaty particip-
ation. These models respond to the need of accommodating a more
realistic political process within the classic framework of analysis (Car-
raro & Siniscalco, 1998).
According to Putnam (1988) and Barrett (1998), ratification is the
outcome of a two-stage game: the first played internationally by na-
tional representatives during the negotiation phase of the treaty, the
second domestically by the political institutions and domestic stake-
holders. A realistic model of treaty formation and participation needs
to consider the domestic dynamics that could impinge on the willing-
ness of countries to join environmental agreements. At the moment,
there is a growing effort to assimilate the leanings of public choice the-
ory into the classic framework of analysis. This type of work is directly
relevant to our research questions and formulates interesting predic-
tions about the role and impact of domestic interest groups on treaty
participation.
Haffoudhi (2005) is one of the earliest contributions lying at the
intersection of public choice theory and treaty participation literature.
Haffoudhi (2005) develops a model in which environmental and in-
dustrial lobbies influence the ratification of environmental agreements
through political support to politicians. The political interactions are
grafted on a classic non-cooperative two-stage game of environmental
agreement participation, with a one-off participation choice and simul-
taneous abatement decision, identical to the one presented at the begin-
ning of this chapter. In Haffoudhi (2005), the citizens of every country
are organised in two groups: environmental and industrial groups. The
environmental group benefits from an increase in the global abatement
level and is harmed if the abatement level of the country is lower than
the environmental equilibrium level. In contrast, the industrial group
would prefer the abatement level to be as low as possible in the country.
The political support offered from environmental and industrial groups
depends on the welfare gains derived from government’s actions. In this
model, rather than opting for the social best, politicians maximise a
function of political support. Countries deciding to join the environ-
mental agreement maximise the coalition’s political support function
while non-ratifiers maximise unilaterally their political support func-
tion. Ultimately, governments choose to participate in the agreement
and choose the abatement level in such a way as to maximise the sup-
port from the two domestic groups. The precise outcome depends on
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the exact specification of the support function and payoffs for the lobby
groups. Haffoudhi (2005) specifies payoff functions similar to the ones
in Carraro & Siniscalco (1993) and assumes that the political support
function is linearly additive. In the end, a stable coalition is achievable
and the participation of a country depends on the relative strength of
the two groups.
Habla & Winkler (2013) also encompass domestic interest groups.
Their game analyses the choice of countries to join a common permit
emission scheme in a first stage and choose the level of emission allow-
ances in a second stage. This model has the same structure of a classic
two-stage game of environmental treaty participation, but in this game
the agreement relates specifically to the institution of a common mar-
ket for emission permits. The game has some special features. Firstly,
it is played by only two countries. The tradeable permit scheme is
only formed if both countries decide to participate. Secondly, groups
of industrial lobbies can affect both the “ratification” phase and the
phase in which the number of emission allowances is chosen. Industrial
interest groups are not assumed to be unitary groups but a multitude
of lobbies. Environmental lobbies are not explicitly modelled, however
demand for environmental protection is channelled through electoral
support to politicians. As a result, policy-makers balance two conflict-
ing incentives. On the one hand, environmental protection increases
the welfare of voters. On the other hand, favouring the interest of in-
dustrial lobbies could grant easier re-election thanks to their support
and financial backing (funding campaign, information or even bribes).
In the end, Habla & Winkler (2013) conclude that it is the aggregate
strength of industrial lobbies that affects participation to the scheme,
rather than the distribution of power among lobby groups. Interest-
ingly, they also find that if the influence of a single lobby group greatly
increases, the interest of that lobby is less likely to be attended in both
countries. Depending on the parametrisation of the electoral prefer-
ences in this model, the effect of the lobbies could be reduced. That is
to say, if the preferences of voters are strongly in favour of participation
in the treaty, the policy-maker would find it advantageous to tap into
the electoral benefits rather than favouring industrial lobbies.
Hagen et al. (2016) study participation in environmental agreements
and abatement decisions when environmental and industrial lobbies in-
fluence decisions of policy-makers. Their model does not treat elect-
oral dynamics, it just focuses on rival contributions from the two lobby
groups. The contribution of lobbies to the policy-makers represents
their willingness to pay in order to see their desired policy adopted.
Again, an equilibrium ratification and abatement level is derived from
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a two-stage treaty participation game in which the decisions of coun-
tries take into account both the benefits of abatement and the con-
tributions of environmental and industrial lobbies. Industrial groups
offer contributions hoping to decrease abatement levels while environ-
mental groups wish to increase abatement levels. The framework of the
analysis is very similar to that of Haffoudhi (2005). However, unlike
Haffoudhi (2005) and Habla & Winkler (2013), they consider hetero-
geneous countries. Furthermore, the support of lobby groups is exerted
with a delay in time. Before ratification and abatement decisions are
taken, environmental and industrial lobbies announce their intended
contributions on the basis of the expected abatement level. Then,
after the ratification and abatement decisions are taken, lobby payoffs
are determined and contributions are paid according to the original
announcements.
Abatement levels are decided simultaneously by ratifiers and non
ratifiers in the second stage of the game. Hagen et al. (2016) conclude
that the abatement level of ratifiers and non-ratifiers is influenced by
the announced contributions of environmental and industrial lobbies
in the expected direction. Higher environmental contributions lead to
higher abatement, while higher industrial contributions lead to lower
abatement. The effect of environmental lobby groups in a ratifying
country also increases abatement in other ratifying nations because
ratifiers are assumed to behave cooperatively. Regarding the particip-
ation levels in the agreement, lobbying has ambiguous effects for the
stability of coalitions. Industrial lobbying lowers the ratification in-
centives of other countries, but has no clear effect on the country in
which the lobby is based. On the contrary, environmental lobbying in-
creases the likelihood of a country to join the coalition, but reduces the
likelihood of other nations to ratify. Environmental lobbying is associ-
ated with higher participation because it mitigates the costs of higher
abatement levels that come with treaty membership. The “spillover”
effect of lobbying offshoots from the joint maximisation process of rat-
ifiers (cooperative behaviour), which implies that an increase in the
abatement in one of the ratifiers also requires an increase in abatement
levels in all other ratifiers. All of this entails higher abatement costs
that dissuade less ambitious countries from joining the agreement. In
the end, the ambiguous effect of lobbying prevents the determination
of a stable coalition size.
The work by Hagen et al. (2016) shows that domestic interest groups
may have a strong impact on the size, depth and stability of interna-
tional coalitions. They further show that environmental lobbying is
able to positively influence a country’s propensity to ratify an agree-
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ment. The effect of industrial lobbying results on lower abatement
levels, but has an ambiguous effect on ratification. Conversely, envir-
onmental lobbying increases the likelihood of joining the treaty, but
has an ambiguous effect on the level of abatement.
In Marchiori et al. (2017) the structure of the game is nearly identical
to that in Hagen et al. (2016). Countries have two opposing interest
groups with different welfare functions which determine their willing-
ness to contribute. The main difference revolves around the way con-
tributions are announced and paid. Marchiori et al. (2017) distinguish
three phases: i) in the first phase the lobby groups announce their in-
tended contributions; ii) given these contributions the policy makers in
every country simultaneously decide their abatement levels; iii) finally,
lobby groups make contributions based on the choices of the policy
makers. The ratification decision is derived by backward induction
after the abatement level is set. The influence of lobbies is assumed
to depend on the level of organisation of the lobby and the preference
for “contributions” of the policy maker. Paradoxically, they find that
in correspondence of strong preferences for contributions a country is
more likely to join the agreement when industrial lobbies are strong
or environmental lobbies are weak. The reason behind this finding is
that higher abatement levels will be expected if a country joins the
agreement. As a result, industrial lobbies will be propense to make lar-
ger contributions to avoid high abatement levels in the second stage.
Conversely, strong environmental lobbies will make larger contribu-
tions when the treaty is not ratified in order to limit the environmental
damage. Hence, policy makers maximise contributions by joining the
agreement when industrial lobbying are strong or when environmental
lobbies are weak. However, if contribution announcements occur be-
fore the ratification decisions is taken (phase i and ii are inverted), the
results return to normal because ratification can no longer be used by
the government to extract maximum returns. In this case, government
ratifies when the environmental lobby is strong or the industrial lobby
is weak.
A final contribution in this area of research comes from Ko¨ke &
Lange (2017). Unlike in previous works, Ko¨ke & Lange (2017) more
realistically separate the negotiation (and signature) from the ratific-
ation (and entry into force) of agreements. They consider different
players at the national level and recognise that the entities that negoti-
ate and sign the agreement are different from the ones that ultimately
ratify and determine the entry into force of the agreement. Following
Putnam (1988) framework, participation to environmental agreement
is seen as the outcome of a two-levels game in which country’s rep-
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resentatives have to negotiate an agreement with international players
but also have to satisfy the domestic actors responsible for ratifica-
tion. By taking the classic participation game as a reference, Ko¨ke &
Lange (2017) introduce two intermediate stages in which negotiators
endogenously agree on a minimum participation rule, then domestic
legislative bodies choose whether to ratify the agreement. As a con-
sequence, a treaty could be agreed by a coalition of countries, but then
some countries in the coalition might subsequently fail to ratify. Com-
pared to the traditional framework, this model provides a more realistic
representation of the ratification process.
The payoffs are derived from a welfare function similar to that in
equation 4.2.1, except that the benefit function discerns two separate
domestic actors: the negotiator (government) and the ratifier (legis-
lative body). The negotiator and the ratifier have different preference
functions toward the agreement. Furthermore, the negotiator’s know-
ledge of the preferences of the ratifier are subject to uncertainty. In
general, this framework of analysis leads to more optimistic conclusions
over participation levels in the agreement. Since countries have the pos-
sibility of not ratifying, the number of countries joining the coalition
in the first stage is much larger, which in turn leads to higher payoffs
in case of ratification. The analysis also indicates that negotiators will
try to reduce the abatement commitments implied by the agreement
in order to make ratification less costly and more likely. The authors
evaluate the impact of minimum ratification clauses on participation
levels when ratification is uncertain. They find that the impact of par-
ticipation rules is different from the classic scenario. With lower levels
of uncertainty in the preferences of domestic ratifiers, the clause en-
larges the stable coalition, whereas high uncertainty cancels the effect
of a minimum participation clause. Finally, Ko¨ke & Lange (2017) find
that participation in environmental agreements increases when there is
uncertainty over ratification.
4.3 Framework of the empirical analysis
So far, we have presented the theoretical literature surrounding par-
ticipation in environmental agreements. We also explored how public
choice theories integrate with this body of literature, producing inter-
esting conclusions on the influence of domestic interest groups. In this
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last section, we pull together all the elements discussed so far in order
to build a framework for the empirical study of treaty participation,
and formulate a set of hypotheses that will be tested in the course of
our analysis.
4.3.1 Studying the determinants of treaty particip-
ation
The prevailing theoretical framework is the following. Nations are seen
as unitary actors that maximise domestic social welfare. Environmental
issues affecting a group of countries could be solved by the negotiation
and participation in international environmental agreements. However,
countries also have an incentive to free-ride on environmental agree-
ments to get the environmental benefits without bearing the costs asso-
ciated with the treaty (Pearson, 2011). This dynamic has been treated
by several economic models, mostly using game-theoretical approaches,
with the aim of predicting the optimal abatement and participation
levels. The conclusions are generally pessimistic on the capacity to
solve environmental problems beyond the non-cooperation level (Wan-
gler et al., 2013). This outlook originates from the core assumptions
of the models, in particular how free-riding incentives are defined and
whether or not compensating mechanisms are included.
The case for empirical evidence
According to classic models, environmental treaties are ineffective and
do not induce abatement levels higher than what would be achieved
unilaterally because of the strong free-ride incentives (Barrett 1994,
Carraro & Siniscalco 1993). Large coalitions can only be achieved with
low abatement targets that fall short of the social optimum (Finus,
2008). The prevalent conclusions seem to be at odds with what is
observed for many treaties. It is not uncommon to observe particip-
ation levels that are higher than what would be expected by theor-
etical results. However, it is hard to control for the “depth” of the
agreement, hence it is often unclear whether these agreements involve
abatement levels higher than the non-cooperative equilibrium. Some
papers attempted specifically to tackle the thorny question of envir-
onmental commitments; the results are mixed. For example Bratberg
et al. (2005) find a positive effect on abatement levels compared to the
non-cooperative solution, but Ringquist & Kostadinova (1985) does
not. Other papers focused on the level of participation and found that
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the trade-off between the strictness of the agreement and the number
of members is not inevitable. According to Bernauer et al. (2013b)
and von Stein (2008), some design features of environmental agree-
ments could promote participation and simultaneously induce tighter
obligations for its members.
Theoretical models also depict strong free-ride incentives on abate-
ment commitments. However, non-compliance with the agreement is
rarely observed, penalties or sanctions have seldomly been applied, and
free riding on commitments is generally considered less problematic
than what is postulated by game-theoretical models (Wagner, 2001).
In many countries ratification makes the content of the agreement na-
tionally binding because the text of the agreement acquires the same
value of domestic laws. Although cheating on abatement commitments
is still possible, it should corresponds to the same type of cheating that
a country experiences for national policies. All of this may suggest
some discrepancies between the theoretical predictions and observed
facts. Nevertheless, the limited amount of empirical evidence does not
allow to draw final conclusions.
A drawback of the traditional game-theoretical approach is that it
is often hard to apply to real agreements. As a first issue, the pay-
offs of the games are hard to determine in reality. The most realistic
method is to use integrated assessment models (IAM) to generate pay-
offs for the participation games (e.g. Tol 2001, Carraro et al. 2006
or Bosetti et al. 2013). However, IAMs model exclusively a handful
of environmental issues. A climate change IAM cannot be applied in
games treating other types of environmental problems. Despite these
advanced methodologies, theoretical models tend to over-simplify the
incentives faced by countries, particularly non-material factors which
are the hardest to incorporate in the current framework (Finus, 2008).
For example, a country’s decision to join an agreement could depend on
strong peer effects, gains in diplomatic reputation, or the coordinating
role of international institutions 4, ethical considerations of fairness and
equity, or the interest for the well-being of future generations (Finus,
2008). Some of these are often important factors in political science
literature which have found consistent empirical support (e.g. Frank
1999, Recchia 2002, Neumayer 2002a, Schneider & Urpelainen 2013,
Schulze & Tosun 2013, Hugh-Jones et al. 2018).
From this point of view, the premise of the classic model does not
4International organisations are widely acknowledged to have fostered international co-
operation (Roberts et al., 2004). These organisations often initiate, promote or endorse
environmental agreements. A large share of the agreements in our data set are agreed un-
der the guardianship of the European Union, the United Nations or one of UN’s specialised
offices (See Appendix B).
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seem to entirely fit the facts and overlooks important factors that could
underpin national decisions. For analytical ease, treaty participation
games rely on simplifying assumptions. Assumptions which are of-
ten embraced without a thorough understanding of their impact on
the final conclusions of the models. For example, nearly all studies
assume no distinction between the formation of the agreement (sig-
nature) and the adhesion to the treaty (ratification) (Ko¨ke & Lange,
2017). Moreover, many games — such as the one presented at the be-
ginning of this chapter — assume that ratifications are a one-off sim-
ultaneous decision. From a strategic perspective the incentives change
when sequential or repeated ratification choices are allowed (Marrouch
& Chaudhuri, 2015). Often studies are framed in a full-information set-
ting, while in reality uncertainty clouds environmental problems and
policies. Asymmetries in incentives are often ignored and constant mar-
ginal benefit of abatement are frequently used (Perman et al., 2003).
Furthermore, fundamental assumptions on how decisions are made can
significantly alter the outcome of the game (e.g. cooperative vs non-
cooperative equilibrium). All this makes it hard to apply game theory
to real environmental treaties.
It has been argued by Finus (2008) that these simplifications are
useful to derive workable models of environmental agreements. How-
ever, the accuracy of the core assumptions is rarely put to a serious
test. To make matters worse, there is a substantial lack of empirical
evidence verifying whether the structure and implications of the game-
theoretical approach correspond to a realistic model of environmental
treaties. Our work attempts to contribute in this direction. The need
for empirical analysis has been stressed in previous works (Carraro &
Siniscalco 1998, Finus 2008). Empirical analysis allows one to assess
the functionality of the models and verify how these models translate
on real data. To that, empirical evidence is lacking mainly because
several of the variables involved are hard to quantify. The free-ride
incentives faced by countries, the strictness of the agreement, or the
negotiation position during bargaining phases are all concepts that are
hard to measure and for which data is not readily available. Taking into
account the limitations in data availability, we now expound on how
our empirical analysis fits within the theoretical framework of IEA par-
ticipation games. This framework of analysis is then used to formulate
hypotheses on the effect of key variables of interest.
A framework for analysing ratification
Game theory is used to study the conditions necessary for the form-
ation of agreements and subsequently the equilibrium level of abate-
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ment. In many cases, empirical analysis lacks a proper counterfactual
to carry an equivalent analysis. For example, we do not observe the
potential agreements that never came into existence, and we cannot
derive the unilateral abatement levels in the case of coalition members.
It is complicated to keep track of negotiations and equally complex
to observe what environmental issues have been the object of negoti-
ations and which instead have been excluded. In this respect empirical
analysis has limited scope for additional insight, because studies of en-
vironmental agreements can only evaluate agreements that have taken
shape. Even for existing agreements, the formation process is hard to
follow and the characteristics of the treaty — such as its stringency or
implied abatement levels — remain hard to qualify and compare across
treaties. Yet, despite the limitations in measurability and data availab-
ility, empirical analysis is still able to test theoretical predictions and
generate precious insights that could inform a better understanding of
the dynamics at play.
In this thesis we mainly focus on the determinants of participation
in environmental agreements. As mentioned above, we only observe
agreements that already took shape. Hence, we specifically answer to
the question: Given that an agreement has been agreed, what motivates
participation? This type of analysis necessarily overlooks the process
of formation of the agreement, but it still able to tackle many of the
questions raised by classic game-theoretical models on the level of par-
ticipation in environmental agreements.
The decision to participate in a treaty is implemented in two stages:
signature and ratification. We focus on ratification because it is the
final and definitive act marking participation in the agreement. We re-
mark that the signature stage is costless as it does not entail any formal
commitment to ratify and it does not legally bind the country to envir-
onmental actions. Hence, only ratifiers are interpreted as participants
in the agreement. We take the model described in Ko¨ke & Lange (2017)
as conceptual reference. Their model comprises three stages: the first
stage corresponds to the formation of the treaty and its signature by a
coalition of countries; in the second stage, the coalition members may
or may not ratify the agreement5; in the third stage, countries imple-
ment their environmental policies. The goal of our study is to evaluate
the ratification choice of countries corresponding to the second stage
of Ko¨ke & Lange (2017) model.
Following Almer & Winkler (2010), we assume that a country be-
haves rationally and ratifies the environmental agreement only if its net
5Ko¨ke & Lange (2017) model presumes that only coalition members can ratify. This
is not true in reality.
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Figure 4.1: A model of environmental agreements in three stages
expected benefit of ratification, B, is positive. The net benefit cannot
be observed directly, but we postulate it is a function of a series of
domestic factors (D), international interactions (I) and treaty charac-
teristics (T ). These factors constitute the variables of our model and
influence either positively or negatively the net benefit of ratification
of country i for treaty j. The ratification choice is presented as follows:
Yij =
{
1, if Bij
(
Di, Iij, Tj
)
> 0
0, if Bij
(
Di, Iij, Tj
) ≤ 0 (4.3.1)
Where Yij = 1 denotes ratification of treaty j by country i, while
Yij = 0 if country i does not ratify treaty j. Domestic factors, denoted
by D, include income level of a country, quality of the environment,
as well as other variables of interest such as the strength of domestic
pressure groups or the quality of institutions. International interac-
tions, I, encompass the influence of foreign nations on the decision to
ratify. The decision by country i is linked to the ratification by those
other nations with which it shares economic or cultural ties, diplomatic
connections or are both part of the same international institutions. I
is specific to the treaty because the ratification of the agreement by
a foreign nation affects the net benefit of ratification solely for agree-
ment j. It does not alter the general net benefit of ratification for all
treaties by country i. In principle, it is possible to have interrelated
ratification choices for groups of environmental agreements. However,
the current understanding is that this type of situation is an exception
rather than the norm, and linkage is more likely across different types
of issues (e.g. trade agreements) rather than two agreements dealing
with environmental issues (Marrouch & Chaudhuri, 2015). Finally, T
encloses the features of the agreement that have an influence on the
cost of ratification. T includes whether a treaty is regional or global,
the stringency of obligations, whether it includes transfers for develop-
ing countries, or other design features such as minimum participation
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rules, the presence of escape clauses or penalties for non-compliance.
The variables in Bij and the implementation of this framework are
discussed in detail in the next chapter.
Assuming that Bij is continuously differentiable in D, I and T ,
we are able to draw conclusions on the marginal effect of variables of
interest on the willingness to join the environmental agreement, thus
answering the questions posed in chapter 2. The marginal effects are
obtained conditional on the variables in Bij and assuming that the
agreement j has been negotiated. It could be argued that the act of
ratification represents the adhesion of a country to the set of ideas
and implications of the agreement. If the negotiation position differs
strongly from the interests and values of the treaty, ratification is im-
plausible (Bailer & Weiler, 2015). So the act of ratification implicitly
bears information on the diplomatic position of a country during nego-
tiation phases. However, given the weakness of this link, no conclusive
inference can be made on the impact over the final design of the treaty
or on cooperation in environmental issues for which an environmental
treaty is not agreed.
Ratification decisions are generally made by the legislative body of
the nation and represent the ultimate act of acceptance of an envir-
onmental treaty. In traditional game-theoretical models, the decision
is made by a unitary welfare maximising entity, but a more realistic
representation depicts ratification as the result of conflicting interests
within the country. For this reason, it makes sense to analyse the ef-
fect on ratification of the two opposing tensions within the country:
the so called environmental and industrial lobbying. These two forces
apply opposing pressure on the decision to participate to the environ-
mental agreement. With an appropriate measure of the strength of
environmental and industrial lobbying we are able to infer on their re-
lative impact on ratification decisions. And in a similar fashion, we
can provide a better understanding of how the quality of institutions
interacts with these dynamics. This framework echoes the recent de-
velopments in the economic literature discussed in this chapter, which
in recent years have attempted to integrate the public choice approach
in the existing game-theoretical literature on participation to environ-
mental agreements (e.g. Marchiori et al. 2017, Habla & Winkler 2013,
Ko¨ke & Lange 2017 and Lui 2018). This study provides important em-
pirical evidence for this field of research. As of now, a comprehensive
study of ratification and domestic pressure dynamics based on large
sample of treaties is missing. Our aim is to fill this gap.
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4.3.2 Hypotheses on key variables
This section formulates the hypotheses that will be empirically tested
in our study. Such hypotheses are derived from theoretical predictions
regarding the participation in environmental agreements and the ex-
pected impact of country and treaty characteristics on ratification. The
hypotheses will be used as an investigation tool to assess our results in
the context of the dominant theoretical paradigm.
Interest groups and institutions
The main focus of our research is on the role played by environmental
and industrial pressure groups in the ratification process. According
to Wangler et al. (2013), lobbying has a significative impact during
the negotiation and ratification of environmental agreements. Pressure
groups, NGOs and lobbies are able to influence politicians by providing
information, raising awareness of electors, providing financial support
to government initiatives, funding campaigns or even bribing politicians
(Wangler et al., 2013). Inspired by public choice theory, new models
are being developed that incorporate the effect of domestic interest
groups on treaty participation choices.
According to the model in Haffoudhi (2005), participation in envir-
onmental agreements depends on the relative strength of the environ-
mental and industrial lobbies. A similar conclusion is reached by Habla
& Winkler (2013) who consider the pressure exerted by a plurality of
industrial lobby groups. They find that the decision to participate
depends on the aggregate strength of the industrial lobby groups. In
Marchiori et al. (2017) stronger industrial lobbies hinder participation
in the agreement while environmental lobbies increase the chances of
ratifying the agreement whenever lobby groups are allowed to announce
contributions before ratification choices and with a policy maker that
maximises a political support functions. In Marchiori et al. (2017) the
influence of lobbies is assumed to depend both on the level of organisa-
tion of the lobby and the preference for “contributions” of the policy
maker. The general perspective is that industrial lobbying affects neg-
atively the participation in environmental agreements, leading to the
first empirically testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of ratifying environmental agree-
ments decreases when industrial lobbies are
stronger
According to the same body of literature, the impact of environ-
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mental lobbies has the opposite effect. For instance, Hagen et al. (2016)
demonstrate that environmental lobbies support the ratification of en-
vironmental agreements and lead to larger coalitions. In their model,
ratification decisions are based on rival contributions by environmental
and industrial lobbies. An equilibrium coalition size and abatement
level is derived from a two-stage treaty participation game with hetero-
geneous countries. Likewise Biancardi & Villani (2010), in a two-stage
participation game, show that a higher environmental awareness sus-
tains larger coalitions. The relationship between environmental pres-
sure and ratification has already been explored in a number of empir-
ical studies. Fredriksson & Ujhelyi (2006) and Fredriksson et al. (2007)
observe that environmental lobbying has a positive effect on the likeli-
hood of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol (1997). Bernauer et al. (2013b)
test the effect of environmental lobbying on a wider sample of environ-
mental treaties, confirming that it increases the likelihood of ratifica-
tion. In addition, Mohrenberg et al. (2016) find that ratification rates
are higher when environmental NGOs have access to the negotiation of
environmental agreement. Given the results of theoretical models and
the existing empirical evidence in support, we formulate the following
empirically testable hypothesis on the role of environmental pressure:
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of ratifying environmental agree-
ments increases when environmental pressure
groups are stronger
The second focus of our research is on the role played by institutions
in forging international cooperation over environmental issues. Institu-
tions are defined as the legal and social constraints that structure the
interactions between economic agents. They set the operational rules
and shape the incentives of agents, affecting economic and social out-
comes at different levels. In general, countries with better institutions
tend to exhibit higher ratification rates (Frank, 1999). Several theories
could explain this observation.
According to institutional economics, good institutions foster eco-
nomic growth, which in turn fuels a higher demand for environmental
protection (Cole, 2004). Fredriksson & Gaston (2000) notice that de-
veloping countries tend to have slower ratification, and link the delay
to the inferior quality of institutions. Roberts (1996) and Roberts et al.
(2004) stress that developing nations, lacking infrastructures and with
poor institutions, are less likely to ratify environmental agreements.
Roberts et al. (2004) argue that the level of development and the qual-
ity of institutions in a country mainly depend on its colonial past. Ex-
traction colonies tend to turn into peripheral countries even after their
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independence because the political institutions and economic structure
of the country were based on the extraction of raw materials to the
benefit of the metropolitan power. Hence, countries that historically
depended on extractive resources tend to develop worse institutions
with political power concentrated in the hands of dominant economic
groups. These two factors lead to lower ratification rates (Roberts
et al., 2004). We formulate the following hypothesis on the effect of
the quality of institutions:
Hypothesis 3: Countries with better institutions are more
likely to join environmental agreements
Finally, the success of certain lobbying practices may be directly
related to the quality of institutions. First of all, better institutions
channel more effectively demand for environmental protection, without
the need of pressure from environmental groups. Hence, good institu-
tions could act as a substitute to the pressure of environmental groups.
Bernauer et al. (2013a) conclude that the effectiveness of environmental
pressure groups is reduced in more democratic states because of the in-
creased competition for the provision of environmental protection and
more direct accountability of politicians. Secondly, lobbying practices
in general are more effective in corrupt states. As a matter of fact,
Fredriksson et al. (2007) find that environmental lobbying has a posit-
ive effect on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and that the
effects of both industrial and environmental lobbying are stronger in
countries having more corrupted institutions. We hence formulate the
following hypothesis on how domestic pressure groups interact with the
quality of institutions:
Hypothesis 4: The effect of environmental and industrial
pressure increases when the quality of institu-
tions is lower
The set of hypotheses presented in this section are directly related
to the research questions advanced in chapter 2: they focus on the effect
exerted on ratification by domestic pressure groups and the quality of
institutions. It is the first time these effects are studied on a large
sample of treaties. The only comparable work is Fredriksson et al.
(2007), but that study focuses exclusively on the Kyoto Protocol (1997)
and is not intended to produce generalisable results.
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International interactions
The ratification choices of different countries are intertwined. Their
choices cannot be thought of as being independent from each other.
A growing body of evidence shows that the likelihood of ratification
increases when other nations decide to join the agreement; this is par-
ticularly true for geographical neighbours, or geopolitical, economic
and cultural partners (Bernauer et al. 2010, Perrin & Bernauer 2010,
Sauquet 2014, Yamagata et al. 2013, Yamagata et al. 2017). However,
these results are at odds with theoretical expectations, which state that
strong free-ride incentives apply to environmental agreements. Accord-
ing to the classic treaty participation models, a country joining the
agreement increases the benefits of the treaty for non-ratifiers without
increasing incentive in participation to other nations (Carraro & Sinis-
calco, 1998). In the case of minimum participation rule the effect is even
adverse, when an additional country — over the minimum participa-
tion level — joins the coalition, the other countries have an incentive
to leave the coalition (Rubio & Casino, 2005). Milder predictions are
generated by models that include issue linkages among treaties, but
even in this case, the general assumption is that ratifications do not
interact positively unless a grand coalition is formed.
While there is consensus on the inherent interdependence in ratific-
ations, there are opposing arguments regarding the direction of inter-
national interactions. The contrasting conclusions lead to ambiguous
expectations on the effect of foreign ratifications. Although this is not
the main focus of our study, we contribute to the debate by offering
additional evidence on how nations interact on ratification. As ex-
plained in next chapter, we will take into account the influence exerted
by the ratifications of big nations and neighbouring countries. Big na-
tions (e.g. US, China, India, Russia) are assumed to have an impact
on other countries’ behaviour because of the importance of their ac-
tion for solving environmental issues as well as the diplomatic weight
associated with their size. On the other hand, neighbouring countries
are likely to share economic bonds, social and cultural backgrounds
and generally the same political interests. These links could prompt
stronger cooperation on the diplomatic plane (Sauquet, 2014).
Regionality
Last but not least, ratification choices depend on the shape and content
of the agreement itself. In fact, the design of the agreement is crucial for
its success (Carraro & Siniscalco, 1998). Different empirical attempts
have been made to study how treaty design affect participation levels,
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notably Bernauer et al. (2013b) and von Stein (2008). These attempts
are unlikely to capture the entire spectrum of nuances involved in the
texts of environmental agreements because it is complicated to evaluate
all the features of an agreement, especially for large number of diverse
agreements. The ratification costs for a country usually depend on
technical clauses, for which full implications are hard to grasp. To
make matters worse, information is very limited and the estimated
implementation costs are at best imprecise.
Treaty features play a fundamental role in ratification choices, so
we employ methodological strategies to account for unobserved treaty
characteristics. Our data set comprises more than 250 environmental
agreements, with the particularity of distinguishing between global and
regional agreements. In theory, cooperation is easier and generally
more successful when environmental problems involve a small number
of countries. On the contrary, for large or global issues environmental
agreements usually do not secure sufficient participation because free-
riding incentives become too large to overcome (Perman et al., 2003).
Barrett (1999) finds that global agreements can only sustain small co-
alitions, but he argues that a combination of regional agreements can
achieve higher participation for the same issue. The same result is
obtained by Osmani & Tol (2010) under weaker assumptions, such as
asymmetric payoffs and accounting for different levels of environmental
damage. Given that our data allows us to distinguish between global
and regional agreements, we will test empirically the following hypo-
thesis:
Hypothesis 5: Regional agreements are more likely to be rati-
fied than global agreements
Again, it is the first time regional agreements are studied contextu-
ally to global treaties. This is made possible by our special treatment
of potential ratifiers. In the next chapter, we will describe in detail
the data and the methodological approach employed in the empirical
testing of the hypotheses expressed in this chapter.
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Chapter 5
Methodology and data
This chapter scrutinises the strategy used to answer the research ques-
tions raised at the beginning of the thesis. In the first part we explain
in detail the chosen methodological approach and motivate why it is
the most suitable to the data and the analysis of ratification. We dis-
cuss the modelling choices and the estimation technique. The second
part of the chapter is dedicated to the dependent and independent vari-
ables of the model. We delineate how the data set on ratification was
assembled and emphasise the importance of identifying the potential
ratifiers of the treaties. The final section describes the measurement of
the independent variables in the model.
5.1 Methodology
5.1.1 If and when : choosing the right approach
Do domestic pressure groups influence the ratification of environmental
agreements? And how is this relationship affected by the quality of
institutions? Are good institutions facilitating international coopera-
tion? In order to answer these questions we must first understand how
to “measure” ratification.
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The first possibility is to take a sample of treaties and simply count
the number of agreements that have been ratified by a given country.
Unfortunately, if we want to understand the motivations that push to
the ratification of an agreement, this approach is inappropriate because
it fails to answer an important question: what treaty is ratified? After
all, not all of the agreements are alike. Figure 5.1 and 5.2 show that
environmental agreements differ greatly in terms of participation and
size. This is partly due to the fact that the scale of environmental
issues is in itself heterogeneous. Some agreements are small regional
agreements setting up local committees, others are important interna-
tional concordats safeguarding countries from environmental hazards.
Each treaty has its own peculiar mix of obligations and economic im-
plications, has a unique scope and deals with environmental subjects
having specific individual characteristics. Adding treaties up would
mask a plethora of differences in the choice of ratification. For all these
reasons, knowing how many agreements a country has ratified does not
help us understanding the driving forces behind environmental com-
mitment. We need to distinguish the ratification of each individual
treaty instead of lumping them together.
Hence, in measuring ratification, we wish to know if a treaty has
been ratified by a given country, not the total number of ratifications. It
is theoretically possible to cross-sectionally analyse if a treaty has been
ratified at one point in time but this approach has some limitations.
First, whether a ratification occurred depends on the point in time we
choose to assess it. That is to say, ratification could occur later in time
and not being taken into consideration. This introduces arbitrariness in
the measure of ratification and potentially measurement error. There
is a second and more fundamental reason to consider a time dimension.
Ratification is intrinsically dynamic: what matters is not only if but
also when a country ratified. If we merely focus on the occurrence of
ratification, we are ignoring precious information. In fact, ratification
could be affected in two ways: i) by changing the final outcome (i.e.
whether or not the country ratifies), and ii) by delaying the ratification.
We believe that the latter is a crucial aspect in understanding the effects
of institutional quality and group pressure on ratification. Timing is
also inherently important in understanding the sequence of ratification
by different countries. It is impossible to disentangle foreign influence
on ratification without a temporal observation of ratification.
In other words, the differences between countries are reflected not
only on the final outcome of ratification, but also on its timing. This is
especially true for agreements that succeeded an almost universal rat-
ification. In which case, a strategy based solely on the outcome would
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Figure 5.1: Number of ratifiers
Notes: Most of the agreements have fewer than 50 members. The low num-
ber of ratifiers is not the consequence of countries’ reticence to ratify (Fig
5.2), but it reflects that a large part of the cooperation takes place regionally.
Hence the relevance of including regional agreements in the analysis.
fail to capture the heterogeneity among countries. The same applies
to smaller agreements that are ratified by almost all of the potential
ratifiers. To some extent, the more successful a treaty is at securing
ratifications, the more important is the timing aspect of ratification.
Agreements with high ratification rate represent an important share of
our sample (Figure 5.2). For example, the UNFCCC (1992) and the
Montreal Protocol (1987) both achieved universal ratification with 197
parties. The ratifications did not occur all at the same time, they are
spread over a long period of time. For instance, Canada ratified the
UNFCCC in 1992 (soon after signing), France in 1994, Turkey in 2004
and Andorra in 2010. Similarly, the Montreal protocol was ratified in
1992 by Australia, Belgium in 1996, Angola in 2000 and Iraq in 2009.
We argue that, in addition to the decision to ratify, any delay in rat-
ification is a function of treaty and country idiosyncrasies. Both the
occurrence and the timing reveal precious information on the determ-
inants of ratification.
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Figure 5.2: Ratification rate
Notes: The figure unveils substantial heterogeneity in the ratification rate of
environmental agreements. What factors explain the success or failure of a
treaty? We argue that country and treaty characteristics are responsible for
this variability. The ratification rate is calculated as the number of ratifiers
over the number of potential ratifiers up to 2017. For more details on the
ratification data see section 5.2.2.
In conclusion, to answer the research questions, we are interested in
knowing if and when a treaty is ratified. To this end, we track through-
out time the ratification decisions for all treaty-country combinations.
In the next section we explain how this strategy is implemented.
5.1.2 Model specification
Our data has the format of survival/duration data which is defined by
two sets of information: whether the event (ratification) occurs and
the time to the event. Time to ratification starts elapsing from the sig-
nature date and ends either with ratification or a missed ratification.
The information on ratification is grouped into yearly observations.
Despite its continuous nature we reduce the data on ratification into
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yearly observations in order to match the observation frequency of the
explanatory variables. The alternative is to take smaller time intervals
and assume that the explanatory variables are constant throughout the
year. We opt for annual observations, despite the loss in precision, be-
cause a monthly or daily time interval would result in a cumbersome
number of datapoints. Annual observations are also a natural choice
because the independent variables are measured on an annual basis.
We can handle discrete survival analysis with a binomial regression by
thinking of this data as a series of success/failure trials for which we
observe a binary response once every year (Allison, 1982). For every
country-treaty-year combination we have a dichotomous response vari-
able that takes the value of 1 if ratification occurred and 0 otherwise.
We define the hazard function h(t) as the probability of having an event
during the time interval t, given no earlier occurrence:
hi(t) = Pr
(
yi(t) = 1 | yi(t− 1) = 0
)
(5.1.1)
Where yi and t are respectively the response variable and the event
time for every country-treaty combination i. Time is a discrete variable
and the hazard is assumed constant over the time interval. Then, our
binomial regression has the following form:
cloglog
[
hi(t)
]
= log
(− log (1− hi(t))) = α(t) +Xi(t)β (5.1.2)
In equation 5.1.2, β is the vector of coefficients for the vector of
explanatory variables Xi. Unlike some types of survival models, this
specification allows the explanatory variables to be time-varying; for
this reason we express them as a function of time Xi(t). In practice,
time-varying explanatory variables can change throughout time, but
we are assuming that they are constant within each time period (i.e.
year). α(t) is a function of time called the baseline hazard function.
Its form needs to be specified in advance. We choose to use a cubic
polynomial (Equation 5.1.3); this approach has been proposed for our
type of data by Carter & Signorino (2010). Another viable alternative
would be to use splines (Beck et al., 1998), however these have the
disadvantage of being less easy to interpret and implement. Carter
& Signorino (2010) show that the cubic polynomial and the spline
perform similarly. We also opt for the cubic polynomial because it
is how temporal dependency in ratification is preferably modelled in
the existing empirical literature. For instance, Bernauer et al. (2010),
Leinaweaver (2012), Spilker & Koubi (2016) and Bo¨hmelt et al. (2015)
all use a cubic polynomial. It is also possible to use a non-parametric
baseline hazard. Our main reason to prefer cubic polynomials is that
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a non-parametric definition of the baseline hazard heavily affects the
estimation time for the model. This assumption will be assessed by
testing a non-parametric specification in chapter 6.
α(t) = α0 + α1t+ α2t
2 + α3t
3 (5.1.3)
The complementary log-log link function is preferred over a logit
or probit function because it approximates a standard survival model
with grouped observations. Prentice & Gloeckler (1978) demonstrate
that the coefficients of a continuous proportional hazards model with
grouped data are identical to those obtained from a discrete binary
regression using the cloglog link function. In addition, the results ob-
tained from a complementary log-log link function can be interpreted
in terms of hazard ratios. This differs from the odds of hazard ra-
tios produced by a logit model. In fact, the discrete-time hazard rate
defined in equation 5.1.1 can also be written in terms of survival time
T for the treaty-country i conditional on the covariates Xi:
hi(t) = Pr
(
Ti = t | Ti ≥ t,Xi(t)
)
t = 1, 2, ... (5.1.4)
applying the properties of conditional probabilities,
Pr
(
Ti = t
)
= hi(t)
t−1∏
j=1
(
1− hi(j)
)
(5.1.5)
and,
Pr
(
Ti ≥ t
)
=
t∏
j=1
(
1− hi(j)
)
(5.1.6)
If ti is the observed survival time for the treaty-country combination i,
then the response variable yi = 1 if Ti = ti and yi = 0 if Ti > ti. It is
possible to derive the likelihood L.
L =
∏
i
[
Pr
(
Ti = t
)]yi[Pr (Ti ≥ t)]1−yi (5.1.7)
=
∏
i
( hi(ti)
1− hi(ti)
)yi ti∏
j=1
(
1− hi(j)
)
(5.1.8)
=
∏
i
ti∏
j=1
( hi(j)
1− hi(j)
)yi(j)(
1− hi(t)
)
(5.1.9)
106
As demonstrated by Allison (1982), the likelihood function L is
identical to the one we would obtain for a binary response model that
has a probability equal to the hazard function. Note that for the treaty-
country combination i, when time j corresponds to the ratification time
Ti, then yi(j) = 1. In the other cases yi(j) = 0. The complementary
log-log link function allows the discrete model, that has discrete obser-
vations, to approximate a survival model with continuous observations
grouped in years.
This model assumes that the effect of the hazard ratio is constant
throughout time. This assumption is known as the Proportional haz-
ard Assumption. That is to say that, conditional on other covariates,
the effect of the variable is the same for all durations. The proportion-
ality assumption could be relaxed by introducing an interaction term
between Xi(t) and α(t).
5.1.3 Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and
treaty-country correlation
The model we presented so far is likely to be misleading. We can-
not presuppose that the ratification timings and decisions for the same
country vis-a`-vis different agreements are independent from each other.
Even after controlling for external effects, there are some specific un-
observed factors that are likely to systematically affect the hazard for
all events. Failure to account for this would lead to biased coefficients.
Similarly, it is reasonable to expect a degree of correlation between the
acts of ratifications of an agreement by different countries. Again, the
observations for units within the same treaty are not independent and
this could lead to biased results. Moreover, for higher durations the
risk set will increasingly consist of dyads with low risk of ratification
(Figure 5.3). These will participate in the estimation of the baseline
hazard and, if we do not control for unobserved heterogeneity, could
tend to accentuate the effect of negative factors on duration and under-
state the effect of positive factors. To sum up, in the case of ratification,
unobserved heterogeneity subsists on two different levels: treaty and
country. We need to adjust the model accordingly.
For normal responses, unobserved heterogeneity is addressed by in-
cluding either fixed effects or random effects. However, with survival
data fixed effects perfectly predict non-occurrence. In other words, it
would exclude all the units for which the event does not occur because
their observations are invariantly composed by zeros. The resulting sur-
vival estimates would be based solely on the units that experienced the
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Figure 5.3: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
Notes: The Kaplan-Meier curve is a non-parametric method to derive sur-
vival functions. This curve shows that in 20 years a country has approxim-
ately 50% of probability of ratification. It also depicts how the likelihood of
ratifying a treaty is drastically reduced after the 20 years, with the probabil-
ity of “surviving” ratification slowly converging to 47% at higher durations,
meaning that the remaining countries are very unlikely to ratify at this stage:
they have a very low failure rate.
event and consequently biased. As a result, fixed effects are not usable
in survival analysis, the only exception being the analysis of repeated
events (Allison & Christakis, 2006). In the context of survival analyses,
unobserved heterogeneity is modelled with frailty, which correspond to
the inclusion of a random effect. Previous studies dealt with this prob-
lem by using robust standard errors clustered on countries (e.g. Perrin
& Bernauer 2010; Bo¨hmelt et al. 2015 and Mohrenberg et al. 2016).
The problem is that observations are clustered not only on countries
but also on treaties. That is to say, not only ratification of treaty A
and treaty B by France are correlated, but also, Russian and French
ratification of treaty A will not be entirely independent. The use of
robust standard errors can alleviate the problems linked to the correl-
ation of units but does not correct the bias deriving from unobserved
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heterogeneity. This is particularly serious in the case of environmental
agreements because ratification depends on a large number of unmeas-
urable characteristics of the agreement; notably, ratification is very
likely to be affected by the stringency of the agreement — as pointed
out by the “depth vs participation” trade-off widely discussed in game
theoretical literature1.
What we want to study is how variations in country and treaty char-
acteristics in general influence the chances of ratification. This can be
accomplished more parsimoniously by the inclusion of 2 random effects,
namely the treaty (uj1) and country (uj2) random effects. This means
we are assuming the effects to be randomly drawn from a distribution
of country and treaty effects defined as in equation 5.1.11. The final
model will have the following specification:
cloglog
[
hi(j1j2)(t)
]
= α(t) +Xi(j1j2)(t)β + uj1 + uj2 (5.1.10)
α(t) = α0 + α1t+ α2t
2 + α3t
3 (5.1.3)
uj1 ∼ N (0, σ2uj1 ) uj2 ∼ N (0, σ
2
uj2
) (5.1.11)
We are using the usual multilevel notation for cross-sectional models
(Fielding & Goldstein 2006, Goldstein et al. 2002). Units lying at
the first level are designated by the subscript i, while variables at the
second level by subscript j. The subscript j1 indicates nesting within
the treaty and within j2 the country. Since both country and treaty
effects lie at the same level (not as in a typical hierarchical model), the
treaty-country combinations are indicated with (j1j2). This notation
facilitates the representation of complex types of nesting, particularly in
models including more than 3 nesting variables and a complex variance
structure. The total variance at level two is σ2uj1 + σ
2
uj2
. It is also
possible to include an interaction term between the two random effects.
This practice is uncommon and for our data there is no theoretical
arguments in favour of this modelling choice.
To be specific, the model we are building is a binary multilevel
model for duration data, with cross-classified random effect at level
2. The multilevel structure emerges from the structure of the data
which is characterised by the correlation between the observations of
same countries and same treaties. This can be thought as process in
which the ratification decisions are nested simultaneously within the
agreements and the countries. These two levels of nesting (country
1See chapter 4.
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Figure 5.4: Censoring in ratification data
Notes: Survival spells for a representative environmental agreement. The
figure also illustrates the difference between the age of the treaty and the
concept of duration. The duration is subjective to the country-treaty dyad
because the starting points for the survival spells may differ across countries.
and treaty) are not hierarchically organised, as in a typical multilevel
model, but they lie on the same level. This sort of model is known
as cross-classified multilevel model. If a simple hierarchical model is
fitted, and the peculiar structure of the levels is ignored, the resulting
estimates would be misleading because, for every cluster, the units
on the lower level are considered to be all independent. At the same
time, the omission of one of the two random effects leads to severely
underestimated standard errors with high probability of engendering
type I error in the inference. Hence, it is important to include both
country and treaty effects, and to pay attention to the cross-sectional
structure of the model.
Estimation through traditional maximum likelihood methods do not
perform well because of the complexity of the model and the type of
data. Instead, we rely on the Monte Carlo Markow Chain (MCMC)
estimation method that we implement in MLwiN. This is a software
developed specifically to work with multilevel models. The estimation
method will be described in detail in section 5.1.5 and 5.1.6.
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5.1.4 Censoring and competing risks
Figure 5.4 illustrates the observation of typical survival spells for a rep-
resentative environmental agreement. Each survival spell ends either
with ratification or a missed ratification 2. The second case is called
right-censoring. Right-censoring typically occurs when the event falls
beyond the observation period, as opposed to left-censoring which hap-
pens when the event takes place before the observation period. In
survival analysis censoring is considered to be non-informative. This
means that the timing of the event is independent from censoring reas-
ons.
With our data left-censoring is impossible by definition because the
act of signature is always public and the observation period is uninter-
rupted until 2017. For existing countries, the survival spell starts with
the signature of the agreement because it is the moment in which the
text of the treaty is agreed and becomes formally open to ratification.
If a country does not exist at the moment of signature its survival spell
starts from the year it acquires independence. It makes sense to imagine
that a country enters in the risk set from the moment the agreement is
signed or the country becomes independent, even though the adminis-
trative requirements that go with ratification make it almost impossible
to ratify the agreement immediately. In essence, left-censoring is not a
concern since it is impossible to miss a ratification before the starting
of the observation period. This property follows from the fact that a
treaty cannot be ratified before it is agreed or before a country becomes
independent.
On the other hand, there are two reasons why right-censoring could
take place: i) the country has no intentions to ratify the treaty, ii)
the country has not yet ratified the treaty. Our data does not allow to
distinguish between the two reasons. We will argue that, within our
empirical framework, it is possible to deal with both situations.
For the first case we are interested in keeping these countries in
the sample. We would create sampling bias if only countries that rati-
fied were to be left in the risk set. Even though the country does not
ratify immediately, it has a possibility of subsequently reevaluating its
participation to the agreement. Potentially it could join the treaty at
any point in time. Hence it makes sense to keep the country in the
risk set. For this reason the decision not to ratify cannot strictly be
2A third case for the end of the survival spell is the extinction of the country itself.
In our data set only a handful of countries experience extinction: East Germany, USSR,
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, South Yemen, South Vietnam. Despite the low incidence,
extinction is a potential competing risk. For this reason all countries that become extinct
are immediately removed from the risk set.
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Figure 5.5: Kernel density estimates of duration for the countries that
ratified
Notes: Ratifications tend to concentrate in the 10 years following the signa-
ture. Some agreements experience more than one wave of ratifications (e.g.
Kyoto Protocol), but generally the chances of being ratified rapidly decay
with time. The kernel density function gives an approximate representation
of the probability distribution of survival times (duration) for the countries
that ratified.
considered a competing risk. Competing risks are events that prevent
the occurrence of the event of interest. It is possible to model compet-
ing risks within the framework of survival analysis. The best solution
involves right-censoring the survival spell when the competing event
takes place. In the case of the decision of not ratifying, not only the
occurrence and timing are unknown, but, most importantly, it would
be incorrect to right-censor the ratification survival spell because the
country could decide to enter in the agreement at any second moment
in time. Such a decision does not preclude future ratification but it
would certainly delay it.
The second case of right-censoring mainly concerns the most recent
agreements in the database since most of ratifications fall in the first
10 years following the signature (Figure 5.5 and 5.3). The event of rat-
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ification could occur after the observable time period. This is a classic
problem deriving from truncation of the data. Fortunately, if we can
assume independent censoring it does not raise difficulties in survival
analysis. Independent censoring means that the distribution of the
censoring time is independent of survival, conditional on the covari-
ates. If this holds, the censoring timing does not bear any information
about our variables of interest; it is non-informative. In the case of
ratifications that take place after 2017, truncation time depends on the
exogenous year of signature. Hence, the starting year of the life spell
is independent from the risk period.
5.1.5 Model estimation
Data transformation
The strategy we described in the previous sections implies expanding
the data to cast a discrete survival model in the form of a binomial
regression, so that traditional estimation methods can be used (Barber
et al., 2000). This is done by taking the survival data and transforming
the duration information into a sequence of binary response for each of
the years for which the country-treaty is at risk of being ratified. The
main disadvantage of this transformation is that the size of the data
file greatly expands despite no new information is added. Note that
the problem is exacerbated for the dyads having longer observation
time. Sometimes, researchers try to mitigate the effect by aggregating
time intervals and assuming values are constant over the time interval.
However, bundling together observations leads to a loss of information.
In the case of our data, we have 263 agreements and 198 countries
observed over a maximum period of 67 years3. Thus the potential num-
ber of data entries is a rather large 3.5 million combinations. Luckily,
not every treaty-country-year combination is in the risk set. In fact, we
can exclude all the years after ratification and before the signature of
the agreement, as well all the years in which the country did not exist
and the combinations for which the country is not a potential ratifier.
This reduces the total number of ratification observations to 348377,
only one in ten combinations is in the risk set.
3We collected data on agreements signed exclusively between 1950 and 2017. The first
year of observation for the ratification is 1950 and the last one is 2017
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Estimation methods
The new format allows us to fit the model with traditional techniques.
Because of the random effect and binary dependent variables, the like-
lihood of the observed data does not have a closed-form expression.
Therefore estimation methods involve approximation. The most pop-
ular are quasi-likelihood methods (such as Goldstein & Rasbash 1996
or Breslow & Clayton 1993) and Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method, although several others have been developed (e.g. adaptive
quadrature, simulated maximum likelihood or modified Laplace estim-
ation).
Cross-sectional models can be fitted through iterative algorithms
based on generalised least squares (e.g. IGLS or RIGLS) giving quasi-
likelihood estimates obtained by alternating between random and fixed
part until convergence is reached. Marginal quasi-likelihood (MQL)
and Penalized (or predictive) Quasi-Likelihood (PQL) are applicable
even though they tend to perform worse with dichotomous variables
(Browne & Draper, 2002). They work by approximating the discrete
multilevel likelihood with a normal multilevel likelihood to allow estim-
ation. These can be adapted for cross-sectional models by including
constraints on the model but convergence is harder to reach with lar-
ger data sets (Capanu et al., 2013). Softwares such as Stata implement
Laplacian approximation for cross-classified random effects. However,
because of the low variation in survival data and the complex structure
of random effects, this type of estimation takes a very long time on large
data sets and convergence is seldom reached. Compared to maximum
likelihood methods, MCMC improves estimation precision at the cost
of estimation time (Ng et al., 2006). Browne & Draper (2002) demon-
strated that for random-effect binary regressions the results are more
precise when estimated with MCMC than quasi-likelihood methods.
In fact, MQL and PQL have a notorious tendency to bias the variance
components downwards (Browne & Draper, 2002). MCMC is also more
convenient in the case of non-continuous data and complex models
with cross-classified random-effects because quasi-likelihood becomes
increasingly intricate, with numerical integrations over many random
effects, while the presence of cross-classified effects does not raise the
complexity in estimation through MCMC method (Steele et al., 2004).
Furthermore, Beck & Katz (2007) demonstrate that MCMC performs
well even when the normality assumptions of the random effects are
violated; this result is corroborated by Shor et al. (2007).
We decide to estimate the model using MCMC method because it
is a more robust estimation technique. It can be applied to the binary
cross-classified model by using the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm as a
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sampler. This is a simulation method that produces the complete dis-
tribution of the parameters instead of providing just point estimates
for the mean and the standard error. We prefer MCMC also because
alternative estimation methods often fail to converge given the size of
the data set, the complexity of the random effect structure and the low
variability intrinsic to survival data. Furthermore, with uniform pri-
ors and large samples, MCMC yields estimates that are asymptotically
equivalent to MLE. This property is derived from the Bernstein-von
Mises theorem, which state that with large-enough samples the in-
formation contained in the samples dominate the influence of the prior
and the posterior distribution is asymptotically equal to a normal dis-
tribution centred upon the maximum likelihood estimate (Nickl, 2013).
The main downside of MCMC is that estimation with MCMC is com-
putationally very intensive for data in a binary format and, in addition,
MCMC is a Bayesian technique so priors must be stated in advance.
The model is estimated with MLwiN (Charlton et al., 2017), a software
developed by the Centre for Multilevel Modelling of the University of
Bristol expressly to deal with large and complex multilevel models.
The software supports both MCMC and quasi-likelihood estimation.
Estimation of Bayesian models
In Bayesian statistics probabilities are interpreted differently than in
the standard frequentist approach. The probability of an event is con-
ceived as the degree of belief to which the event is thought to take
place. Unlike the frequentist approach, this definition involves a sub-
jective appreciation of the odds linked to the event because it incor-
porates personal beliefs. This will be reflected in how the parameters
of a model are obtained.
In Bayesian modelling, the parameter θ of a model is considered
a random variable that cannot be determined exactly, the uncertainty
surrounding its value is represented by a probability distribution. The
initial view on the shape and densities of this distribution is formed by
the researcher and represents the starting point of the analysis. This
preliminary statements on the values of the parameter are called priors
and summarised in the distribution pi(θ). The core of Bayesian analysis
rests on Bayes’ theorem, an equation that offers a system to update
the initial beliefs as new data x = {x1, x2, ..., xn} is gathered. In fact,
Pr(θ | x) = Pr(θ,x)
Pr(x)
=
Pr(x | θ) pi(θ)
Pr(x)
(5.1.12)
Bayes’ theorem links the posterior distribution Pr(θ | x), i.e. our
updated beliefs on which inference is based, with the observations and
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the prior distribution. With a distributional assumption, Pr(x | θ) is a
function expressing the probability of observing the data x given our
prior beliefs on the values of θ. The denominator Pr(x) is the marginal
distribution of x and has the property of normalising the posterior, it
can also be written also as:
Pr(x) =
∫
Pr(x | θ)pi(θ)dθ (5.1.13)
The problem with this equation is that, very often, it does not have
a closed-form solution. With several parameters, this equation involves
many complex integrations. Hence, Bayes’ theorem is often written in
the following form:
Pr(θ | x) = L(θ) pi(θ)∫
L(θ)pi(θ)dθ
(5.1.14)
Where the likelihood function L(θ) is proportional to Pr(x | θ),
L(θ) ∝ Pr(x | θ) (5.1.15)
Notice that the normalising denominator of the equation is an integral
and, despite its complexity, does not depend on the parameters since
they have been integrated out. Hence, as long as it solves to a finite
value, it will not affect the shape of the posterior distribution Pr(θ | x).
As a result, the posterior distribution is proportional to the likelihood
function and the prior distribution.
Pr(θ | x) ∝ L(θ)pi(θ) (5.1.16)
The consequence of equation 5.1.16 is that, in theory, the pos-
terior distribution of the parameters can be derived once we obtain
the likelihood function and the probability distribution of θ. However,
in practice, the integrations lead to posterior distributions that have
intractable forms. The sheer complexity of these integrals was a major
obstacle to the application of Bayesian methods. Nevertheless, with
the increase in computing power new approaches have been developed.
In particular, Markow chain Monte Carlo is a simulation technique
that bypasses the problem of integration by drawing samples from the
posterior distribution which are then used to approximate the value of
the parameters of interest. A more detailed explanation is given in the
next section.
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5.1.6 Markow Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
With the exception of simple problems, it is hard to find analytical
solution for the posterior distribution. Hence, instead of calculating
the posterior distribution, MCMC avoids the problems by simulating
draws from it. MCMC extracts samples from a target distribution that
are used for inferences on the parameters of the model. The samples are
taken from the conditional posterior distributions because it is gener-
ally hard to simulate from the posterior distribution itself. It has been
demonstrated that sampling from the conditional posterior distribu-
tions in succession is comparable to sampling directly from the joint
posterior distribution (Chib & Greenberg, 1996). The method works
by drawing a large number of consecutive samples; each of the samples
should depend exclusively on the previous one. This is formalised by
using the mathematical notion of Markow chains. Markow chains are
a sequence of random variables θ1,θ2,..., θn that exclusively depend on
the value of the previous one. That is to say:
Pr(θn+1 | θ1, ..., θn) = Pr(θn+1 | θn) (5.1.17)
The future value of the process exclusively depends on the present
value. Any past information affects the future value only through the
present one. These repeated samples are driven by an algorithm that
expresses the way the sample draws move through the distribution.
In the case of our research we use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
because the conditional posterior distribution of our model is not work-
able with Gibbs sampler.
To sum up, the aim of MCMC is to draw a series of independent
samples that are used to summarise the (joint) posterior distribution
of the parameters. The mean, standard deviation, density plots and
quantiles of the posterior distribution are all derived from these ran-
dom samples. The most important property of MCMC is that the
Markow Chain will converge to the target distribution independently
from its starting point or the complexity of the model. The longer the
simulation is carried out, the more accurate the approximation is. The
accuracy can be elevated to any degree of precision if the simulation is
long enough. Of course, the issue here is the practical obstacle of time,
because complex simulations are extremely time consuming.
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm and convergence
The algorithm was first proposed by Metropolis & Ulam (1949) and
Metropolis et al. (1953). Their work was then generalised by Hastings
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(1970), hence the name of Metropolis-Hastings. The algorithm allows
to draw independent samples from the joint distribution of multiple
variables. Gibbs sampler (Geman & Geman, 1984) can be reconducted
as a special case of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
In MCMC, the generation of new values for a parameter is done on
the basis of a proposal distribution that is used to iteratively obtain
values that are either rejected or accepted as a replacement of the
current estimate. The proposal distribution could have any shape, but
it needs to be easy to sample from. We use a random walk proposal
distribution, which corresponds to a normal distribution centred on the
current parameter θ. This also has the advantage of being symmetrical,
meaning that at time t,
Pr
(
θ(t) = a | θ(t− 1) = b) = Pr (θ(t) = b | θ(t− 1) = a) (5.1.18)
Metropolis-Hastings then involves the following steps:
1. Draw a new θ∗ from the proposal distribution θ(t) ∼ N (θ(t −
1), σ2p), where σ
2
p is the variance of the proposal distribution
2. Calculate the posterior ratio rt. For a simple variance component
model, with residual variance σ2e
rt =
Pr
(
θ∗, σ2e(t− 1) | y
)
Pr
(
θ(t− 1), σ2e(t− 1) | y
) (5.1.19)
3. Define the acceptance probability at = min(1, rt). Then, the
proposed value θ(t) = θ∗ is accepted with probability at otherwise
θ(t) = θ(t− 1)
These steps are repeated until the desired number of samples is
reached. The role of the algorithm is to generate new values that are
accepted or refused; in the latter case the Markow chain remains on
the same value. The algorithm will move until reaching convergence
with the target distribution. The main problem with the algorithm is
that the proposal distribution tends to create samples that are auto-
correlated because the samples are a realisation of a Markow chain. As
a consequence, it is often necessary to run a large number of iterations
before reaching convergence. Since it is impossible to run an infinite
number of iterations, a special attention should be devoted to checking
the convergence of the Markow Chain. In the result chapter we assess
the convergence of the posterior distribution by i) analysing the distri-
bution of the chain values and traces. ii) calculating Raftery-Lewis and
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Brookes-Draper statistic for the convergence rate, iii) calculating the
effective sample size (ESS), iv) assessing autocorrelation through auto-
correlation and partial autocorrelation functions, and v) Estimation of
the model from different starting points to rule out pseudo-convergence.
In order to increase the efficiency of MCMC estimation we use or-
thogonal reparametrisation. Browne et al. (2009) document how this
technique of reparametrisation affects the mixing and convergence time
in the estimation of cross-classified multilevel survival models. The ap-
plications to our data seem to corroborate their thesis: the number of
independent samples we obtain highly increases and we notice a general
improvement in the mixing of the Markow chains. Orthogonal repara-
metrisation involves a substitution of the parameters of the model with
an orthogonal vector of predictors that are then used for estimation.
These new parameters have the advantage of facilitating sampling by
reducing the correlation between variables. The initial set is then re-
trieved at the end of the estimation. For more details on the algorithm
employed for this form of parametrisation refer to Browne (2017).
In addition to the issue of convergence, the part of the chain ob-
tained before convergence needs to be appropriately discarded, other-
wise the inferences could be biased. The initial simulation period that
we discard is called burn-in. The final inference of the value of the
parameters is be made on the summary distributions of the remaining
portion of the Markow chain. The median, mode or mean of the chain
is used as the parameter estimate for the model. With diffuse priors
this estimation method mimics likelihood maximisation (Rabe-Hesketh
et al., 2002). MCMC estimation is time-consuming, however for ran-
dom effects models the estimates obtained with this method are more
accurate than with the methods mentioned in section 5.1.5.
Priors
We have seen that in Bayesian statistics the estimation of the para-
meters starts from an initial value and prior distribution that is then
updated, by following precise rules, as new evidence is gathered. The
posterior value and distribution obtained from this process form the
starting point for a new sequential update of the beliefs on the para-
meter values. This process is repeated until the end of the analysis.
Now that we understand how the mechanism works, we need to discuss
the starting point of the estimation, that is to say our priors.
The priors for every parameter of the model have to be stated in
advance because they constitute the starting point of the analysis. Ac-
cording to their nature, the priors can be uninformative or informative.
Uninformative priors are priors that are set in such a way as to have
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very small effect on the posterior distribution of the parameter. These
are also called “flat” or “diffuse” priors. They are an attempt to min-
imise the impact of the prior specification, thus they are often seen
as more objective. On the other hand, informative priors are priors
that dominate the likelihood and have a strong effect on the posterior
distribution. Nonetheless, as the number of draws tends to infinity,
the impact of any type of prior on the posterior distribution shrinks
to zero. The impact of the prior is reduced for larger data and longer
simulations because with sufficiently long simulations MCMC estim-
ates are guaranteed to converge on the true posterior distribution from
any starting distribution.
For the purpose of our analysis we use “diffuse” priors. For the
parameters of the model (α and β in equations 5.1.10 and 5.1.3) we
use the following priors:
Pr(α) ∝ 1 Pr(β) ∝ 1 (5.1.20)
Where α = {α0, α1, α2, α3} are the coefficients of the baseline haz-
ard and β = {β1, ..., βn} the coefficients of the n independent variables
of the model. They are improper uniform priors. These priors are
called improper because they do not integrate to 1, meaning that they
are not probability distributions. However, this is not important to us
because we just need the posterior distribution to be a proper prob-
ability distribution integrating to 1. This is guaranteed by the finite
normalising constant4. The priors roughly correspond to Normal dis-
tributions with extremely large variance, giving the shape of a flat line.
On the other hand, the scalar variances have the following priors;
Pr(σuT ) ∝ Γ−1(ε, ε) Pr(σuC ) ∝ Γ−1(ε, ε) ε = 10−3 (5.1.21)
This is a proper prior — it integrates to 1 — and corresponds to a
uniform prior for the logarithm of the variance. In addition to that, we
use the estimates obtained from quasi-likelihood estimation as starting
value for the parameters of the model. The values are obtained from a
model in which we ignore the cross-sectional nature at the country and
treaty levels (i.e. assuming a hierarchical model with countries nested
within treaties) and estimating the value of the parameters through
first-order Marginal Quasi-Likelihood (MQL) procedure. This should
accelerate the convergence of the Markow chains by giving a good initial
value.
4The denominator in equation 5.1.14
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Estimation summary
The estimation of the parameters of the model starts with the trans-
formation of the duration data into a binary format. The data is
then used to fit a simplified hierarchical model with quasi-likelihood
method. The results we obtain are taken as starting point for the
MCMC analysis together with the priors earlier defined. With large
samples, diffuse priors also yield estimates that are asymptotically equi-
valent to MLE. The simulation is run for as many iterations as possible
to guarantee the convergence of the series and reliable inference from
the posterior distribution. In general we run no less than 500000 itera-
tions. The convergence to the target distribution is evaluated through
a number of tests and measures. To accelerate the convergence rate
and improve the efficiency of MCMC estimation we use orthogonal re-
parametrisation. We recapitulate here the priors and the specification
of the model using standard multilevel notation (Fielding & Goldstein
2006, Goldstein et al. 2002).
cloglog
[
hi(j1j2)(t)
]
= α(t) +Xi(j1j2)(t)β + uj1 + uj2 (5.1.10)
α(t) = α0 + α1t+ α2t
2 + α3t
3 (5.1.3)
uj1 ∼ N (0, σ2uj1 ) uj2 ∼ N (0, σ
2
uj2
) (5.1.11)
Pr(α) ∝ 1 Pr(β) ∝ 1 (5.1.20)
Pr(σuj1 ) ∝ Γ−1(ε, ε) Pr(σuj2 ) ∝ Γ−1(ε, ε) ε = 10−3 (5.1.21)
To sum up, we have modelled the hazard of ratifying a typical en-
vironmental treaty by a representative country. The presented model
is intentionally “general”. It is useful not only to derive overall con-
clusions on the role of institutions and pressure group, but also to
understand the forces that push and hinder the ratification of environ-
mental treaties. Despite this, the model can be fine-tuned to produce
information for specific countries or specific treaties. In the second
part of chapter 6 we show some practical applications of the model by
generating estimates on the probability of ratification for given treaties
and countries.
In the next two sections we describe the data set assembled to an-
swer the research question. Section 5.2 explains what treaties are in-
cluded in the analysis and how ratifications are tracked for all countries.
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While in the subsequent section we discuss the variables in the vector
X of equation 5.1.10.
5.2 Ratification as dependent variable
5.2.1 Ratification data: format and collection
Format of the data
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable representing the rat-
ification of an environmental agreement, by a country, in a specific
year. In other words, for every combination of country-treaty-year, we
observe a binary response that takes the value of 1 if the country rat-
ified the treaty in year t, or 0 if it did not. In case of ratification, the
country-treaty dyad is removed from the risk set. This is necessary
to avoid biased results. In fact, a series of 1s would indicate that the
country is repeatedly ratifying the treaty. On the other hand, if the
treaty is not ratified by the end of the observation period, the series
for the treaty-country dyad is exclusively composed by zeros.
For every country-treaty dyad the survival spell starts from the year
of signature of the treaty, unless the country didn’t exist at the time
of negotiations, in which case we use the country’s independence year
as a starting point (see figure 5.6). To be more precise, the signature
year refers to the year in which the agreement is opened for signa-
ture (and consequentially ratification), rather than the specific year in
which signature by country i takes place. The reason for this is that a
country could ratify a treaty without signing it — so called accession.
In addition to that, agreements normally receive signatures on behalf
of the negotiating countries soon after the text of the treaty is agreed.
Thus, signatures tend to be grouped together. It is rare to have treaties
signed after the first year of the agreement’s life and the treaties are
often open for signature only for a limited time period (Hugh-Jones
et al., 2018).
Sample of treaties and source of the data
We have 2 main sources for the date and status of ratification of treat-
ies: The ENTRI (CIESIN, 2013) and the IEA (Mitchell, 2017) Data-
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Figure 5.6: Transforming ratification data into a binary format
bases. The Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators (ENTRI)
database has been compiled by the International Union for the Con-
servation of Nature and Natural Resources. It includes environmental
agreements signed from 1940 to 2012. In total, 200 countries and more
than 600 multilateral environmental agreements are covered by the
database. We used it mainly to cross-check the information contained
in the International Environmental Agreements (IEA) Database which
contains over 1250 multilateral agreements signed between 1850 and
2017 by over 200 countries. The definition they adopt for “environ-
mental” is broader, hence it includes a larger number of agreements
than the ENTRI database. For example, it also contains data about
energy agreements or nuclear non-proliferation treaties. We focus ex-
clusively on binding agreements that relate to any of the following
areas of interest: i) protection of the environment in general, ii) spe-
cies protection, iii) pollution (air, land and water), iv) habitat and
ecosystem preservation. As a further restriction, only agreements and
protocols to the agreements are taken into consideration, while amend-
ments are ignored. The reason behind this choice is that most of the
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time amendments imply minor changes in the text of the agreement;
they only partially modify the obligations of the parties, without cre-
ating new areas of regulation. Furthermore, the amendments tend to
be adopted internally to the agreements and sometimes do not require
a formal act of ratification.
Finally, we intentionally exclude all bilateral treaties from the ana-
lysis. Bilateral treaties tend to be negotiated differently than multi-
lateral agreements. Bilateral agreements are often formed through the
medium of embassies and diplomatic visits; the ratification of these
agreements can often be carried out by plenipotentiary and representat-
ives of the government, while multilateral agreements generally require
the approval by the country’s parliament. The underlying determin-
ants of ratification for these agreements would be different. In addition
to that, the ratification rate of bilateral agreements is extremely high.
Thus, the question of interest for this type of agreements is not so
much whether or not the agreement is ratified, but whether or not the
two nations decide to negotiate a treaty on the environmental issue.
The second question requires a different set of information and goes
beyond the interest of this study, which focuses on ratification, not on
negotiation. Since small multilateral agreements could share some of
the characteristics of bilateral agreements, we limit our analysis to the
agreements that have at least 5 potential ratifiers5. With these restric-
tions the number of agreements that meet our criteria is drastically
reduced: in total the final data set contains 263 agreements (listed in
Appendix B). This remains the largest data set applied to the question
of ratification.
5.2.2 Treaties, countries and the problem of poten-
tial ratifiers
Potential ratifiers
Mitchell (2017) and CIESIN (2013) report a list of treaties together
with the signature and ratification dates of the countries that signed
and/or ratified that agreement. However, to correctly estimate our
model we need to know all the countries that are in the risk set. In
other words, for every treaty we need to take into account the countries
that ratified and those for which the treaty was open but did not ratify.
5Potential ratifiers are the potential members of the treaty, independently of whether
the country actually ratified the agreement. A complete definition is provided in the next
section.
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We can distinguish between two categories of multilateral agreements:
global and regional. The former encompasses the agreements that,
in principle, concern every nation on earth; as such, every country
is a candidate ratifier for this type of agreements. All the remaining
multilateral agreements are regional, in the sense that they only regard
a subset of nations. We can include regional agreements in our data set
as long as we know exactly the nations that are able to ratify or bear
an interest in the treaty. We call these countries the potential ratifiers
of a treaty.
Unfortunately, the concept of potential ratifier has been dangerously
neglected in the ratification literature. The current empirical literature
assumes that every country in the world is a potential ratifier of the
agreement. While the assumption holds for global agreement, this leads
to an overestimation of the survival probability if applied to other types
of treaties. In all of the previous studies no one has addressed this
limitation. The result is that, in many cases, the inference is completely
unreliable because of the erroneous identification of the agreements on
which the analysis is based. This is the first time that potential ratifiers
of every treaty are clearly identified, thus tackling a major source of
bias and allowing us to expand the analysis to regional agreements.
In the remaining part of this section we explain the concrete methods
used to identify the potential ratifiers of a treaty.
Identifying the potential ratifiers
The potential members of a regional agreement are identifiable if they
are stated in the text of the treaty. This is very often the case for re-
gional agreements. In some other cases the ratification is open exclus-
ively to members of a previous convention. Typical examples for this
are the protocols to an existing framework convention: even if not ex-
plicitly stated, de facto the ratifier of the protocol needs to be a member
of the convention as well or at least a potential ratifier of the conven-
tion. Another set of regional treaties is negotiated by pre-established
groups of countries. For example, the Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution agreements (LRTAP) are negotiated under the banner of the
UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), hence all UNECE
members are considered in the risk set. Other examples of organisa-
tions that develop internal environmental treaties are the European
Union, African Union, ASEAN, Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), or the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of States (ACP).
The raison d’eˆtre of environmental agreements is to address an en-
vironmental issue. Because of this correspondence between the envir-
onmental problem and the scope of the agreement, it is often possible
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Figure 5.7: Potential ratifications
Notes: This map shows the number of agreements in the data set that
countries can potentially ratify.
to geographically localise the members concerned by the agreement.
For a treaty regarding the pollution of the Danube, the nations that
are crossed by the Danube are naturally potential ratifiers of the treaty.
The Alpine convention regards the countries in the region of the Alps:
Indonesia and Peru are clearly not potential ratifiers. This principle can
be extended to a large number of regional agreements; if the agreement
tackles a local natural resource, which can be demarcated geograph-
ically, then the identification of its potential members follows easily.
When the potential members of an agreement cannot be identified un-
equivocally by the text of the treaty or one of the above-mentioned
criteria, the treaty is excluded from the data set. In total we excluded
less than 10 agreements.
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The potential ratifiers of global agreements
Global agreements are open to every nation in the world. Typically
this category of agreements addresses universal problems such as cli-
mate change, depletion of the ozone layer, desertification or sea pollu-
tion. They can also concern more general aspects related to environ-
mental issues such as the liability for environmental damages, disposal
of wastes, protection of species, or general laws on plants, prevention
of environmental disasters, or compensation and cooperation on envir-
onmental matters. In the case of global environmental agreements any
existing country is a potential member. This is less simple to imple-
ment than it first appears. First, we need to define the ratifiers at any
point in time. We decided to restrict our sample to sovereign nations.
Hence, the analysis excludes all the states that are not sufficiently
recognised internationally (e.g. Northern Cyprus, South Ossetia, Art-
sakh or Transnistria) or international entities with no control over their
foreign policy6 or which fail to qualify as fully sovereign nation7. We
also ignore the ratification of international organisations — both NGOs
and inter-governmental organisations — and supranational organisa-
tions (e.g. European Union). Even if one of these entities ratifies a
treaty we do not take it into account. Moreover, we drop the following
4 countries because of the lack of consistent data: South Moluccas,
South Vietnam, South Yemen and East Germany.
As a second complication, the treaties in the sample span from
1950 to 2017. During this period many countries appeared, merged
or disappeared from the world map. We must duly account for this
by taking into consideration a nation’s date of creation/independence
and disappearance, if applicable. Information on the independence of
nations is collected from World Factbook (CIA, 2017). The countries
are in the risk set only if they exist at the time of the signature of
the agreement (see figure 5.6) and leave the risk set if the country is
extinct. For example, for a treaty signed in 1990: Czechoslovakia would
be in the risk set from 1990 to 1993 while Slovakia and Czech Republic
from 1994 to 2017. Of course, Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic and
Slovakia could leave the risk set earlier if they ratify. In Appendix
A we report the full list of countries included in the sample together
with information on their creation and extinction (if they occur between
1950 and 2017). In total there are 198 countries and 263 environmental
6For example, this is the case of colonial territories until their independence or depend-
encies such as Puerto Rico that have limited control over their foreign policy.
7For example, the Sovereign Military Order of Malta which is widely recognised, pos-
sess extraterritorial land in Rome, and even citizenship. However, it is not considered a
sovereign nation.
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agreements in the sample, of which 190 are regional and 73 global. For
each of these treaties we identified the potential ratifiers out of the
198 countries and the years during which those countries are at risk of
ratifying. A complete list of the agreements in the data set is available
in Appendix B.
5.3 Description of the independent vari-
ables
5.3.1 Main variables
Environmental lobbying We adopt a loose definition of environ-
mental lobbying, encompassing all actions aimed at influencing the
outcome of ratification decisions in favour of participation. In demo-
cracies, the lobbying action can be channelled both through political
representation and through the pressure exerted by civil society. The
probability of ratification is expected to increase with environmental
lobbying. Lobbying, as a variable, is very difficult to measure. It would
be interesting to quantify it with the economic resources of environ-
mental groups. Unfortunately this sort of data is unavailable and it
would not entirely reflect the complexity of the lobbying effort. Hence,
in the literature, environmental lobbying is proxied by the number of
environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs). This obvi-
ously cannot capture the qualitative aspect of lobbying. However, it is
often regarded as the best available measure. In general, it is reason-
able to assume that the strength of environmental lobbying increases
with the number of ENGOs. We use the number of ENGOs mem-
berships by country to the International Union for the Conservation
of Nature (IUCN) in 2017. IUCN is one of the oldest and largest
environmental organisations; it has around 1300 members, including
governments, universities and NGOs. In a second part of our empirical
analysis we perform sensibility checks by using the following alternat-
ive proxies for environmental lobbying: i) the percentage of territory
that is designated as protected area (ProtectedArea), which we assume
correlates with the influence of environmental lobbies, and ii) the “en-
vironmental concern” of the population (EnvConcern). The “envir-
onmental concern” is the percentage of population that reports being
concerned about climate change in a survey conducted in 119 countries
by Tien et al. (2015). The main argument being that the environ-
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mental pressure should increase with stronger environmental concerns,
both through civil society organisations and political channels. The re-
lationship could be affected by cultural and political factors, but — in
general — a stronger environmental concern should result in more en-
vironmental pressure. Besides cultural factors, environmental concerns
are also likely to be influenced by the level of income (Environmental
Kuznet Curve), so we will have to control for this in our model.
Industrial lobbying We anticipate a negative relationship between
industrial lobbying and ratification. The term “industrial” is used
to loosely indicate a group of economic and political agents that op-
pose environmental agreements and the introduction of tighter envir-
onmental regulations. This group includes highly-polluting companies,
fossil fuel producers, energy-intensive activities, but also entities from
other sectors that share similar economic interests regarding environ-
mental regulations. Again, the lobbying activity of industrial interest
groups is opaque and hard to identify. Recently some data has been
compiled for a small number of countries on lobbying expenses. How-
ever the data is seriously incomplete and only represents the tip of the
iceberg. We use the sum of fossil fuels rent as a percentage of GDP
(ResourceRent) to approximate the influence of industrial groups. The
data is calculated by the World Bank, and is termed “Total natural re-
sources rent (%GDP)” in the WDI data set (World Bank, 2017a). The
rents are calculated as the difference between the average production
cost and the commodity price. Hence, the variable captures the extent
of the monopolistic power enjoyed by the fossil industry; we assume
this correlates with their lobbying potential. Then, in a second part
of the analysis, other measures are experimented, these include: i) the
share of GDP value added from manufacturing, mining and utilities at
current prices (ShareIndustry), data from UNSD (2017), ii) a dummy
variable (IMFresourcerich) for countries classified as resource-rich by
the IMF (IMF, 2012), iii) FossilExports; the share of fossil fuels,
ores and metals export over the total value of the merchandise export
(World Bank, 2017a) and iv) EnergyUse, the energy use of the country
in per capita terms (IEA, 2017). Higher exports of fossil resources and
energy-intensive production are assumed to correlate with industrial
lobbying potential because of the existing link between energy-intensive
processes and several forms of pollution. Some of these proxies could
correlate with economic factors such as the level of income and devel-
opment or the quality of the environment. Hence, it is important to
control for these factors in our equation.
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Quality of Institutions The quality of institutions is an eclectic no-
tion. We focus on the concepts of transparency, corruption and ef-
ficiency of bureaucracy, which are used as a proxy for the general
institutional quality. These concepts tend to be strongly correlated
and are directly linked to the success of many forms of interest lob-
bying. Several indices have been developed to measure the quality of
institutions. The most popular being: World Governance Indicators
(World Bank, 2017b), Economic Freedom Index and its component by
the Fraser Institute (2017), Corruption Perception Index (Transpar-
ency International, 2017), “Institutions” pillar of Global Competitiv-
iness Index (World Economic Forum, 2017) and the scores from the
International Country Risk Guide (Political Risk Service, 2011). We
mainly use the Control of Corruption indicator (Institutions) from the
World Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2017b), expressed in units
of a standard normal distribution. This has the advantage of being dir-
ectly related to our definition of quality of institutions, calculated for a
large base of countries and a sufficiently long period of time. Moreover,
to study how lobbying varies with the quality of institutions, we add
two interaction terms: between institutions and environmental lobbying
and between institutions and industrial lobbying. We expect a negative
coefficient for both interactions. That is to say, we expect lobbying to
be more effective when the quality of institutions is poorer. The results
are then confronted with those obtained by substituting the Economic
Freedom Index (Institutions3) with Fraser Institute Fraser Institute
(2017) and Government effectiveness indicator (Institutions2) from
the World Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2017b). For all indic-
ators, a higher score indicates better institutions.
We follow the practice of controlling for the quality of democracy
since this could affect the extent to which environmental preferences
are represented within the government — often expressed through vote
and other civil rights. The effectiveness of environmental and industrial
lobbying could depend on the environmental stance of government.
However, this interaction is not modelled because it is not deemed to
be a major factor in the effectiveness of lobbying action. The existing
empirical research on the subject did not unveil a systematic impact
on ratification (Schulze, 2014). Future research could further explore
the link between government’s identity and ratification probabilities.
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Table 5.1: Definitions and sources
Variables Definitions and sources
ENGO Number of ENGOs memberships to the International Union for
the Conservation of Nature by country in 2017. Data from IUCN
website. We assume a constant value over the entire time period
because no panel data is available. We perform sensibility checks
with other time-varying proxies for environmental lobbying.
ResourceRent Sum of fossil fuels rent in percentage of GDP. “Total natural re-
sources rent (%GDP)” in WDI dataset (World Bank, 2017a).
Institutions Control of Corruption indicator from the World Governance In-
dicators (World Bank, 2017b). Expressed in units of a standard
normal distribution.
ENGO.Institutions Interaction term between ENGO and Institutions
ResourceRent.Instit Interaction term between REsourceRent and Institutions
logIncome Natural logarithm of the GDP per capita in current USD. Data
from the UN National account estimates (UNSD, 2017).
FreedomHouseCL Freedom House index of civil liberties. On a scale from 1 to 7,
where a lower score indicates greater freedom. Data from Freedom
House (2017).
ThreatenedSpecies Red List Index. The index indicates the conservation status of
species groups in a territory. A higher risk of extinction is associated
with lower scores. Data from IUCN website (IUCN, 2017).
logForest Natural logarithm of the forest area, expressed in thousands of
squared kilometres. Own calculations from data on the total land
surface (FAO, 2017) and the percentage of land covered by forest
(World Bank, 2017a).
RatRegion Share of countries in the same region that ratified the agreement.
RatUS Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the United States
already ratified the agreement.
RatChina Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if China already ratified
the agreement.
RatRussia Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Russia already ratified
the agreement.
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Definitions and sources (continued)
Variables Definitions and sources
RatIndia Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if India already ratified
the agreement.
RatGermany Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Germany already rati-
fied the agreement.
Regional Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the treaty is not open
to all countries or if the scope of the agreement is regional (e.g.
a treaty on the protection of a river basin or EU environmental
agreements). The variable has been coded on the basis of the text
of the agreement as reported in the IEA Database Mitchell (2017).
FrameworkAgreement Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the agreement is a
framework agreement (typically with non-binding obligations) ac-
cording to classification from Mitchell (2017).
t Duration: number of years the treaty-country combination has
spent in the risk set.
EnergyUse Energy use per capita, in kg of oil equivalent. Data from the Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA, 2017).
ShareIndustry Share of GDP value added from manufacturing, mining and utilities
at current prices. National accounts data (UNSD, 2017).
IMFresourcerich Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country is on the
IMF list of resource rich countries (IMF, 2012). The IMF identifies
resource-rich countries mainly on the basis of their reliance on the
export of natural resources.
FossilExports Export of fossil fuels, ores and metals over the total value of the
merchandise export. Data from WDI (World Bank, 2017a).
EnvConcern Percentage of population that reports being concerned about cli-
mate change. Data from Tien et al. (2015) based on a survey con-
ducted in 2007-2008 that covers 119 countries, with 500 to 8000
respondents per country.
ProtectedArea Percentage of terrestrial territory that is designated as protected
area. The data is from UNEP (2017). For missing values the vari-
able is assumed constant.
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Definitions and sources (continued)
Variables Definitions and sources
Institutions2 Government effectiveness indicator from the World Governance In-
dicators (World Bank, 2017b). Expressed in units of a standard
normal distribution.
Institutions3 Economic Freedom Index by Fraser Institute (2017). Score ranges
from 0 to 10. Data is annual from 2000, but it is only available on
a 5 years basis between 1970 and 2000. The missing years are filled
by linear interpolation.
5.3.2 Control variables
Income We include the logarithm of GDP per capita and its squared
value to control for income (logIncome). A higher income is associated
with higher ratification probability. The squared value is necessary
to account for non-linearity in the relationship between income and
environmental preference as described by the Environmental Kuznet
Curve (Andreoni & Levinson, 2001). The data on GDP per capita in
current USD comes from the UN National account estimates (UNSD,
2017).
Democracy A control for democracy is a constant feature in the em-
pirical works on ratification. This is probably linked to the fact that
earlier works emerged in the area of political science and focused on
how civil liberties and regime types affect ratification (Congleton, 1992;
Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000; Neumayer, 2002a). The results show a
significant positive effect on ratification. All the subsequent works in
the area include some form of control for this factor. We use Free-
dom House index of civil liberties (Freedom House, 2017) to control
for democracy (FreedomHouseCL). The index is expressed on a scale
from 1 to 7, where a lower score indicates a higher degree of freedom.
State of the environment Dissatisfaction with the quality of the en-
vironment prompts governmental action. On the international stage
this translates into higher chances of taking part in environmental
agreements. As the agreements in the sample cover different envir-
onmental issues, the measure for environmental quality needs to be as
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general as possible to reflect the broad range of environmental issues in-
volved in the analysis. We decide to use an index on the conservation of
species as a proxy for the state of the environment (ThreatenedSpecies).
Most environmental changes tend to either directly or indirectly affect
animal species. Temperature change, habitat disruption, water pollu-
tion, poaching, desertification, air pollution and/or deforestation have
a devastating impact on animal species. The link between animal spe-
cies and environmental quality can be used to evaluate the state of the
environment. The Red List Index ranges from 0 to 1 and indicates the
conservation status of species groups in a territory. A higher risk of
extinction is associated with lower scores. The data is sourced from
the IUCN website (IUCN, 2017).
Natural capital By natural capital we refer to environmental assets
rather than extractive assets. Some countries possess unique ecosys-
tems that are fundamental in maintaining global sustainability. These
countries receive more international pressure to ratify, and environ-
mental agreements often facilitate the protection of their natural re-
sources, through aid-transfer and flexibility clauses, in order to secure
their participation. These considerations suggest that the question of
ratification could be approached differently by environmentally rich na-
tions. The literature postulates a positive relationship between richness
in natural resources and participation in international agreements. We
control for this factor by including the natural logarithm of the forest
area in thousands of squared kilometres (logForest)8.
Regional agreements Regional and global agreements address envir-
onmental issues on a different scale. The larger the agreement, the
harder is the negotiation phase. Global agreements have to result in
a compromise for all nations; which is reflected in their characteristics
and in the way they are ratified (Figure 5.8). The difference is ac-
commodated in the model by including a dummy variable (Regional)
that takes the value of 1 if the treaty is not open to all countries or
if the scope of the agreement is regional (see section 5.2.2 for more on
this). The variable was coded on the basis of the text of the agreements
reported in the IEA Database Mitchell (2017).
Interdependence in ratification dynamics When a treaty is rati-
fied by a country, notably a big one, the ratification probability of
other countries is affected. In fact, the higher the number of ratifiers,
8Own calculations combining data on land extension (FAO, 2017) and share of territory
occupied by forest (World Bank, 2017a).
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Figure 5.8: Ratification of regional and global agreements
Notes: In general, global agreements tend to have a lower turnout than re-
gional ones. Ratification displays a bimodal distribution; agreements are
either joined by the majority of countries or just by few because countries’
decisions are interrelated (particularly evident for global agreements). The
kernel density function provides an approximation of the probability dis-
tribution of the ratification rate. The ratification rate is calculated as the
number of ratifiers over the number of potential ratifiers up to 2017. For
more details on the ratification data see section 5.2.2.
the stronger is the peer pressure on the country that did not ratify.
Either by emulation or because of stronger diplomatic pressure, the
country has a greater incentive to ratify. Some authors argue that for-
eign ratification also bears a strong signalling effect on the economic
and technical feasibility of the agreement goals. We account for this
by including the share of countries in the same region that ratified the
agreement (RatRegion). This is calculated as the percentage of the po-
tential ratifiers in the same geographic UNSD sub-region9 that already
ratified the agreement at time t. By including ratification choices of
other countries in the same equation, we create the risk of spatially cor-
related error terms and simultaneity bias from spatially lagged variable
(Sauquet, 2014). For this reason we consider only the ratifications that
took place up to time t−1. The temporal lag ensures there is no direct
causality running back from the explanatory to the dependent variable.
9Cf. Appendix A
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In fact, there is no way the ratification decision of country A at time
t might influence ratification of country B at time t − 1. Moreover,
the ratification status in the previous year is still a relevant variable
to capture international influence on domestic ratification choices be-
cause treaty ratifications often take several months to get legislative
approval. Thus, foreign ratification choices are likely to reflect on do-
mestic policies with a temporal lag. Lagged ratification variables have
first been used by von Stein (2008) and became a common practice in
ratification studies 10.
Big ratifiers In addition, we also isolate the effect of 5 big ratifiers:
United States, Russia (and USSR), China, India and Germany. For
each of these a dummy variable is included that takes the value of
1 if the country already ratified at time t and 0 otherwise (RatUS,
RatChina, ... etc). United States and Russia (and USSR) are dip-
lomatic superpowers, a ratification by any of these is very likely to
trigger the ratification of other countries in their respective sphere of
influence. Similarly, China and India are two rising powers. Because of
their size and population their participation is decisive for the success
of environmental agreements. Finally, Germany is chosen because after
the creation of the EU, European countries tend to ratify environment
agreements as a “bloc”. Hence, the dummy for German ratification
is a proxy for European participation to the agreement. Table 5.2 il-
lustrates the correlation among the ratifications of some key nations;
European countries generally exhibit higher correlation among them
than with other nations as illustrated by the coefficients for the United
Kingdom, France and Germany.
It must be noted that for some countries the ratification choice of
the big ratifiers might enter twice in the equation. If India ratifies an
agreement, the effect of its ratification will affect all the countries in
the world through the dummy RatIndia and additionally affect South-
ern Asian through the variable RatRegion. As a result, although the
variables are not collinear, the correlation between the two variables
increases. This might make it harder to isolate the effect of India’s
ratification from the overall regional effect, but the estimates should
not be biased in principle. Also, the five big ratifiers are not in the
same geographic sub-region; hence, their effects do not cumulate.
10Among others, they are used by Bernauer et al. (2010), Leinaweaver (2012), Schneider
& Urpelainen (2013), Bernauer et al. (2013a), Yamagata et al. (2013), Sauquet (2014),
Schulze (2014), Bo¨hmelt et al. (2015), Mohrenberg et al. (2016), Spilker & Koubi (2016),
Yamagata et al. (2017), and Hugh-Jones et al. (2018).
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Table 5.2: Correlation matrix for ratification variables — post 1990
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. RatRegion 1.000
2. RatUS 0.221 1.000
3. RatChina 0.332 0.461 1.000
4. RatRussia 0.259 0.286 0.278 1.000
5. RatIndia 0.487 0.407 0.446 0.275 1.000
6. RatGermany 0.364 0.272 0.360 0.444 0.537 1.000
7. RatFrance 0.341 0.440 0.427 0.434 0.446 0.661 1.000
8. RatUK 0.392 0.443 0.467 0.378 0.618 0.672 0.583 1.000
Framework agreements Framework agreements are treaties that set
general principles, guidelines, or goals, but only weak or non-binding
targets or obligations. We expect non-binding treaties to receive a
higher number of ratifications. Therefore, we introduce a dummy
(FrameworkAgreement) that takes the value of 1 if the agreement
is a framework agreement according to the sequence classification of
the IEA database (Mitchell, 2017).
5.3.3 Missing observations and sampling bias
Our data set on ratification of environmental treaties covers the period
1950-2017 for almost 200 countries. This chapter has detailed how
attention has been paid to ensuring that all nations are adequately
included in the study in order to obtain a sample of nations as close
as possible to the entire population. Similarly, the sample of treaties
is as large as possible and we intentionally include regional agreements
because they have an important weight in environmental diplomacy.
In the course of the empirical analysis we use just a subset of our
ratification data set, primarily because of global political shifts and
because of problems linked to missing observations for some of the
explanatory variables. In this section, we discuss these two issues in
more depth.
The focal point of the analysis is to understand the ratification of
environmental treaties. Yamagata et al. (2017) drew attention to how
the fall of the communist block entailed a shift in international polit-
ics, with major changes in how ratification is approached by sovereign
nations. In econometrics this is termed a structural break. We could
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account for the structural break in different ways, but unfortunately
the data available in the pre-1990 period is not as complete as the
post-1990. For this reason, it is prudent to restrict the analysis to the
post-1990 period. Moreover, modern ratifications are a better basis for
understanding current environmental diplomacy.
The problems linked to data availability are essentially of two types:
i) missing values, and ii) missing country series. Regarding the first
point, some of our explanatory variables have a shorter time coverage.
For example, while data on income is easily available from 1970, the
index on the quality of institutions or the proxy for industrial pres-
sure are only consistently available from the 1990s. In the post-1990
period we have generally very few missing values for our set of vari-
ables. Therefore, focusing on the post-1990 period allows us to put
together a more complete panel of data.
With reference to the second point, missing country series have po-
tentially bigger consequences. In fact, the problem is that the data is
not missing in a random fashion; typically the countries with missing
data have similar characteristics. They tend to be smaller nations, less
developed and/or with special political situations. The risk associated
with such missing observations is to incur into sampling bias because
specific groups of countries are systematically excluded from the sample
of nations. As a consequence, the estimates are no longer valid for the
entire population. We therefore limit the impact by selecting indicators
available for as large a number of nations as possible. In the end, only
the following countries are excluded because of missing observations in
the independent variables: the Holy See, North Korea, Nauru, Monaco,
San Marino, Kosovo, South Sudan. The exclusion is clearly not ran-
dom, the countries for which data is not available tend to be small or
with peculiar institutional characteristics. We argue that the exclusion
of these countries has a negligible impact on the final estimates.
Firstly, the Holy See has a special status. It is a fully independent
nation capable of ratifying treaties, but its religious status entails that
international relations are approached rather unconventionally. They
often strive for impartiality on political decisions as shown by the fact
that they refused a seat at the UN and opted for an observer status.
Likewise, Monaco and San Marino have their own peculiarities. While
they are sovereign nations, their security is guaranteed respectively by
France and Italy. They depend economically and diplomatically on
their surrounding neighbours and as such their international policy is
mostly dictated by France and Italy. Kosovo and South Sudan are
the two youngest states. The first was created in 2008 and the latter
in 2011. They are both politically unstable, which explains the lack
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of collected data. In the case of North Korea, political isolation is
responsible for the lack of data. Finally, Nauru is a small island in
the South Pacific Ocean. The country is known for having few and
unreliable official statistics (CIA, 2017). Their economy is dependent
on the export of phosphate and the depletion of its mineral resources
is making the state increasingly dependent on Australian financial aid.
All these nations have very precise reasons for lacking observations.
There is no systematic pattern to their missing observations. Unfortu-
nately there is no way of compensating the missing data with supple-
mentary data or circumventing the problem by other means. Neverthe-
less, the effect of these omitted countries should be negligible overall.
They only account for a very small portion of the total observations
and our sample still contains 190 countries, which is almost the total-
ity of sovereign nations in the world. Since our sample almost matches
the entire population we are confident that the effect of the excluded
units is inappreciable on the final estimates, and more importantly, the
estimates of the model remain reliable for the population of countries
and are generalisable beyond our sample of treaties.
In summary, the data on participation in environmental agreements
goes back to 1950 but we choose to start the analysis from 1990 to
avoid any problem linked to missing observations and structural shifts
in international politics. Starting in 1990 also allows us to have an
almost perfectly balanced panel data. The panel is almost balanced
because some countries came into existence after 1990: e.g. Montenegro
and Slovakia. Notwithstanding, for the period 1990-2015 we still have
more than 200000 usable observations on ratification. In this section
we argued that despite the omission of 5 nations from the analysis the
resulting estimates should remain valid for the entire population.
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Table 5.3: Summary statistics — post 1990
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Country variables
ENGO 5224 4.849 8.086 0 62
ResourceRent 4732 7.611 11.961 0.000 89.166
Institutions 4732 -0.060 0.997 -2.174 2.470
logIncome 4776 8.009 1.622 4.388 12.142
FreedomHouseCL 4976 3.430 1.869 1 7
ThreatenedSpecies 4616 0.875 0.089 0.404 0.995
logForest 4463 7.422 2.815 -1.514 13.652
Treaty Variables
Regional 263 0.722 0.449 0 1
FrameworkAgreement 263 0.717 0.451 0 1
Ratification variables
RatRegion 254350 0.128 0.211 0 1
RatChina 254350 0.269 0.444 0 1
RatGermany 254350 0.519 0.500 0 1
RatIndia 254350 0.303 0.460 0 1
RatRussia 254350 0.08 0.271 0 1
RatUS 254350 0.381 0.486 0 1
Ratification (dependent) 254350 0.025 0.155 0 1
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Chapter 6
Results on the ratification of
environmental agreements
In this chapter we present the main results of the analysis. The model
we develop is used to study the determinants of ratification, with a
special focus on the effect of environmental and industrial lobbying
as well as the role played by institutions in fostering participation to
environmental agreements. The results are used to derive important
conclusions on the main determinants of ratification and on how lobby-
ing practices are exerted. The chapter is structured as follows. The first
part of the chapter is dedicated to the discussion of the results. In the
second and third section we evaluate the convergence of the paramet-
ers and the robustness of the findings. The fourth section summarises
the main findings and draws important policy implications. Finally,
the last section applies the model to different treaties and countries to
illustrate a few practical applications of the model.
6.1 Main results
In table 6.1 we report the main results on the ratification of environ-
mental agreements. Five different model specifications are presented
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(model I to V). The first two are the reference specifications of the
study, the estimates correspond to the mean of the marginal posterior
distributions which are also presented in terms of hazard ratios1. The
only difference between model I and II is that the latter does not have
an interaction term between the quality of institutions and the lobbying
variables. Model V is identical to model I but estimated on a sample
composed exclusively of global environmental agreements. In Model
III the income and democracy variables are replaced with a different
proxy for the level of economic development and Model IV is a simpli-
fied specification of model I. A description of all the variables used in
the model can be found in appendix C. All models are estimated with
MCMC, as described in chapter 5. The estimates presented in this
chapter are asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood estim-
ates. This property is derived from the Bernstein–von Mises theorem,
which posits that — with large enough data, full parametrisation of
the model and uniform priors — the posterior distribution of the para-
meters approaches a normal distribution centred upon the maximum
likelihood estimate (Nickl, 2013). Hence, for the purpose of frequentist
asymptotic inference, this implies that MCMC yields identical results
to the ones obtained with the asymptotic distribution of the maximum
likelihood estimator. In other words, this means that the estimates
derived from the posterior distribution can be directly compared to a
“classic” frequentist estimate.
Environmental and industrial lobbying
To begin with, we find that environmental lobbying has a positive and
significant effect on the probability of ratifying. An additional environ-
mental NGO (ENGO) increases the hazard of ratifying environmental
agreements by 1.6% (Model II), and by 2.1% (model I) if the quality
of institutions is at its average2. The positive effect of environmental
lobbying is in line with other results in the literature (e.g. Fredriksson
& Ujhelyi 2006, von Stein 2008, Bernauer et al. 2013a). On the other
1All other things being equal, a hazard ratio higher than 1 indicates an increase in the
probability of ratification while a hazard ratio between 0 and 1 suggests a reduction in
the probability of ratification. Hazard ratios indicate the relative risk of an event between
two groups of reference. For example, in the case of RatUS, it compares the hazard for
treaty-country-year dyads in which the United States has already ratified the agreement
with the ones in which it has not. In the case of continuous variables (e.g. ENGO or
ResourceRent), the comparison is made with having a unit increase in the variable. In
Model I, the hazard ratio for Regional has a value of 2.370. This implies that ratifications
occur 2.370 times more often in regional treaties than in global ones.
2In model II the interpretation of ENGO’s coefficient is made in correspondence of
Institutions = 0. Since the variable Institutions is normalised, the value of zero is also
the average quality of institutions.
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hand, the results for industrial lobbying are in sharp contrast with our
hypothesis on the impact of lobbying. In fact, industrial lobbying is
not statistically significant in any of the five specifications of table 6.1.
The most puzzling side of this result is that industrial lobbies are often
considered to have more economic resources and influence than environ-
mental groups. These findings contradict our expectations, hence they
are investigated in more detail in the next section, where — among
other things — different measures for industrial lobbying are tested to
verify the robustness of our estimates.
Disentangling institutional effect: institutions, income and democracy
The quality of institutions plays an important role in the ratification of
environmental agreements. From model II we estimate that a 1 s.d. in-
crease in the quality of institutions has a multiplicative effect of 8% on
the baseline hazard of ratification. Institutions have a positive effect
on the participation in environmental agreements and the result is con-
sistent across the five specifications of table 6.1. In addition to that,
Model I indicates that the effect of ENGO’s lobbying is stronger when
the quality of institutions is lower. We propose two reasons for this.
First of all, better institutions should channel more effectively environ-
mental demands, and reduce the need of pressure from environmental
groups. Hence good quality institutions substitute the effect of envir-
onmental groups. A similar conclusion was reached by Bernauer et al.
(2013a) on the interaction between environmental lobbying and the
quality of democracy. Secondly, lobbying practices in general are more
effective in corrupt situations. The second argument was proposed by
Fredriksson et al. (2007) who find that environmental lobbying for the
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is more effective when institutions
are more corrupted. Both arguments imply that environmental lobby-
ing is an effective tool to stimulate participation of countries with less
developed institutions because of the higher marginal effect of lobbying.
Table 6.2 shows that our measure for the quality of institutions ex-
hibits a non-trivial degree of correlation with logincome (0.736) and
FreedomHouseCL (−0.681). Richer nations tend to have better insti-
tutions and more mature democracies. To ensure that the estimates of
Institutions are not distorted, in model III we omit both logIncome
and FreedomHouse and replace them with AnnexI which is used as
control for the level of development. AnnexI is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the country is in the “Annex I” list of
countries under the UNFCCC (1992). Annex I countries are the na-
tions that have tighter obligations under climate change agreements.
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This list of countries corresponds to the economically most developed
nations in the world and gives a good indication of the level of en-
vironmental commitment expected of every nation. A comparison of
model I and model III reveals that the difference between the two es-
timates for institutions is not statistically significant3. The inclusion
of FreedomHouseCL and logIncome does not affect the consistency
of the estimates.
Table 6.2: Correlation matrix for country variables in model I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. ENGO 1.000
2. ResourceRent −0.151 1.000
3. Institutions 0.173 −0.399 1.000
4. logIncome 0.127 −0.189 0.736 1.000
5. FreedomHouseCL −0.127 0.490 −0.681 −0.575 1.000
6. ThreatenedSpecies −0.100 0.154 0.020 0.025 0.070 1.000
7. logForest 0.341 0.181 −0.240 −0.218 0.194 0.084 1.000
logIncome is associated with a higher probability of ratification, but
only at the 10% significance level. Moreover, we do not find evidence
of a non-linear relationship with income. Income explains part of the
difference in ratification behaviour, but the impact of economic devel-
opment is often mitigated by differentiated terms in the environmental
agreements. In other words, several environmental agreements transfer
to richer nations most of the costs associated with the agreement in or-
der to secure higher participation. In fact, environmental agreements
often include facilitating measures, technical assistance, and financial
aid to developing nations that decide to take part to the agreement.
According to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilit-
3A formal hypothesis test shows that the two estimates are not statistically different.
H0: β
III − βI = 0
H1: β
III − βI > 0
Where βIII and βI are the estimates for Institutions of model III and I, respectively. The
correct Z score for two coefficients of separate regressions is (Paternoster et al., 1998):
Z =
βIII − βI√
SE2
βIII
+ SE2
βI
=
0.069√
0.052 + 0.0482
≈ 0.9955
With α = 0.05, the p-value is approximately p ≈ 0.159. The null hypothesis is rejected.
The difference between βI and βIII is statistically insignificant.
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ies the most developed nations are expected to lead the way in terms
of environmental commitments and bear the highest share of the cost
of treaties. All of these measures could explain why the influence of
income is not as clear-cut as anticipated. Nonetheless, in model III,
where AnnexI is used to proxy for both the level of development and
expected environmental commitment, the effect is positive and strongly
significant. This could indicate that tighter obligations for developed
nations do not necessarily offset the positive effect on ratification asso-
ciated with a higher level of economic development.
Democratic states tend to engage more in environmental agree-
ments; a lower score in the FreedomHouseCL index is significantly
linked to higher chances of ratifying in all models. This result cor-
roborates the already established, and widely accepted, relationship
between democracy and ratification of environmental agreements. In
fact, several empirical works have already demonstrated that democra-
cies are more likely to join environmental agreements (e.g Congleton
1992, Neumayer 2002a).
Natural capital
The quality of the environment — proxied by ThreatenedSpecies— is
positively correlated with ratification, but the estimates hardly reach
a significant level; the coefficient is significant at the 10% level only
in model I. Many forms of degradation of the environment do not en-
tail a response under the form of international cooperation, very often
countries may prefer to tackle them domestically and unilaterally. On
the other hand, the richness in natural capital seems to matter for rat-
ification; having a large forest area (logForest) is always significantly
associated with a higher probability of ratifying environmental agree-
ments. We conclude that countries that are rich in environmental cap-
ital are more likely to get involved in environmental agreements with
their neighbours and are also more likely to ratify treaties that aim at
protecting their environmental assets. If environmental agreements are
considered international public goods preserving environmental assets,
then countries with larger forest areas are capable of capturing a higher
share of the benefits derived from the treaty. All things considered, a
country rich in environmental assets has a higher propensity to ratify
environmental agreements.
International interactions
Besides domestic characteristics we find that an important part of rat-
ification decisions is explained by the actions of foreign countries. The
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game theoretical literature on participation in environmental agree-
ments stresses that the decisions of different countries are strategically
linked. Our findings strongly support this contention. If all geographic
neighbours ratify the treaty, the baseline hazard of ratification is mul-
tiplied by as much as 80% (Model I). Furthermore, the ratification
decisions of big countries heavily influences the likelihood of ratifica-
tion by other nations. In particular, ratification by China, Germany
(proxy for the EU), and India increase the chances of ratifying a treaty.
On the contrary, when Russia or the Unites States ratify the hazard
of ratification decreases. These results could be explained by the po-
larising effect that Russia and United States have. Despite the fall
of the Soviet Union, both countries still have a competing area of in-
fluence. The ratification by one of the two countries highly reduces
the ratification likelihood by countries in the opposite area of influ-
ence, though the effect of Russia’s ratification is significant just at the
10% level. The opposite is true for large nations such as China or
India, which are often pivotal for the success of an international en-
vironmental agreement. The ratification by one of these two nations
is a strong signal of success for the treaty because China and India
are often indispensable in achieving environmental goals. We estimate
that ratification by China increases the hazard of ratification by 43%
while India’s by 29%. European Union also has a leading role in pro-
moting environmental commitment, but the high impact of Germany’s
ratification can partially be ascribed to the high correlation between
European ratifications. After the institution of the European Union,
most of European countries tend to ratify in bloc. Hence, the positive
coefficient of RatGermany is in part linked to the correlation among
European ratifications.
Regional agreements and treaty characteristics
Our results highlight that regional agreements regularly attain a higher
participation rate than global agreements. The regionality of the agree-
ment is the single most important factor explaining its likelihood of
being ratified. On average, the hazard of ratification of a regional
agreement is 2.37 times the one of a global agreement. This shows that
treaties can be a very effective tool to solve regional environmental
issues because they can easily engage small groups of countries. On
the contrary, the negotiation of global agreements is more arduous.
Finding a compromise for a large number of nations is hard and could
end up penalising the participation in the treaty or the effectiveness
of the agreement. It has been suggested that participation by a large
number of countries is only achievable by watering-down the content
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of the agreement (Barrett, 1994). Regarding the supposed trade-off
between the strictness of the agreement and the level of participation,
our results are encouraging. We observe that framework agreements,
which generally state principles rather than imposing strict obligations,
are not significantly linked to higher ratification probabilities. Model
III also indicates that on a large sample of treaties annex I countries
are not generally associated with reduced probabilities of ratification.
Overall, these results suggest that it is possible to achieve a good rates
of participation and at the same time a meaningful level of environ-
mental protection. Nevertheless, the set-up of our analysis does not
allow to draw definitive conclusions on this aspect of environmental
agreements.
The random part of the model shows that most of the variation
is explained by heterogeneity at the level of the treaty, which greatly
exceeds the impact of unobserved country characteristics. Differences
among treaties are the fundamental cause of disparities in ratification.
This result is not surprising, the success or failure of a treaty depends
chiefly on the content of the agreement and only secondarily on coun-
try characteristics or strategical interaction. All of this emphasises
the importance of multilevel approach for modelling treaty ratification;
given the profound difference existing between treaties, it is necessary
to account for heterogeneity among treaties in order to ensure correct
estimates. Thus, from a methodological perspective, this study con-
stitutes an important improvement over previous empirical literature
which often fails to account for the individuality of treaties.
Additional comments
Finally, The cubic polynomial of time captures the time dependency of
ratification. The probability of ratifying initially increases with time,
but the negative quadratic term makes ratification after several years
very unlikely. Some simple algebra reveals that, conditional on the
other variables, the maximum hazard of ratification is reached roughly
around the end of third year from the opening to ratification. There-
after, the likelihood of ratification decreases as a result of the “cooling
down” of the treaty. This result closely matches what is commonly
observed in the timings of ratification, where most of ratifications tend
to concentrate in the first years following the opening to ratification.
Model IV is a simplified version of model I. The dummy variables
for the big ratifiers are omitted, but RatRegion is still present to con-
trol for the ratification of neighbouring nations. We do not include
the interaction term between the quality of institutions and lobbying
variables and only keep ThreatenedSpecies as control for differences
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in environmental quality. Even with this reduced specification the es-
timates of our main variables seem stable and do not substantially
differ from Model I. Last but not least, Model V is the same model as
model I but estimated exclusively on a sample of global agreements.
We find that the effects of environmental and industrial lobbying are
the same as in the full sample and the quality of intuitions still dis-
plays a positive effect on ratification. All of this demonstrates that,
after identifying all the potential ratifiers in regional agreements, the
estimates obtained on the full sample are not noticeably different from
global treaties alone. Regional agreements have a higher probability of
ratification than global agreements, but country characteristics affect
both types of treaties in the same way.
Summary
In summary, environmental lobbying has a positive effect on the rati-
fication of environmental agreements, while the effect of industrial lob-
bying is not significant. This result is perplexing; industrial lobbies
usually possess much larger economic means than environmental lob-
bies and, given their interest in the outcome of environmental treaties,
we would expect a negative impact on ratification. In the next section,
we will test other proxies for industrial lobbying to assess whether
this finding is linked to the specific measurement we employ for in-
dustrial lobbying or whether it is robust to changes in the choice of
variables. Besides all this, our findings indicate that institutions play
an important role in promoting international cooperation on environ-
mental issues. Countries with better institutions tend to ratify more
environmental agreements. Furthermore, we find that the effect of EN-
GOs augments in the presence of lower quality institutions. Corrupt
institutions do not channel demand for environmental protection effect-
ively. In this context, environmental lobbying becomes a more effective
tool to apply pressure on ratification choices. The last finding echoes
the results of Bernauer et al. (2013a) and Fredriksson et al. (2007) on
the relationship between the effectiveness of lobbying and institutional
factors.
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Table 6.3: Industrial lobbying
EnergyUse ShareIndustry IMFresourcerich FossilExports
Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Fixed part
ENGO 0.021*** (0.006) 0.022*** (0.006) 0.022*** (0.006) 0.017*** (0.006)
EnergyUse -0.001 (0.001)
ShareIndustry 0.008*** (0.003)
IMFresourcerich 0.095 (0.099)
FossilExports -0.003** (0.001)
Institutions 0.134** (0.066) 0.100* (0.073) 0.105** (0.054) 0.207*** (0.068)
ENGO.Institutions -0.010*** (0.004) -0.008** (0.004) -0.008** (0.004) -0.010** (0.004)
EnergyUse.Instit -0.001 (0.001)
Shareindustry.Instit 0.001 (0.002)
IMFresourcerich.Instit 0.040 (0.084)
FossilExports.Instit -0.003** (0.001)
logIncome -0.110 (0.183) 0.114 (0.158) 0.189 (0.153) -0.149 (0.198)
logIncome2 0.010 (0.012) -0.007 (0.010) -0.010 (0.010) 0.010 (0.012)
FreedomHouseCL -0.125*** (0.021) -0.140*** (0.020) -0.129*** (0.019) -0.108*** (0.025)
ThreatenedSpecies 0.684* (0.471) 0.493 (0.450) 0.596* (0.440) 0.890** (0.488)
logForest 0.031** (0.017) 0.046*** (0.016) 0.052*** (0.016) 0.045*** (0.018)
RatRegion 0.559*** (0.071) 0.586*** (0.063) 0.586*** (0.063) 0.460*** (0.077)
RatUS -0.691*** (0.076) -0.715*** (0.069) -0.714*** (0.068) -0.709*** (0.078)
RatChina 0.389*** (0.064) 0.354*** (0.058) 0.361*** (0.057) 0.272*** (0.067)
RatRussia -0.252** (0.150) -0.200* (0.134) -0.200* (0.133) -0.271** (0.163)
RatIndia 0.209*** (0.065) 0.250*** (0.057) 0.256*** (0.057) 0.214*** (0.067)
RatGermany 0.336*** (0.058) 0.324*** (0.053) 0.327*** (0.052) 0.329*** (0.059)
Regional 0.866*** (0.227) 0.865*** (0.233) 0.881*** (0.238) 0.757*** (0.239)
t 0.046*** (0.011) 0.044*** (0.010) 0.040*** (0.010) 0.073*** (0.012)
t2 -0.006*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.000) -0.006*** (0.000) -0.007*** (0.001)
t3 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)
cons -4.188*** (0.799) -5.058*** (0.827) -5.475*** (0.802) -4.318*** (1.005)
Random part
Variance treaty level 2.501 (0.297) 2.581 (0.303) 2.575 (0.302) 2.523 (0.314)
Variance country level 0.222 (0.033) 0.245 (0.031) 0.239 (0.031) 0.263 (0.039)
Units: treaty 256 257 257 253
Units: country 169 190 191 174
Obs: ratification 160139 219136 220454 151602
DIC: 47969.89 55919.16 56091.86 44496.01
Burnin: 200000 200000 200000 200000
Chain Length: 200000 250000 200000 250000
Thinning: 2 2 2 2
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate one-tailed Bayesian p-values respectively lower than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10.
6.2 Trying different measurements for in-
dustrial lobbying
In the previous section we explained how the results for industrial
lobbying contrast the theoretical expectations formulated in chapter
4. In this section, we test different proxies for industrial lobbying to
assess the robustness of our findings and check if different measure-
ments yield the same counter-intuitive result. After all, our proxy is
an imperfect measure for lobbying activity, which is notoriously hard
to quantify. As far as we know, there is no reliable data tracking in-
dustrial lobbying. Hence, in this section, we experiment with different
proxies to evaluate whether the results we obtained depend from the
specific proxy choice. In table 6.3 we report the results obtained with
4 additional measures for industrial lobbying. The 4 new proxies are
EnergyUse, ShareIndustry, IMFresourcerich and FossilExports.
Hopefully, these should allow to diversify the perspective of the ana-
lysis and ensure that it is not driven by idiosyncratic factors in the
proxy.
Table 6.4: Correlation matrix for industrial lobbying proxies
1 2 3 4
1. EnergyUse 1.000
2. ShareIndustry 0.217 1.000
3. IMFresourcerich −0.063 0.399 1.000
4. FossilExports 0.156 0.582 0.692 1.000
5. Institutions 0.593 −0.151 −0.370 −0.289
6. logIncome 0.697 0.067 −0.270 −0.077
7. FreedomHouseCL −0.282 0.362 0.422 0.457
8. ThreatenedSpecies 0.237 0.101 −0.005 0.116
9. logForest −0.216 0.012 0.104 −0.021
EnergyUse is the per capita energy use measured in kg of oil equi-
valent. The assumption behind this proxy is that energy-intensive eco-
nomies have stronger incentives to lobby against environmental regula-
tions. ShareIndustry is the share of manufacture, mining and utilities
on GDP at current prices. The weight of industry in the economy is
the most common proxy for industrial lobbying in the literature. Some
works that use this measure include: Yamagata et al. (2013), Yamagata
et al. (2017), Sauquet (2014) and von Stein (2008). The main limit-
ation of this proxy is that it mainly reflects the economic paradigm
and development stage of the country rather than lobbying strength.
However, in its defence, it could be argued that industrial interests
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carry more weight and are more likely to be attended if the industrial
compartment accounts for a larger share of the economic activity of
the country. IMFresourcerich is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if the country is rich in natural resources according to the
IMF (2012). This variable mainly takes into account the economic re-
liance upon non-renewable natural resources such as coal, gas, oil and
minerals. We assume that richness in these resources correlates with
stronger pressure against the ratification of environmental agreements.
Both Fredriksson & Ujhelyi (2006) and Neumayer (2002a) use a vari-
able similar to IMFresourcereich based on whether or not a country
is a “fuel” exporting country. The last proxy is FossilExports, which
is calculated as the share of fossil fuels in the export basket. Fossil
industry is chosen because it is one of the most polluting industries.
The bigger the share of fossil exports in the export basket, the stronger
is the power of industrial lobbying. Again, this is not the first time the
measure is used in the empirical literature; Sauquet (2014) and Fre-
driksson et al. (2007) use the share of fossil fuel in the export basket
to proxy for industrial lobbying.
The estimates in table 6.3 are globally stable and the coefficients
are consistent with the ones in model I–V. However, the 4 different
variables we test in this section yield very inconclusive findings on the
impact of industrial lobbying. EnergyUse and IMFresourcerich do
not appear to be significant, just like ResourceRent. On the other
hand, for ShareIndustry and FossilExports the models exhibit con-
trasting results. A higher share of fossil resources in the export basket
is linked to lower ratification probabilities whereas a higher share of
manufacture, mining and utilities in the GDP increases the likelihood
of ratification. Table 6.4 shows the correlation of the four new proxies
with the explanatory variables of the model. The only salient cor-
relation is the one between EnergyUse and logIncome. Despite a
correaltion of 0.7, we notice that the estimates for logIncome and the
effect of industrial lobbying tend to be consistent with the results of the
other proxies. Overall, these results do not provide evidence of a neg-
ative impact of industrial lobbying on the ratification of environmental
agreements.
A comprehensive analysis of the literature reveals that whenever a
measure for industrial lobbying is included in previous empirical stud-
ies, it tends to be statistically insignificant. In table 6.5 we list all the
empirical studies that include a variable for industrial lobbying in their
models of ratification. The second column identifies the proxies used
in each study and the third column summarises the results regarding
the estimates for industrial lobbying.
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Table 6.5: Industrial lobbying in the empirical literature
Paper Proxies Results
Fredriksson &
Ujhelyi (2006)
i) Dummy that takes value
of 1 if a country has a
national Chamber of Com-
merce. ii) Dummy for
“fuel” exporting countries.
Additional variables are
used in non-reported mod-
els: dummy for members in
the World Business Council
for Sustainable Develop-
ment, numbers of vehicles
per capita, intensity of CO2
in commercial energy use.
Both proxies are not sig-
nificant despite 16 differ-
ent specifications are tested.
The variables used in the
non-reported models also do
not yield significant results
according to the authors.
Fredriksson
et al. (2007)
Measured by three vari-
ables: i) Share of the
labour force employed in
the industrial sector as
proxy for importance of
carbon-intensive sectors. ii)
Dummy for countries that
possess a national com-
mittee or an international
chamber of commerce
(ICC). iii) Share of fuel
export as a share of good
exports.
ICC and fuel export are
never significant, each
tested in 3 different spe-
cifications. The share
of labour in industry is
significant with a negative
coefficient at the 95% con-
fidence level in 1 out of 3
specifications.
von Stein
(2008)
Industry as a percentage of
GDP
2 specifications for the UN-
FCCC and 2 specifications
for the Kyoto Protocol;
industrial lobbying never
reaches significance
Yamagata et al.
(2013)
Industrial production as
percentage of GDP
Significant at the 10% level
for the UNFCCC but not
for the Kyoto Protocol (out
of 7 different specifications
considered).
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Industrial lobbying in the empirical literature (continued)
Paper Proxies Results
Sauquet (2014) Ratio of fossil fuel exports
to total exports
Not significant in 3 specific-
ations out of 4.
Yamagata et al.
(2017)
Industrial production as a
share of GDP.
Significant at the 10% signi-
ficance level for the period
1981-1990 but not signific-
ant (out of 7 different spe-
cifications) for the period
1991-2008.
The results are consistent across the 6 studies. Only in very few
cases industrial lobbying has a statistically significant relationship with
the ratification of environmental agreements. The majority of the times
an insignificant effect is found. The analysis of the literature confirms
that our findings are consistent with previous studies. The evidence
from the literature does not support the existence of a relationship
between the intensity of industrial lobbying and the likelihood of rat-
ification. Even in widely different studies, with different models, spe-
cifications and different samples of countries and treaties, the findings
are consistent: industrial lobbying, no matter how it is measured, is
not significantly linked to lower probabilities of ratifying environmental
agreement. In summary, Industrial lobbying has no clear effect on rat-
ification and this is not due to the specific proxy we use.
In this section, we ruled out the hypothesis that Resourcerent was
leading to wrong conclusions by testing several alternative proxies for
industrial lobbying. Not only is our result stable, but we also find that
the models estimated in other studies lead to the same conclusions on
the effect of industrial lobbying. The absence of a relationship is in itself
perplexing and contrary to theoretical expectations. The reasons for
this counter-intuitive result have never been adequately explored, and
this constitutes a gap in the literature. The explanation we advance is
that stronger industrial lobbying does not translate into lower probab-
ilities of ratification because industrial lobbying practices do not target
ratification. We suggest that, in general, industrial lobbies prefer to
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target the implementation phase rather than the ratification of envir-
onmental agreements. This thesis will be explored in the next chapter,
where we will attempt to verify this assertion by evaluating the impact
of lobbying on different environmental domestic policies.
6.3 Convergence and robustness checks
In the previous sections we discussed the main findings on the ratifica-
tion of environmental agreements. We have found that environmental
lobbies and the quality of institutions have a positive impact on rat-
ification and these two effects interact. The impact of an additional
ENGO is reduced when the country possesses good institutions. On
the other hand, industrial lobbying is not significantly associated with
lower probabilities of ratification. In this section, we assess the robust-
ness of the results by checking fundamental assumptions of the model.
In the first part of the section we provide evidence that the sampled
distribution has converged while in the second half we experiment with
a diverse range of specifications to test the stability and validity of our
findings.
6.3.1 Convergence
In this section we discuss the convergence of the reference model (Model
I). A theoretical property of MCMC is that — independently from the
starting values or complexity of the model — the distribution of MCMC
chains are bound to converge on the target distribution after an infinite
number of iterations. However, as the number of feasible iterations is
finite, the question of whether or not the estimation has converged is
fundamental to statistical inference.
Table 6.6 reports a series of statistics that are used to assess the
convergence of the chains. The first three columns present the mean,
median and mode of the marginal posterior distributions. In MCMC
estimation all of these measures are commonly used for inference. The
matching of median, mean and mode hints to the fact that the gen-
erated samples are normally distributed and suggest that the Markow
Chains have converged. For all of the parameters of the model the
mean, median and mode converged toward the same value lending a
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Table 6.6: Convergence statistics for model I
Mean Median Mode ESS RL 2.5% RL 97.5% BD
ENGO 0.021 0.021 0.021 7712 34 890 36 648 12 792
ResourceRent 0.004 0.004 0.005 22 193 40 824 40 880 180 932
Institutions 0.098 0.098 0.098 18 287 42 696 45 664 366 395
ENGO.Institutions −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 8870 34 570 36 038 535 418
Resourcerent.Institutions 0.003 0.003 0.003 25 073 41 272 39 856 108 403
logIncome 0.207 0.207 0.208 22 457 41 736 41 968 32 477
logIncome2 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 22 714 42 664 42 824 12 551
FreedomHouseCL −0.129 −0.129 −0.129 24 221 24 342 23 462 480
ThreatenedSpecies 0.590 0.589 0.587 8147 36 246 37 898 675 411
logForest 0.055 0.055 0.055 7842 41 578 40 772 92 843
RatRegion 0.590 0.590 0.591 47 753 33 800 33 808 2790
RatUS −0.714 −0.714 −0.714 18 307 43 784 43 368 6558
RatChina 0.361 0.361 0.361 33 000 37 656 34 504 3479
RatRussia −0.199 −0.199 −0.198 18 056 25 222 25 426 30 591
RatIndia 0.254 0.254 0.253 39 846 34 608 34 784 2810
RatGermany 0.325 0.325 0.324 33 227 38 056 36 792 2732
Regional 0.863 0.862 0.864 533 92 810 119 068 1 231 190
FrameworkAgreement 0.171 0.171 0.169 901 121 388 101 160 1 599 008
t 0.041 0.041 0.041 37 539 35 488 35 608 7458
t2 −0.006 −0.006 −0.006 34 421 37 144 35 936 2262
t3 0.000 0.000 0.000 36 620 36 728 37 272 4393
cons −5.643 −5.642 −5.644 8968 49 464 50 312 12 949
Variance treaty level (σuj1 ) 2.584 2.563 2.537 79 637 31 656 31 856 303
Variance country level (σuj2 ) 0.239 0.237 0.235 98 590 30 448 31 136 247
Total iterations 800000 Burnin 300000
Stored Chain length 250000 Thinning 2
Notes: ESS is the Effective Sample Size statistic. ESS assesses the chains on the base of their
correlation. “RL 2.5%” and “RL 97.5%” are the Raftery-Lewis statistics (Raftery & Lewis, 1992)
for the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles. The Raftery-Lewis statistcs are estimated for a margin of
error of 0.005 with a probability of 95%. “BD” is the Brooks-Draper statistic; it is calculated for
k = 2 significant figures and a significance level of α = 0.05.
case in favour of convergence. The only exceptions being the variance
parameters of the treaty and country effects. As a matter of fact, the
posterior distribution of variance parameters is typically right skewed
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as illustrated by the histograms in figure 6.1. The value of the median
is comprised between the mean and the mode due to the light skewness
in the distribution.
The effective sample size (ESS) is one of the most popular stat-
istics to assess the efficiency of the sampling algorithm. It quantifies
the number of independent samples generated during estimation. A
higher ESS indicates that the samples are less correlated. Unfortu-
nately, multilevel models for survival data are complicated to estimate,
as chains are highly correlated and typically do not mix well (Steele
et al., 2004). We follow the advice of Browne et al. (2009) and use
orthogonal parametrisation which considerably improves chain mixing.
Given the type of data, we obtain a reasonable ESS. Regional and
FrameworkAgreement exhibit the lowest ESS because of the small
amount of independent observations compared to variables at the coun-
try and ratification level. For Regional and FrameworkAgreement
the effective variability is much lower than for other variables. Since
they are not time-varying, the only variability is across treaties. The
actual number of observations is around 250 independent observations.
This is much less than country variables which have approximately 5000
country-year combinations for the post-1990 period, and even less than
variables at the ratification level which can rely on observations from
more than 200000 separate treaty-country-year dyads. Given the lim-
itations associated with the type of data and the available information
on treaties, we postulate that the ESS results are satisfactory.
Estimation of multilevel survival models with MCMC notoriously
yields highly correlated chains (Browne et al., 2009). For this reason we
opt for a very high number of iterations. In total we perform almost one
million iterations, out of which we discard one every two samples, for
a total of 550000 samples generated. This practice is called “thinning”
and is used to reduce the autocorrelation in the chains. We also choose
a very long burn-in period. In fact, we discard the initial 300000 out
of 550000 samples to make sure the inference is based on a chain that
has converged. Likewise, the number of iterations has been selected in
an overly prudent fashion in order to base inference on a number of
samples as large as possible. The large number of samples allows more
precise estimates for the coefficients of the model.
As a supplementary graphical check, in figure 6.2 we present traces
of the last 20000 iterations of the MCMC estimation. These traces show
that the chains seem to have converged around a mean and that they
explore efficiently the joint distribution. Healthy trace plots resemble
a white noise process, with a constant mean and variance. We also
notice that Regional and FrameworkAgreement mix less efficiently
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Figure 6.1: Marginal posterior distributions
Notes: Histograms for the distributions of the 24 chains of model I. The
densities of MCMC chains are estimates of the marginal posterior distribu-
tions. As expected, the parameters of the model are normally distributed
while the variance parameters are slightly skewed, with a longer right-tale.
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than other chains, but well enough considered the available information
on treaties. Overall, the traces seem to indicate that the chains have
converged and that the algorithm is mixing well.
Additional diagnostic statistics are reported in the last columns
of table 6.6. The Raftery & Lewis (1992) statistic gives information
on the number of iterations needed to yield estimates of the 2.5 and
97.5 percentile, which together form an interval containing 95% of the
distribution. This statistic is used as a diagnostic to assess convergence
and also measures the precision of quantile estimates from the posterior
distribution. The Raftery-Lewis statistic is known to be conservative
and usually suggests more iterations than necessary (Browne, 2004).
If the statistic is satisfied the actual quantile distribution (0.025,0.975)
of the parameter should be less than 1% different from the estimated
probability. All our chains satisfy the Raftery-Lewis diagnostic.
Finally, the Brooks-Draper diagnostic is a statistic for the mean
of the posterior distribution. It estimates the iterations required to
achieve estimates of the mean with a given level of significance and
a desired number k of significant figures. In the last column of table
6.6 we report the number of iterations needed to quote mean estim-
ates with a precision of 2 significant figures and a confidence level of
95%. For example, the Brooks-Draper statistic for the parameter of
ENGO implies that 12792 iterations are needed to express the mean
estimate “0.02” with 95% of confidence; we run a total of 800000 it-
erations, well above the recommended number. The only two para-
meters for which the recommended level is not reached are Regional
and FrameworkAgreement; again, given the lower number of inde-
pendent observations, it is harder to obtain high levels of precision for
these parameters. Nevertheless, if the test is run with k = 1 the chains
satisfy the requirements of the Brooks-Draper diagnostic; in fact, the
Brooks-Draper statistic for FrameworkAgreement is 15991 and 12312
for Regional when k = 1.
To further test the convergence of the chains we follow Gelman &
Rubin (1992) who suggest starting estimation from several different
points in order to ensure the algorithm explores the entire joint dis-
tribution. We experiment with 5 different starting points. The start-
ing values are obtained by multiplying the vector of starting values of
Model I by a scalar taking the values of -1, 0, 2, 3, and 4. The start-
ing values of Model I were obtained by fitting a simplified version of
the model that does not take into account the cross-classification in
random effects with a maximum likelihood method (IGLS)4. The res-
4The starting values for the fixed part of Model I are: 0.0171443, 0.0048971, 0.1881271,
-0.0116787, 0.0027066, 0.3452093, -0.0196376, -0.0938002, 0.3799708, 0.0635263, 0.432282,
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Figure 6.2: Parameter traces for model I
Notes: The traces illustrate the last 20000 iterations of the MCMC estim-
ation. They are commonly used to assess convergence and mixing of the
chains. Traces that look like white noise processes indicate that the sampling
algorithm moves efficiently through the distribution and that the chains have
converged around a high probability region.
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.
ults are reported in table 6.7, they display consistent estimates even
with different starting values. Using different starting points allows us
to rule out pseudo-convergence — that is to say, the convergence to-
wards a local point of high probability. This is particularly dangerous
in multimodal distributions.
Overall the Raftery-Lewis and Brooks-Draper diagnostics suggest
that we have run the MCMC simulation for long enough to achieve a
stable convergence. Notwithstanding, for FrameworkAgreement and
Regional the estimates should be quoted with a lower level of preci-
sion to guarantee the same confidence level. The traces of the chains
suggest that the algorithm is mixing well and explores the distribution
with sufficient efficiency. ESS statistics confirm this conclusion and
indicate that the chains have generated a sample large enough to make
a reliable inference. Finally, the graphical representation of the mar-
ginal posterior distributions, as well as the values of mean, median and
mode suggest that the distribution of the chain values has converged to
the target distribution. By using different starting values we rule out
the possibility of pseudo-convergence and ensure that the chains have
converged on the point of highest density.
6.3.2 Robustness checks
Firstly, we assess the sensitivity of the estimates for the other main
variables in the same way it was done for industrial lobbying. The first
four models of table 6.8 employ different proxies for environmental lob-
bying and the quality of institutions in order to evaluate the consistency
of the results when different measurements are used.
The first model replaces the proxy ENGO with ProtectedArea.
ProtectedArea is defined as the percentage of territory that is desig-
nated as protected area. We postulate that when environmental lobby-
ing is more influential it succeeds in providing protection to a greater
territorial area. Like ENGO, ProtectedArea exhibits a positive and
significant relationship with the hazard of ratification. Countries with
higher ProtectedArea have a higher probability of ratifying environ-
mental agreements. The second proxy for environmental lobbying is
EnvConcern. EnvConcern is the percentage of the population that
reports being concerned about climate change in a survey conducted
in 2008 by Tien et al. (2015) on respondents from 119 different coun-
tries. The number of respondents in each countries varies between
-0.7225903, 0.3376975, -0.299422, 0.1899845, 0.2431447, 0.5060046, 0.2540413, 0.0199538,
-0.0041608, 0.0000641, -5.096715.
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500 and 8000. The assumption behind the use of this variable is that
environmental lobbying correlates with the public’s concern for the en-
vironment. This relationship could be affected by cultural and political
factors but, in general, a higher environmental concern should result
in stronger environmental pressure. The estimate for EnvConcern is
positive and statistically significant at the 10% level.
Both EnvConcern and ProtectedArea indicate that stronger en-
vironmental lobbying increases the chances of ratifying environmental
agreements. These results are consistent with those of model I.
Table 6.9: Correlation matrix for proxies in robustness checks
1 2 3 4
1. ProtectedArea 1.000
2. EnvConcern 0.077 1.000
3. Institutions2 0.164 −0.360 1.000
4. Institutions3 0.174 −0.352 0.925 1.000
5. Institutions 0.183 −0.335 0.962 0.948
6. logIncome 0.265 −0.262 0.810 0.846
7. FreedomHouseCL −0.315 0.099 −0.684 −0.727
8. ThreatenedSpecies −0.166 −0.383 0.217 0.153
9. logForest 0.181 −0.001 −0.099 −0.039
We also experiment with two additional indices for the quality of
institutions. Institutions2 is the “Government Effectiveness indic-
ator” from the World Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2017b) and
Institutions3 is the “Economic Freedom index” by Fraser Institute
(2017). These indicators aggregate several aspects of institutional qual-
ity into one measure and are consistently calculated for a large number
of countries and years. Both indicators are similarly constructed but
have been compiled by different organisations. They capture several
aspects related to the quality of institutions, including: the efficiency
of the bureaucracy, rule of law, protection of property rights, quality of
economic legislation and the extent of corruption in business practices.
The results for these two variables are positive and strongly significant;
countries with high scores in Institutions2 and Institutions3 seem to
engage more in international cooperation. We obtain this result after
controlling for other political and economic factors such as the level of
income and the state of democracy. Institutions appear to be a crucial
determinant of ratification.
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of the baseline hazard of model I with a
non-parametric definition
Notes: In discrete survival models a way of obtaining non-parametric
baseline hazard function is to use dummy variables for each duration inter-
val. Here, we compare the non-parametric definition to the cubic polynomial
we use in Model I.
As a further validation of our model, in table 6.8 we report the
estimates of the model when a different link function and baseline haz-
ard definition are used. Model Logit shows that the estimates obtained
with a logit link are essentially identical to the ones obtained with a clo-
glog link function. The next model is estimated with a non-parametric
baseline function instead of a cubic polynomial. In a discrete setting
the non-parametric baseline is derived using dummies for the individual
duration periods. As a result, this approach implies the estimation of
a much larger number of parameters, heavily affecting both the es-
timation time and convergence speed of the parameter chains. The
estimates of the model have all the same sign and are very close to
the ones in model I. The only differences are a slightly lower coefficient
for Institutions and a slightly higher ResourceRent. The increase in
Resourcerent makes the variable significant at the 10% level of sig-
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nificance. The other estimates do not substantially change from the
results in other models. In figure 6.3 we compare the non-parametric
baseline hazard with the baseline hazard in model I. The cubic poly-
nomial seems to be a reasonable approximation of the non-parametric
version and does not seem to distort the final results. Hence, In model
I we opt for the more parsimonious cubic polynomial. The vast gains
in estimation time make it a worthwhile simplification and — despite
being less versatile than the non-parametric definition — we deem the
cubic polynomial is sufficiently accurate.
Finally, in the last column we present the results for a simplified
version of model I in which the country random effect is omitted. The
estimates are very close to the ones of model I. However, the standard
errors are consistently biased downward, leading to erroneous conclu-
sions on the significance of the parameters. This result highlights the
importance of using a multilevel strategy to model the clustering of rat-
ifications within the same country and also shows that, despite most
of the heterogeneity lies at the treaty level, the country effect needs
to be included in the analysis. Our model assumes normality at the
treaty and country levels. This property is inspected in Figure 6.4
where the cumulative distribution of the treaty and country residuals
are plotted against a cumulative normal distribution. If the residuals
were distributed as a perfect normal distribution the plots would lie
along the diagonal line. We observe that both the country and the
treaty effects follow very closely the diagonal line suggesting that they
are approximately normally distributed.
Overall the results are stable and consistent with what is found in
section 6.1. The findings are unaffected by changes in the definitions of
lobbying and quality of institutions. Different proxies are experimented
leading to similar conclusions. We also experiment with different spe-
cifications of the model. The results obtained with a non-parametric
baseline hazard, a different link function and a different multilevel spe-
cification, are all similar to those in Model I.
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Figure 6.4: P-P plot for the distribution of the treaty and country effect
Notes: The empirical distribution of the treaty and country effects are plot-
ted against a cumulative normal distribution to check for normality. Both
distributions follow very closely the diagonal line, suggesting normality in
both treaty and country random effects.
6.4 Discussion of the results and policy
implications
Figure 6.5 provides a good visualisation of model I. The mean survival
probabilities of every treaty in the data set are plotted along with the
general population mean. Some lines are interrupted before reaching
50 years because they correspond to more recent agreements, which are
right-censored at the observation date. A hypothetical average treaty
has approximately 45% chances of being eventually ratified. Never-
theless, participation upturn varies widely among treaties. Our model
highlights that treaty characteristics are responsible for a much larger
share of the heterogeneity in ratification than country factors. This
result is intuitive: the main factor determining the success of a treaty
is the content of the treaty itself. Specific characteristics of the treaty
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can influence the ratification rate. For example, we have shown there
is a large difference between the ratification rate of regional and global
agreements. Besides these features, the figure also shows how the prob-
ability of ratification evolves over time according to our model. Most
ratifications take place in the initial 10 years, after which the prob-
ability of joining the treaty significantly declines. After 20 years any
additional ratification is very unlikely. This behaviour fits well with
the ratification timings observed for most environmental treaties.
Figure 6.5: Survival functions for the environmental agreements
Notes: All survival probabilities are calculated by keeping the country vari-
ables at their mean values.
The results of the analysis show that environmental lobbying has
a positive effect on the ratification of environmental agreements, while
industrial lobbying does not seem to affect the probability of ratific-
ation. We put forward an explanation for this result based on the
lobbying preferences of environmental and industrial groups. Environ-
mental lobbying target treaties because they see it as a necessary step
to legitimise their action and treaties constitute an effective tool to
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build consensus over environmental issues. Environmental treaties can
also be used to back the claims of ENGOs and force governments to
act. Since transboundary environmental problems involve several coun-
tries, for ENGOs environmental agreements are also the most effective
way of addressing large environmental issues. Lobbying on national
government could also be part of a coordinated effort to address the
problem globally. In fact, countries are generally reluctant to abate uni-
laterally (because of the free-riding incentive that it creates for other
countries); hence, countries are more likely to engage in environmental
regulation if they expect other countries to follow suit. Environmental
agreement can guarantee this reciprocity. In addition to that, the rati-
fication of environmental agreements is a single legal act; this makes it
easier to influence and verify progress compared to other types of reg-
ulations which could be more diffuse or capillary. On the other hand,
the industrial lobbies target the implementation phase because they
are relatively easier to slow down, often draw less attention, and could
be easier to influence by local influential groups. In the next chapter,
we explore this thesis more in detail by testing the effect of industrial
lobbying on several indicators for environmental domestic policies.
Another salient point of the analysis is the relevance of institutional
and political variables in determining ratification. Across all specific-
ations, the quality of institutions and democracy are consistently im-
pacting the likelihood of joining environmental agreements. This res-
ult reinforces the findings of the empirical literature (e.g. Neumayer
2002a, Fredriksson et al. 2007, Bernauer et al. 2013a) and shows that
the conclusion holds even on a larger sample, on regional agreements,
and after correcting for the bias linked to the identification of potential
ratifiers. Differences in income also affect the capacity of a country to
participate in a treaty; however, the impact is less conspicuous than
expected. Not only does the coefficient struggle to reach a significant
level, but we also find no evidence of the supposed non-linearity in the
relationship with income postulated by some authors (e.g. Egger et al.
2011 or Bernauer et al. 2010). We advance two reasons to explain this
result. Firstly, many environmental agreements often include special
provisions that facilitate the participation of developing nations. These
provisions mitigate the impact that a lower income level might have on
the willingness to join the environmental agreement. Secondly, income
levels tend to correlate with the quality of institutions and democracy.
It is possible that the environmental benefits associated with an in-
crease in income should in part be attributed to improvements in the
quality of institutions and political representation.
A last point can be made on the interactions between nations. Our
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findings corroborate the results of Bernauer et al. (2010), Perrin &
Bernauer (2010), Sauquet (2014) and Yamagata et al. (2017) — among
others — on the interdependence among the ratifications of different
countries. The ratifications by other countries in the same geographical
region have a strong and significant positive effect on the likelihood of
joining the treaty. We estimate that if all geographic neighbours ratify
the treaty, the baseline hazard of ratification is multiplied by as much
as 80%. Furthermore, we find that the action of superpowers and big
nations can have a notable effect on other countries. Given the size
of countries like China and India, their ratifications have tremendous
implications for the success of environmental agreements. We find that
when one of these two countries ratify, they notably increase the hazard
of ratification of other nations. On the contrary, superpowers like the
United States have a polarising effect on foreign countries; the overall
effect tends to be negative in terms of number of countries that ratify
an agreement. In general, the higher the number of ratifications the
higher the probability of success of a treaty. This could justify the
game theoretical prediction that considers two probable outcomes for
a treaty: either a very low turnout or a “world coalition”. However,
the question is more nuanced and is invariably affected by the content
and implication brought about by each single agreement. This study
stresses the importance of securing the participation of influential na-
tions which could play a critical role in the success of the treaty. These
nations can have a decisive effect in tilting neighbouring nations toward
ratification and triggering a domino effect in ratifications.
The ratification of environmental agreements is also the result of
a number of unique factors associated with countries and treaties. In
figure 6.6 we rank the countries and treaties according to the their in-
dividual random effect. The figure illustrates how, after accounting for
all the covariates, countries and treaties differ in their propensity to
ratification. Several countries have a significant positive or negative ef-
fect associated to unobserved characteristics. For example, Norway and
the United States are at the two opposite ends of the distribution. At
parity of income, lobbying and other control variables, Norway would
be significantly more likely to ratify an environmental agreement than
the United States. This difference is explained by country-specific cul-
tural, economic and social factors unaccounted for by variables in our
model. For many countries in the middle of the distribution the effect
overlaps and only a minor difference can be discerned. The individual
unobserved characteristics play an even larger role among treaties. It
is interesting to notice how most of the agreements that receive high
media coverage tend to have a significantly positive effect beyond the
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Figure 6.6: Caterpillar plots for the treaty and country effects
Notes & legend : Mean country and treaty effects plotted with their 95%
confidence interval. Some countries and treaties have been highlighted as
examples. For the caterpillar plot of the treaty effect: UNFCCC – United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). Cartagena –
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(2000). Kyoto – Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (1997). Timber – International Tropical Timber
Agreement (2006). Mercury – Minamata Convention on Mercury (2013).
Sulphur – Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution (LRTAP) on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions (1994).
MARPOL – International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (1973). Environment liability – Convention on Civil Liability for
Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment (1993).
172
treaty variables we account for. Even the Kyoto Protocol (1997), a
treaty deemed hard to ratify, is located in the right-hand of the dis-
tribution. Compared to country effects, the share of treaties having a
significant effect is even larger. Many agreements located in the left
side of the distribution have a large confidence interval. This is due
to the presence of a smaller number of potential ratifiers and a low
variance in the ratification outcome. For example, the Convention on
civil liability for damage resulting from activities dangerous to the en-
vironment (1993) is a regional agreement open to a restricted number
of countries5 and, to this date, was not ratified by any of its potential
ratifiers. The smaller number of ratifiers and the low variability in the
outcome lead to less precise results for the agreement.
In summary, this analysis led to several conclusions regarding the
factors motivating the ratification of environmental agreements. The
characteristics of countries and their interactions can shape the in-
centives to ratify and affect the timing of ratification. Nevertheless,
the content of an agreement and the manner it is designed exert an
even greater impact on ratification choices. For example, we highlight
that regional agreements often achieve higher participation rates than
global agreements thanks to their easier negotiation. This finding sup-
ports the claim of Barrett (1999) and Osmani & Tol (2010), who argue
that a more efficient approach to tackle global environmental issues
could be to design a set of interrelated regional agreements instead of
a monolithic global treaty. With regard to our main research question,
we find that environmental lobbying has a positive effect on ratific-
ation while no significant effect is found for industrial lobbying. In
this section we presented a possible explanation for this result based
on the preferences of lobbies. This explanation will be tested in the
next chapter. Finally, the quality of institutions plays a very important
role in fostering international cooperation on environmental issues. We
find that better institutions are consistently associated with a higher
probability of ratification and that the effect of environmental lobbying
is stronger when the quality of institutions is lower. Two reasons for
this are that lobbying practices are generally more effective in corrupt
situations and, secondly, countries with better institutions channel en-
vironmental demands more effectively through the administrative and
political system, hence reducing the need for environmental lobbying
on behalf of civil society.
5According to the article 32 of the Convention the “Convention shall be open for
signature by the member States of the Council of Europe, the non-member States which
have participated in its elaboration and by the European Economic Community”.
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6.5 Application of the results
In this section, we explore some of the applications of this study. Model
I can be used to predict and compare ratification probabilities for spe-
cific countries. Predictions can help building a concrete understanding
of the factors affecting participation in environmental agreements. For
example, figure 6.7 is the plot of the hazard of ratification for a typical
agreement by Germany, China and India. Germany has the highest
probability of ratifying an agreement; the difference is mainly driven
by the higher level of income per capita, better institutions and the
level of democracy. Besides the comparison between nations, the figure
depicts how the hazard of ratification evolves throughout time. The
chances of ratifying a treaty are the highest in the first 10 years of
existence. Then, they decay and remain stably low; at high durations
ratification becomes very unlikely. Simulating probabilities for different
countries could help negotiators in the process of drafting agreements.
It could help identifying and preparing more effective environmental
agreements, capable of securing a widespread participation.
6.5.1 Simulating ratification probabilities of treat-
ies
The model can be used to compare the ratification behaviour of coun-
tries, but arguably the best use is to assess the probability of ratification
for different treaties. The probabilities of ratification can be estimated
by deriving the survival function for the treaty-country combination ij
of interest. First, the hazard function is obtained by calculating the
fitted values and inverting the cloglog link function.
hij(t) = 1− exp[− exp(α(t) + β′Xij + ui + uj)] (6.5.1)
Where α(t) is the baseline hazard specification; in our case a cubic
polynomial. Then, the cumulative hazard function is calculated as:
Hij(t) =
∫ t
0
hij(t)dt (6.5.2)
Allowing to derive the survival function:
Sij(t) = exp[−Hij(t)] (6.5.3)
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Figure 6.7: Comparison of the hazard of ratification for three countries
Notes: All country and treaty variables are kept at their average level.
Finally, a country’s probability of ratifying a given agreement by time
T is:
Pij(T ≤ t) = 1− Sij(t) (6.5.4)
In table 6.10 we simulate the probability of ratifying two hypo-
thetical agreements. The first is a regional protocol agreement, while
the second is a global framework agreement. We call “regional” any
agreement that, unlike global treaties, is not open to all nations in the
world. Regional agreements tend to have a higher ratification rates
than global ones: our model estimates that on average regional agree-
ment more than doubles the baseline hazard of ratification. We define
a framework agreement as the first treaty on a specific topic; frame-
work agreements usually set the general rules and principles, define
the goals and scope of the environmental action and institute govern-
ing bodies to the agreement. Sometimes framework agreements impose
specific actions and binding obligations, but very often these tend to
be incorporated into protocols. We call protocol any agreement that is
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negotiated under the banner of a framework convention. Protocols are
different from amendments in that they create new legal structures and
their main purpose is not to modify an existing agreement. Framework
agreements usually obtain higher rates of ratification than protocols.
Table 6.10: Simulated probabilities for two hypothetical environmental
treaties
Regional Protocol Global framework agreement
5 years 10 years no neighbours all neighbours
United Kingdom 36% 55% 44% 64%
United States 16% 26% 20% 34%
Russia 27% 42% 30% 48%
Turkey 15% 25% 22% 36%
Brazil 44% 65% 46% 67%
Notes: All variables are assumed at the country average for the period
1990-2015. Probabilities of ratifying the regional protocol are given for a
period of 5 and 10 years. In the case of the global framework agreement we
present the final ratification probability (capped at 30 years) respectively
when no other country and all other countries in the same geographic
area have ratified.
We simulate the probabilities of ratifying these two agreements for
5 interesting nations: United Kingdom, United States, Russia, Turkey
and Brazil. The two columns for the regional protocol list the prob-
abilities of ratifying the agreement in respectively 5 and 10 years. For
the global framework agreement we explore how probabilities change
when neighbouring countries ratify the treaty. RatRegion is one of the
most important factors explaining ratification. To illustrate the inter-
action among international countries we present a scenario in which
all neighbours have ratified and another one in which none has rat-
ified the global framework agreement. The likelihood of ratifying a
treaty greatly improves when the neighbouring nations decide to join.
We treat as neighbours all countries that are in the same geographic
area, as described by the sub-region classification of the UN statistical
division (UNSD). In annex A we report how each country is classi-
fied geographically. For the global framework agreement we report the
probability at t = 30; this could be considered as a final ratification
probability because after 30 years the hazard of ratification is almost
null.
The results of table 6.10 show that among these 5 nations there is
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a big differences in the probability of joining treaties. For instance,
the United Kingdom is twice as likely to ratify than the United States.
The difference in probabilities between these two countries is mostly
due to idiosyncratic factors captured by the country effect (Figure 6.6).
The results for the global framework agreement demonstrate the effect
of the interaction among international ratifications. In some cases the
ratification by all neighbours can boost the probability of ratifying
by as much as 20 percentage points. This effect alone could greatly
contribute to the success of a treaty by triggering a “domino effect”
whereby foreign nations are drawn to a treaty by the action of other
countries. Last but not least, the examples of table 6.10 show to what
extent a regional agreement attracts more ratifications than a global
agreement. The ratification probability of the regional protocol after
just 10 years is higher than the final ratification probability of the
global framework agreement when none of the neighbours ratified.
Besides hypothetical treaties, the model can also be applied to gen-
erate predictions on actual agreements. In table 6.11 we simulate
out-of-sample probabilities of ratification for the Minamata Conven-
tion (2013). The Minamata Convention deals with the supply of mer-
cury, in particular with the mining and trading of mercury. It defines a
phase-out period, sets standards on storage and disposal of waste and
imposes restrictions on the trade in mercury with states that are not
members to the convention. We use our model to generate predicted
probabilities for the same five countries of ratifying the convention by
2018. Then, we compare the probabilities with the actual ratification
status. Predictions are made by assuming all variables constant at their
2013 value for the country.
In table 6.11, Brazil and the United Kingdom are the two coun-
tries with the highest probability of ratification. The model predicts
that Brazil is twice as likely as Russia to ratify the Minamata Conven-
tion by the end of 2018. These predictions seem to be verified by the
current ratification status. Up to this point Russia and Turkey have
not yet ratified the convention. Nevertheless, it is possible that these
two countries might eventually ratify the convention too. By taking a
longer time frame, we predict that the probability of ratification in the
first 20 years for Russia and Turkey is respectively of 34% and 26%.
In this application, our model is used to give an approximate idea
of the ex ante ratification probability for a given treaty. Estimates for
a specific treaty can be improved by introducing treaty specific vari-
ables or important covariates. For example, in the case of Minamata
convention coal reliance is an important aspect behind ratification be-
cause coal plants are the second biggest global emitters of mercury
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Table 6.11: Simulated probabilities and ratification status for the
Minamata Convention on mercury
Minamata Convention (2013)
Country
Ratification Ratification
prob. (2013-2018) year
Brazil 31% 2017
United Kingdom 22% 2018
Russia 14% —
United States 11% 2013
Turkey 10% —
Notes: Ex-ante probabilities of ratifying the Min-
amata Convention by the end of 2018. All variables
are assumed constant at their 2013 values. The last
column reports the ratification status as of December
2018.
(Kessler, 2013). It would also be appropriate to include controls for
mercury production and consumption. Our reference model intends to
describe the ratification of environmental agreements in general, hence
it would produce more accurate predictions for specific treaties if ex-
panded with additional information specific to the treaty of interest.
Despite all this, the model predicts reasonably well the ratification
order among the 5 countries. We can see that countries with higher
probabilities are among the first to ratify. The notable exception is
the United states. The predictions generated by the model should be
interpreted as tendencies. Specific political and circumstantial reas-
ons may affect the actual probabilities of ratification in unforeseeable
ways. In the case of the Minamata Convention the United States was
the first country to ratify, and it did so after only 1 month from the
opening to ratifications in order to signal environmental commitment
after several other negotiation attempts had failed (Kessler, 2013). An
important role was played by the impulse of president Obama’s ad-
ministration which concentrated the political weight for such an early
ratification (Leenknedt, 2013). Moreover, several clauses of the agree-
ment are very similar to regulations on mercury that had already been
domestically introduced in the US, hence lowering the costs linked to
the implementation of the treaty (Leenknedt, 2013).
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Chapter 7
Further investigating lobbying
results: lobbying and domestic
policies
7.1 Introduction
Our main models investigate the impact of lobbying and other relev-
ant variables on the ratification of environmental agreements. Despite
testing different measures, specifications and interactions, industrial
pressure does not seem to be significantly associated with a lower rati-
fication rate. In this chapter, we further investigate this puzzling result
to check whether the same conclusion persists at the domestic level.
Our analysis evaluates the effects of industrial and environmental lob-
bying on different areas of domestic policies. We selected 5 dependent
variables that capture how the policies of the country fare in environ-
mental terms.
1. ∆energymix is the share of renewable energy in the electricity
production mix of the country. The renewable energy sources
taken into account include geothermal, solar, tides, wind, bio-
mass, and biofuels. The data covers a period of 33 years. we
take the first difference to avoid spurious results linked to non-
stationarity of the data. Data source: International Energy Agency
(IEA, 2017).
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2. EnvPolicyScore is an indicator of the extent to which domestic
institutions and policies promote the protection and sustainable
use of natural resources and the management of pollution. Ac-
cording to its developers, this index is “intended to capture the
quality of a country’s policies and institutional arrangements, fo-
cusing on key elements that are within the country’s control,
rather than on outcomes (such as economic growth rates) that are
influenced by events beyond the country’s control”(International
Development Association, 2017). The index is calculated exclus-
ively for low-income countries. The individual scores are attrib-
uted by country experts of the World Bank and subsequently
reviewed to ensure comparability across countries. The source
of the data is the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
(CPIA) database (International Development Association, 2017).
3. FossilSupport is the support to fossil fuels in OECD and BRICS
countries as percentage of tax revenues. Support is defined as
public spending programmes or tax breaks in favour of fossil fuel
production or consumption. Data from OECD (2017a).
4. BiodiversityProtect is the proportion of sites with significant
biodiversity value in the country that is covered by the status
of protected area. The data is from the Goal 15.1 of the SDG
(UN, 2017). The important areas for biodiversity are identified
by the UN Statistical Division (UNSD) by using a subset of the
biome composed especially of highly threatened species and birds.
Diversity in bird species is often used as marker for general biod-
iversity because birds are very sensitive to changes in their hab-
itat, the composition of bird population quickly reacts to changes
in the environment (Brooks et al., 2001).
5. EnvInventions is a variable capturing the relative specialisation
in environment related research and technologies. It is calculated
by the OECD as the ratio of i) the share of environment-related
inventions on all inventions (in all technologies) at home over
ii) the share of environment-related inventions on all inventions
(in all technologies) in the world. The number of inventions is
estimated from the data on deposited patents. Data from OECD
(2017b).
These 5 variables are selected to reflect a broad spectrum of do-
mestic policies. They intend to capture the effort in promoting sustain-
ability, green energy, as well as environmental research and protection.
We then use a proxy for industrial pressure to study the impact that
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lobbying exerts on the environmental outcome of domestic policies.
The models we build are used to compare whether the mechanisms
that underpin the ratification of treaties operate in the same way during
the implementation phase of the environmental commitments. Further-
more, we wish to confirm whether the same conclusions on the role and
impact of industrial lobbying are valid also for domestic environmental
policies. For each model, two measures of industrial pressure are tested:
ResourceRent and ShareIndustry. ResourceRent is the sum of fossil
fuel (gas, coal, oil, mineral and forest) rents as a percentage of GDP.
Rents are calculated as the difference between the average production
cost and the commodity price. Hence, ResourceRent captures the
extent and relevance of the monopolistic power in the fossil industry.
We assume this correlates with lobbying power. ShareIndustry is
the value added by the industrial sector as a share of the GDP. In
the literature ShareIndustry is the most common proxy for industrial
lobbying.
In the next section we elaborate on the main determinants of each
of the 5 policy variables. Then, the subsequent section expounds on
the methodological approach and describes the variables of the mod-
els. Finally, we present the results of the study and draw important
conclusions on the impact that pressure groups have on domestic en-
vironmental outcomes.
7.2 A note on the determinants of do-
mestic policies
The impact of interest groups on the formulation and rigour of envir-
onmental policies is a fact well established in economic theory. Already
Buchanan & Tullock (1975) and Dewees (1983) construct public choice
models in which environmental policies are not merely the outcome of
a policy maker maximising social welfare; the interests of those that
are affected by the policies are also taken into consideration. A more
complete formulation of the link between environmental policies and
interest groups is produced by Damania (1999) and Fredriksson (1997).
Fredriksson (1997) develops a model where competing interest groups
contribute to fix the equilibrium tax rate for a pollution tax in which
increased strength of the industrial lobby lowers the equilibrium tax
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rate. Damania (1999) builds a theoretical model of political lobbying
to explain the selection of environmental policy instruments. Emission
taxes are proposed by parties that represent environmental pressure
groups, while industrial lobbies push for less onerous policies such as
standards. The intuition behind this model is further developed by
Glachant (2008). In Glachant’s model the policy maker can choose
between 3 environmental policy instruments: emission standard, tax
on emission, tradeable emission permits. The author shows that under
the influence of pressure groups representing polluting industries, the
policy outcome is steered away from social optimum toward the most
preferable outcome for lobbying industries.
The relevance of lobbying groups is confirmed by the analysis of
Dijkstra (1998) and Beard et al. (2007). The authors of these papers
adopt a game theoretical approach to study the selection of policy
instruments. Dijkstra (1998) explores the selection between 2 envir-
onmental policy instruments (market instruments vs direct regulation)
when government decisions are open to the influence of industrial pres-
sure groups. They conclude that market instruments such as tradeable
emission caps are implemented less often because of the impact of lob-
bying activity. A similar conclusion is reached by Beard et al. (2007).
They design a two-stage game of political lobbying for policies aimed
at improving the quality of the environment. However, unlike previous
works, they assume that governments have imperfect monitoring capa-
cities; they can only gather incomplete information on the real quality
of the environment. Finally, some initial empirical evidence also seems
to strengthen the theoretical link between lobbying and environmental
policies. For example, Tanguay et al. (2004) study the determinants of
environmental policy stringency in 22 OECD countries. Their findings
show that interest groups have sufficient impact to induce changes in
environmental regulation.
In this sections we look more in detail at the literature and results
surrounding the determinants of our 5 policy variables.
7.2.1 Renewable energy
There is a long-standing body of literature on the relationship between
income and energy consumption showing that energy consumption and
income are highly correlated (e.g. Kraft & Kraft 1978, Wolde-Rufael
2009). The relationship has mainly been studied along two lines of
enquiry: the supply-side and the demand-side. The Supply side looks
into the role of energy consumption within the framework of a produc-
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tion function, where energy is considered a factor of production (e.g.
Stern 2000). On the other hand, the demand side typically explores
the relationship between energy consumption, energy prices, and GDP
(e.g. Lee 2005). This approach has also been extended to cover the link
of energy consumption with environmental pollution (e.g. Ang 2007).
Besides aggregate energy consumption, a number of studies have fo-
cused specifically on the use of renewable energy; it is the results of
this strand of literature that we will now shortly review.
Sadorsky (2009a) investigates the relationship between income and
renewable energy use for a sample of developing nations. The results
show that the increase in renewable energy use is mainly driven by the
growth in income and the general rise in the demand for energy. In
a similar paper, the same author finds that in the long-run, income
is positively linked to per capita consumption of renewable energy,
while oil price has a negative and small effect on renewable energy
use (Sadorsky, 2009b). Gan & Smith (2011) attempt to identify the
factors behind differences in the share of renewables in the primary
energy for OECD countries. They conclude that income is particularly
important, while other factors such as R&D expenditures, energy prices
and CO2 emissions are statistically not significant. The result echoes
the finding of another study on OECD countries conducted by Apergis
& Payne (2010), which finds that income is significantly linked to the
consumption of renewable energy.
The relevance of income and growth is not exclusive to OECD coun-
tries; the findings hold for other groups of nations as well. Salim &
Rafiq (2012) study the determinants of renewable energy consumption
in 6 large developing countries. Again, the level of income is strongly
related to the consumption of renewable energy in the long term. In
several countries, CO2 emissions are also found to have an important
impact on the adoption of renewable energy sources. The main vari-
ables in Salim & Rafiq (2012) model are: income, price of oil and CO2
emissions. Sineviciene et al. (2017) conclude that the growth rate of
GDP and the share of the industry in the economy are key determinants
of the consumption of renewable energy in post-communist countries.
It is interesting to notice that industrial share — a variable similar
to ShareIndustry — has a negative impact on renewable energy, and
could be associated with the lobbying practices of industrial interest
groups. Finally, Mehrara et al. (2015) study the determinants of renew-
able energy consumption in a group of central-Asian countries. They
employ a very large number of variables in their analysis including the
share of industry and several institutional variables. Institutional vari-
ables such as indices for political instability, government effectiveness,
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regulatory quality are all consistently significant across specifications.
However, this result could be linked to the lack of a control for the level
of income, since only the growth rate of GDP is used.
Both FDI inflows and trade have frequently been linked to an in-
crease in the use of renewable energy, but the evidence is scant. Doytch
& Narayan (2015) analyse the relationship between FDI inflows and
the consumption of renewable energy, controlling for income and en-
ergy prices. The impact of FDI varies substantially according to the
sector of destination. The effect on renewable energy tends to be pos-
itive mainly for FDI into manufacturing and financial services. With
reference to trade, Omri & Nguyen (2014) investigate the determinants
of renewable energy consumption on a sample of 64 countries. They
find that trade openness is significantly linked to a higher consump-
tion of renewable energy in low-income countries, but not in middle-
and high-income nations. They argue that the effectiveness of trade in
promoting renewable energy is primarily due to the transfer of tech-
nologies. Chen (2018) explores the same research question with data
from different provinces in China. The author argues that the volume
of trade correlates with the openness of the province. However, the
export and import variables are significant only for the provinces of
central China.
In addition to the factors we already mentioned, Aguirre & Ibikunle
(2014) contend that the “renewable potential” is also important to ex-
plain the adoption of sustainable energy sources. They employ estim-
ates on biomass stocks and wind and solar power capacities as proxies
for the potential of countries to adopt renewable technologies. Marques
et al. (2010) and Mehrara et al. (2015) use the land surface of the coun-
try as a rough measure for its renewable potential. Moreover, Marques
et al. (2010) and Aguirre & Ibikunle (2014) argue that the energy de-
pendence of the country is a fundamental determinant for the adoption
of sustainable energy technologies. Fossil fuel exporters are less prone
to consume renewable energy than net energy importers, because of
the relative abundance and energy security they enjoy.
Economic growth and oil prices are usually acknowledged to be
the pivotal factors influencing renewable energy consumption. On the
other hand, trade and CO2 emissions have a less definite effect and
their impact on renewable energy consumption is demonstrated to be
heterogeneous across different countries and regions (Marques et al.
2010, Salim & Rafiq 2012, Omri & Nguyen 2014). Other important
factors include the energy dependency of the country and their po-
tential for the adoption of renewable energy technologies (Aguirre &
Ibikunle, 2014). The share of industry is also considered a potential
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determinant of renewable energy consumption. A higher share of in-
dustry in the economy is often linked to higher energy demand, but
also captures the relative strength of industrial pressure groups (Sinev-
iciene et al. 2017). Hence, industrial lobbying is expected to adversely
affect the adoption of renewable energy sources.
7.2.2 Fossil subsidies and support
Fossil subsidies and government support to fossil fuel production have
been studied less extensively than renewable energy consumption. The
major impediment comes from the fact that they are often opaque; the
actual dimension of government support is hard to assess and measure
(McKitrick, 2017). Hence, a large effort has been invested in estimating
the size of fossil subsidies. For example, Jiang & Lin (2014) estimate
that fossil subsidies may be worth around 1.65% of Chinese GDP, and
Coady et al. (2017) calculate that in 2015 fossil subsidies reached 5.3
trillion USD globally, accounting roughly for 6.5 percent of global GDP.
The estimates range widely because of differences in definition and
methodology.
Notwithstanding the size of estimates, fossil support and subsidies
are deemed to induce a series of undesirable effects. Fossil fuel extrac-
tion and production is a polluting activity, emitting large amounts of
greenhouse gases and generating harmful side effects on human health
and the ecosystems (Pearson, 2011). Subsidies impose a fiscal cost that
needs to be covered by any combination of: taxes, debt or lower spend-
ing in other areas (McKitrick, 2017). Given the budget constraint of
governments, there is an opportunity cost associated with fossil sub-
sidies; what is offered in support of fossil fuel production cannot be
invested into more productive activities. Furthermore, the fiscal meas-
ures linked with subsidies have a redistributive effect on income, typ-
ically away from low-income households, which benefit the least from
fossil subsidies (Arze del Granado et al., 2012). According to Coady
et al. (2017), subsidies and fossil support measures also discourage in-
vestments in renewable energy and improvements in energy efficiency.
Fossil support is linked to several unappealing effects but govern-
ments still choose to devote economic resources to fossil subsidies. It
is often the case that governments wish to subsidise national produc-
tion to reduce energy dependency and protect domestic markets from
foreign production (Clements et al., 2013). In addition, some schol-
ars have argued that there are political advantages associated to fossil
subsidies. According to Overland & Kutschera (2011), governments are
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willing to subsidise fossil consumption because a reduction in the price
of basic commodities, such as electricity or fuel price, is a popular move
among incumbent governments. Thus, fossil subsidies confer electoral
bonuses in democracies (Overland, 2010) and provide political stability
to autocratic regimes (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001). In countries that
export fossil fuels, access to cheap fuel is considered a right, particu-
larly when the state is in control of fossil extraction (Clements et al.
2013, Hartley & Medlock 2008). Overland & Kutschera (2011) give
the example of post-Soviet Russia, where fuel prices are expected to be
kept low because under the USSR the prices were artificially fixed at a
low level.
Overall, there are two sets of factors that appear to be particu-
larly relevant in explaining fossil subsidies. First, it is how extensively
a country is economically reliant on fossil fuels for exports or imports
(Clements et al., 2013). Secondly, the quality of institutions, in particu-
lar, the level of corruption is considered a leading factor in determining
the support to fossil fuel (Cheon et al., 2013).
7.2.3 Environmental stringency and environmental
protection
Just as subsidies were hard to measure, the stringency of environmental
policies is a concept hard to quantify. Environmental policies can fare
differently with regards to different environmental goods and the no-
tion of stringency is necessarily nuanced when diverse policies are ag-
gregated (Brunel & Levinson, 2016). Nonetheless, different stringency
scores have been developed, such as the one by Botta & Kozluk (2014)
and International Development Association (2017). Another common
practice is to use pollution abatement costs as an estimate for the strin-
gency of regulation (e.g. Levinson 1996, Becker 2011) or the level of
target emissions for specific pollutants (e.g. Cole et al. 2006, Dam-
ania et al. 2003). In addition, sophisticated approaches have been
proposed to measure performance in specific areas of regulation. For
example, Galeotti et al. (2014) propose an approach to evaluate the en-
vironmental commitment of a country conditional on the undertaken
policies to improve energy efficiency. Besides the measurement of envir-
onmental policy stringency, much of the research surrounds the effect
of environmental stringency on trade and FDI flows (Cole et al. 2006,
Keller & Levinson 2002, Dean et al. 2009, Lu 2010, Grether et al. 2012,
Cave & Blomquist 2008). The pollution haven hypothesis underpins
this strand of literature, because it implies that states with more leni-
187
ent environmental regulations have a competitive advantage which, at
the margin, should translate into an increase in exports and an influx
of capital (Cole, 2004).
The literature highlights the role of income, the quality of institu-
tions, and the pressure of interest groups as the key determinants of the
stringency of environmental regulation and environmental protection.
Grossman & Krueger (1995), in their seminal contribution, suggest
that the relationship between income per capita and environmental
quality is non-linear because to higher levels of income correspond a
higher demand for environmental protection. As a matter of fact, en-
vironment protection and income exhibit a high level of correlation
and empirically the evidence shows that economic growth is linked to
an increase in environmental policy stringency. Chen (2017), using a
system of simultaneous equations, finds that income and the quality of
institutions are the two fundamental factors explaining the tightness
of environmental regulations. Gallego-Alvarez et al. (2014) study the
environmental performance of a large sample of countries. Again, they
find that two of the most important factors are income and corruption.
Pellegrini & Gerlagh (2006) and Fredriksson et al. (2005) draw the
attention to the special role of democracy and corruption of the insti-
tutions. They argue that the protection of the environment is likely to
increase with income only when the country possesses good institutions.
According to the theoretical model of Fredriksson et al. (2005), demo-
cratic participation improves the general quality of environmental reg-
ulation. In a second part of his paper this assertion is verified empiric-
ally using cross-sectional data on the lead content of gasoline in OECD
countries as a proxy for the stringency of environmental regulation.
Similarly, Pellegrini & Gerlagh (2006) conclude that low corruption is
a major determinant of the stringency of environmental policies How-
ever, they find that the relationship with democracy is not as strong
as the one postulated by Fredriksson et al. (2005). He et al. (2007)
develop a theoretical model in which the stringency of environmental
policies is endogenously determined by the presence of interest groups.
Their model predicts that in a corrupt setting the quality of environ-
mental regulation is always lower. The conclusions of the model are
tested and confirmed with cross-sectional data on the emissions of dif-
ferent pollutants. Industrial lobbying is also considered an important
determinant of policy stringency by Galeotti et al. (2014), who sug-
gest that environmental protection is inhibited in countries in which
industrial production accounts for a high share of GDP.
188
7.2.4 Environmental innovation
Environmental innovation is a subject of study in both environmental
and innovation economics. Conventionally in innovation economics,
the factors affecting firm’s environmental innovation are classified as
supply- and demand-side. The supply-side stresses the role of techno-
logical knowledge in the process of innovation (Lundvall & Johnson,
1994). In fact, the most innovating companies are usually those hav-
ing significantly larger knowledge capital. Knowledge capital can be
accumulated with costly investments in R&D and by hiring skilled em-
ployees (Rave et al., 2011). Empirical evidence shows that, at the
firm level, technological knowledge and resources invested in R&D are
strong determinants of firm’s patent production (Mazzanti & Zoboli
2005, Rehfeld et al. 2007, Horbach 2008, Rave et al. 2011). Further-
more, Coe et al. (2009) find that level of education in a country contrib-
utes to enhance innovation because it correlates with the qualification
of the work force.
Environmental innovation is also explained by demand-side factors.
To a large extent, investment in R&D and innovation is undertaken to
meet the demand of consumers, companies or institutions. The market-
pull factor is critical because innovation is not economically sustainable
without a market that rewards technological innovation (Rave et al.,
2011). Green et al. (1994) survey a large number of British companies
and report that the demand factor is one of the strongest determinants
of environmental innovation among companies. In general, the higher
the needs or expected benefits for innovation the more advantageous it
is to innovate (Horbach, 2008). For this reason, government regulation
and incentives play a vital role in stimulating environmental innovation.
In innovation economics, regulation is considered important to over-
come the externality deriving from the discrepancy between the private
benefit of R&D and the social benefits generated by environmental in-
novations (Rennings, 2000). On the other hand, environmental eco-
nomics stresses the role of regulation as a tool to increase the cost of
environmental goods and indirectly stimulate environmental innova-
tion. In particular, Porter (1991) and Porter & van der Linde (1995,
1999) claim that research is mostly incremental and may overlook the
optimal innovation paths. Thus, government intervention can help
steer research efforts toward superior environmental technologies. The
work of Porter and van der Linde prompted vast research on the link
between environmental regulation and firm performance that goes un-
der the name of the Porter Hypothesis. The controversial Porter Hypo-
thesis states that environmental regulation, despite raising input costs,
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may stimulate innovation and make companies more competitive (Rave
et al., 2011). Jaffe & Palmer (1997) are the first to empirically test
this argument. Many other studies followed that considered different
measures and aspects of regulation (Blind 2012, Johnstone et al. 2012,
Rubashkina et al. 2015 and Franco 2017). Overall, the evidence on the
Porther Hypothesis is mixed and no consensus has been reached.
To sum up, both demand- and supply-side factors concur in de-
termining environmental innovation. At the firm level, R&D spending
plays an important role in building knowledge capital and ultimately
determining innovation (Mazzanti & Zoboli, 2005). The supply side is
relevant also at the national level. The empirical analysis of Guloglu
et al. (2012) reveals that for G7 countries, the main factors driving in-
novation are government R&D expenditure, economic growth, and ex-
port of high technology products. Similar results are obtained by Bayar
(2015); economic growth, financial development and domestic savings
are particularly relevant to environmental innovation while FDI is not
significant. On the other hand, the demand for innovation is a potent
catalyst for environmental innovation (Horbach, 2008) and, through
regulation and funding, governments are able to shape private incent-
ives and foster environmental innovation.
7.3 Methodology and variables choice
We select five dependent variables that reflect the sustainability of
government’s policies. Namely, ∆EnergyMix, BiodiversityProtect,
EnvPolicyScore, FossilSupport, and EnvInventions. These vari-
ables cover diverse areas ranging from environmental research, to the
protection of the environment and the use of renewable energy. For
every variable a separate model is built in order to capture the effect
of industrial and environmental lobbying on specific policy outcomes.
We opt for different modelling strategies in order to suit best the dis-
tribution and characteristics of the individual dependent variables. In
this section we expound on the modelling choices for each variable.
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7.3.1 Methodology
∆EnergyMix is fitted with a linear specification. We employ Correl-
ated Random Effects (CRE) to tackle the unobserved heterogeneity at
the country level. This approach, first proposed by Mundlak (1978)
and Chamberlain (1982), works by introducing the country averages of
every time-varying variable; the averages are called Mundlak devices.
This technique separates the between from the within effects and yields
fixed effect estimates (average marginal effects) for time varying vari-
ables. The Mundlak test checks the joint significance of the Mundlak
devices. It is a robust version of the Hausmann test (1978), when the
Mundlak devices are insignificant the CRE is reduced to a Random
Effect estimator. CRE can be extended to unbalanced panels following
the approach of Woolridge (2016), who demonstrates that averaging
across the unbalanced panels maintains the canonical properties of the
CRE. We opt for this approach because of its flexibility and because
one of our main variables is time invariant (ENGO). In addition to
that, year dummies are added to control for time-specific effects. The
following model is estimated:
Yit = β0 +Dtα+Xitβ +Xiγ + ui + it (7.3.1)
ui ∼ N
(
0, σ2u
)
it ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
(7.3.2)
Where Yit is the dependent variable ∆EnergyMix. Xit is the vector
of independent variables that includes industrial lobbying and other
control variables. Dt are year dummies. β, α and γ are vectors of
coefficients while β0 is a constant. ui is the country random effect and
it is the error term, both assumed to be independent of each other and
to follow a normal distribution. Xi is the vector of Mundlak devices,
i.e. the country averages for the time-varying variables. The model is
estimated with a Random Effect estimator (feasible GLS).
EnvPolicyScore, FossilSupport and EnvInventions are fitted with
a Poisson model. These variables are left-bounded (non-negative) and
heavily skewed with low frequencies for high values and high frequen-
cies for low ones. As seen in figures 7.1 and 7.2, this is particularly
evident for EnvInventions and FossilSupport. Although Poisson re-
gression was developed for count data (Hausman et al. 1984,Cameron
& Trivedi 1986), it is not exclusively restricted to such a type of data
(Winklemann, 2008). A direct alternative to Poisson regression would
be to use a log transformation of the dependent to account for the
left-bound; however, Poisson (GLM) regression is generally superior
(Winklemann, 2008). Unlike log-transformed models it can take the
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Figure 7.1: Distribution of FossilSupport
value of 0, and performs better with values that approach the left-
bound (Greene, 1994). As for previous model, we include year dum-
mies and use Correlated Random Effects (CRE). We do not dwell on
the issue of overdispertion, since it does not affect the consistency of
estimates. The present study is not interested in making probability
predictions for domestic policies, so we simply account for overdisper-
tion with robust standard errors.
The Poisson distribution is commonly used to describe the prob-
ability of a rare event on the basis of a parameter λ, called incid-
ence rate. Using the same notation of the previous model we can
call Y a dependent variable such as EnvPolivyScore, FossilSupport
or EnvInventions. Note that Poisson regressions require positive in-
tegers, so we multiply the original EnvPolivyScore by 10 and multiply
FossilSupport and EnvInventions by 100. For EnvInventions, the
values are also rounded to obtain integers. Then, we can define the
probability of observing the value yit for country i at time t, condi-
tional on λ as:
Pr
(
Yit = yit | λit
)
=
e−λitλyitit
yit!
(7.3.3)
Where the incidence ratio λit is considered to be determined by a set
of regressors.
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Figure 7.2: Distribution of EnvInventions
λit = exp
(
β0 +Dtα+Xitβ +Xiγ + ui
)
(7.3.4)
ui ∼ Γ (k, θ) (7.3.5)
The notation convention is unchanged from equation 7.3.1. Again, Xit
designates the vector of independent variables specific to the dependent
variable. In this case, the country random effect ui is assumed to follow
a gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance 1/θ. The equation is
estimated through maximum likelihood with approximation of the log
likelihood by adaptive Gauss–Hermite quadrature.
Finally, BiodiversityProtect is strictly bounded between 0 and
100. Hence, a linear model would be ill-suited for this type of data
(Papke & Woolridge, 1996). Instead, we treat BiodiversityProtect
as a fractional outcome. Following Papke & Wooldridge (2008), we
fit a fractional model with a logit link function that we estimate us-
ing a Generalised Estimating Equation (GEE). Such a model produces
population-averaged effects. Moreover, CRE is implemented by includ-
ing the averages across the unbalanced panels (Woolridge, 2016). The
following model is estimated for BiodiversityProtect:
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logit
[
E
(
Yit
)]
= log
(
E
(
Yit
)
1− E(Yit)
)
= β0 +Xitβ +Xiγ (7.3.6)
Since some of the series are over 15 years long, the data has an
important time series component. This is especially true in the case of
EnergyMix, which encompasses over 30 years of observations. Thus,
we make sure that in all of the models the variables are stationary to
avoid spurious results. Stationarity is assessed with the Im, Pesaran
and Shin (2003) panel unit-root test, a test that supports unbalanced
types of data. Our data is unbalanced because some countries —
mainly the nations from the Balkans and Communist bloc — come
into existence at a later point in time or dissolve before the end of the
observation period. The results of the test are reported in Table 7.2.
7.3.2 Variables selection
Main variables
The results on treaty ratification indicate that stronger industrial lob-
bying is not associated with lower chances of ratifying environmental
agreements. We now wish to establish whether the same results persist
at the level of domestic policies. The goal of this analysis is to assess the
impact of industrial lobbying on the implementation phase of treaties’
environmental commitments. A different model is built for each of the
following indicators of domestic policy: EnergyMix, EnvPolicyScore,
FossilSupport, BiodiversityProtect and EnvInventions. For each of
the 5 policy variables we employ two different measures for industrial
pressure to verify if lobbying activity is systematically linked to more
lenient regulation and scarcer environmental performance. The two in-
dicators for industrial pressure are ResourceRent and ShareIndustry.
ResourceRent is the sum of fossil fuel (gas, coal, oil, mineral and
forest) rents in percentage of GDP. The rents are calculated as the dif-
ference between the average production cost and the commodity price.
Hence, ResourceRent captures the extent and relevance of monopol-
istic power in the fossil industry, which we assume correlates with lob-
bying potential. ShareIndustry is the value added by the industrial
sector as a share of GDP. In the literature, ShareIndustry is the most
common proxy for industrial lobbying. Additionally, every model in-
cludes ENGO as a proxy for the counterbalancing effect of environ-
mental lobbying. ENGO is measured as the number of environmental
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NGOs in the country that are members of the IUCN. In the remaining
part of the section we present the control variables of every model. A
detailed definition of all the variables can be found in Table 7.1 as well
as in appendix C.
Table 7.1: Definitions and sources
Variables Definitions and sources
∆EnergyMix Percentage point variation in the electricity production from renewable
sources. The energy sources taken into account are geothermal, solar,
tides, wind, biomass, and biofuels. International Energy Agency (IEA,
2017).
EnvPolicyScore Score attributed to the sustainability of policies. The score ranges
from 1 to 6, with 6 indicating higher levels of importance attributed
to sustainability. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)
database (International Development Association, 2017).
FossilSupport Government support to fossil fuels (consumption and production) in
percentage of tax revenues. “Total fossil support” in OECD Green
Growth Indicators dataset (OECD, 2017a).
BiodiversityProtect Proportion of the important sites for biodiversity that are covered by
protected area status. Data from the Goal 15.1 of the SDG (UN,
2017).
EnvInnovation Relative advantage in environment-related technologies. A value of
1 indicates that the country develops environmental technologies as
much as the average world invention rate. OECD (2017b).
ENGO Number of ENGOs memberships to the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature by country in 2017. We assume a constant
value over the entire time period. Data from IUCN website.
ResourceRent Sum of fossil fuels rent in percentage of GDP. “Total natural resources
rent (%GDP)” in WDI dataset (World Bank, 2017a).
ShareIndustry Share of GDP value added from manufacturing, mining and utilities
at current prices. National accounts data (UNSD, 2017).
FreedomHousePR Freedom House index of political rights. On a scale from 1 to 7, where
a lower score indicates stronger rights. Freedom House (2017).
AnnexI Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the country is in the Annex I of
the UNFCCC (1992).
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Definitions and sources (continued)
Variables Definitions and sources
∆logIncome First difference of the logarithm of GDP per capita in current USD.
Data from UN National account estimates (UNSD, 2017).
Export Total exports of goods and services, measured as share of GDP. Data
from WDI (World Bank, 2017a).
∆logCrudeOil Differneced logarithm of the global price of Brent crude oil on the first
of January. Original data expressed in Dollars per barrel. Federal
Reserve (2017).
IMFresourcerich Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country is on the
IMF list of resource rich countries (IMF, 2012). The IMF identifies
resource-rich countries mainly on the basis of their reliance on the
export of natural resources.
∆ThreatenedSpecies Yearly change in the Red List Index; the index indicates the conserva-
tion status of species groups in a territory. A higher risk of extinction is
associated with lower scores. Data from IUCN website (IUCN, 2017).
Corruption Corruption score from the International Country Risk Guide (Political
Risk Service, 2011).
FossilExports Export of fossil fuels, ores and metals over the total value of the mer-
chandise export. Data from WDI (World Bank, 2017a).
AgricultureReliance Value added by agriculture, forestry and fishing as a share of GDP.
Data from WDI (World Bank, 2017a).
EnergyDepletion “Energy Depletion” variable from WDI dataset (World Bank, 2017a).
Calculated as the “ratio of the value of the stock of energy resources
to the remaining reserve lifetime (capped at 25 years)”. The resources
taken into consideration are coal, crude oil, and natural gas.
Land Total land surface in thousands squared kilometres. Data from FAO
(2017).
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Renewable energy development (EnergyMix)
By far the biggest determinants of renewable energy consumption at
the country level are demand-side factors such as income, growth and
oil prices. We control for the level of income with the dummy AnnexI
that takes a value of 1 if the country is in the Annex I of the UN-
FCCC (1992). Annex I countries are not only the most developed na-
tions, they are also expected to take the biggest action to curb carbon
emissions under the UNFCCC (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol (1997).
Both these factors could explain consumption patterns in renewable
resources. In addition to AnnexI, we include the growth in GDP per
capita (∆logIncome) to account for the effect of economic growth.
The demand for renewable energy depends in part on the prices of
the competing energy sources. The price of fossil energy is captured
by ∆logCrudeOil, the percentage change in the international price of
crude oil. An important role in the diffusion of renewable energy has
been played by the development of more efficient and affordable re-
newable technologies. The technological progress is accounted for by
including a time trend (trend). Moreover, we follow Marques et al.
(2010) and Mehrara et al. (2015) by including the land surface of the
country (Land) as a rough proxy for the “renewable potential”. Coun-
tries with large territories are more likely to contain exploitable re-
newable sources of energy. Wind and solar capacities — the two most
important renewable technologies — are not strictly related to a coun-
try’s surfaces but they both require a sizeable land surface to produce
significant energy outputs. Smaller nations such as Luxembourg may
find it difficult to reach significant levels of production because of the
territorial limitations. Moreover, larger land surfaces tend to correl-
ate with richness in environmental resources such as rivers and water
basins, coastlines, reliefs, forests or climatic diversity — all factors that
generally relate to the possibility of producing renewable energy with
alternative renewable technologies.
Finally, a fundamental factor in the weight of renewable resources
is the access to fossil energy sources in the country. Hence, a dummy
variable (IMFresourcerich) is included that takes the value of 1 if
the country is on the IMF list of resource rich countries (IMF, 2012).
A nation is considered as resource-rich primarily if it exports natural
resources or economically depends on the export of natural resources.
Sustainability of domestic policy (EnvPolicyScore)
Similarly to the previous model, we use ∆logIncome to control for the
effect of the growth in per capita income. We do not control for the
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level of income because the countries in the sample are homogeneous in
terms of development, in fact, EnvPolicyScore is calculated exclusively
for low income nations1. The model also includes IMFresourcerich
to account for the fact that countries reliant on natural resources could
have different incentives towards environmental policies. In fact, the
economic interests probably hinder the implementation of more strin-
gent regulation in countries more dependent on the extraction of nat-
ural resources.
The theoretical literature has emphasised the connection between
exports and the environmental stringency of policies. According to
the pollution haven hypothesis, countries with indulgent environmental
regulation have a competitive advantage on the export of pollution-
intensive goods (Cole, 2004). Countries reliant on trade are more re-
luctant to embark in environmental policies (Neumayer, 2002b). We
control for this factor by including Export — the relative weight of
exports as a share of GDP.
The tightening of environmental regulations often follows a worsen-
ing in environmental qualities (Beron et al., 2003). That is to say, a
country could be implementing tighter environmental policies because
it experiences a strong degradation of the environment. We control for
the link with the quality of the environment by including the yearly
change in an index on species conservation (∆ThreatenedSpecies).
The conservation of flora and fauna summarises well the overall en-
vironmental quality because it is sensitive to most types of pollutions.
For example, air, water and soil pollution are all leading factors in spe-
cies decline. We use the Red List Index (IUCN, 2017) as a reference
for our variable because it is reliably estimated for a large number of
countries and years.
Lastly, Pellegrini & Gerlagh (2006) and Fredriksson et al. (2005) —
among others— have argued that the political institutions of a country
play a fundamental part in promoting environmental policies and sat-
isfying the demand for environmental regulation. We use the variable
FreedomHousePR to capture the quality of political institutions and
political representation. FreedomHousePR is the “Political rights”
index computed annually by Freedom House (2017). It ranges from 1
to 7, with lower scores indicating weaker political rights.
1The average GDP per capita in 2015 for the sample of countries is 2004 USD (sd =
1939).
198
Support to fossil energy (FossilSupport)
In addition to the effect of lobbying, which constitutes the focus of
the study, we need to control for the strong economic interests linked
to fossil subsidies. Clements et al. (2013) suggest that the reliance
on the exports of fossil fuels greatly explains governments’ support to
the fossil sector. When fossil extraction accounts for a large share
of the economy, the country may use subsidies to harbour national
companies and provide help against foreign competition. Further-
more, it has been argued that producing countries often subsidise fossil
energy to keep prices artificially low (Overland & Kutschera, 2011).
We use IMFresourcerich and FossilExports to isolate the effect of
industrial lobbying from other economic incentives which could bias
our main estimates. FossilExports measures the weight of extract-
ive goods in the export basket and is calculated as the share of fossil
fuels, ores and metals exports over total merchandise exports. Again,
IMFresourcerich is a dummy that takes the values of 1 if the country
is considered resource-rich by IMF (2012).
The literature on fossil subsidies highlights the importance of insti-
tutions. In particular, corruption seems to be a strong determinant of
fossil support (Cheon et al., 2013). We use the Corruption score from
the Political Risk Service (2011) to measure the level of corruption in
the country. The rating on corruption is compiled under the “Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide”, which assesses a large number of institu-
tional elements. Besides corruption, we also control for the democratic
credentials of the government with FreedomHousePR. Democracy
and fossil support could be linked in several ways; political account-
ability is thought to hinder the support to fossil energy (Cheon et al.,
2013) and it has even been argued that subsidies are linked to electoral
cycles (Overland 2010, Overland & Kutschera 2011).
To conclude, AnnexI is used to control for the level of income and
∆logCrudeOil is included to account for any type of relationship ex-
isting between market price of fossil products and government support
to fossil energy.
Protection of biodiversity (BiodiversityProtect)
The dependent variable is the proportion of important biodiversity sites
that are covered by protected area status. It captures the effort that a
country invests into environmental protection. We control for the dif-
ferences in income and development levels with the dummy AnnexI,
which takes the value of 1 for the Annex I countries of the UNFCCC
(1992). This variable isolates the most developed nations that are also
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expected to engage into more important environmental actions. Fur-
thermore, Pellegrini & Gerlagh (2006) and Fredriksson et al. (2005)
stress that the protection of environment strongly improves when a
country possesses good institutions and strong democratic participa-
tion (Fredriksson et al., 2005), which ensures a stronger accountability
of political action. Again, FreedomHousePR is used to measure the
democratic quality of the country.
The literature highlights the prominent role of interest groups on
the stringency of environmental policy and environmental protection
(He et al. 2007, Galeotti et al. 2014). The effect of industrial pressure
groups is studied with the variablesResourceRent and ShareIndustry,
while the impact of environmental lobbying is captured by ENGO.
The creation of protected areas could also be a response to a trend
in the degradation of the environment. Changes in the quality of the
environment are proxied by ∆ThreatenedSpecies, which measures the
changes in the conservation of species within the country. The conser-
vation of species is an ideal proxy for the quality of the environment
because it reacts to virtually all types of human activities. However,
the consistency of the estimates could be affected by reverse caus-
ality. In fact, the conservation of species could directly respond to
the institution of protected areas, with improvements in the quality
of the environment following the protection of biodiversity sites. In
order to avoid the issues linked to simultaneity, we take the lagged
value of ∆ThreatenedSpecies which cannot be causally determined
by the present level of BiodiversityProtect. Moreover, the creation
of protected areas as a response to a degradation in the environment
is likely to occur with a delay in time. Hence, the lagged value of
∆ThreatenedSpecies is likely to be correlated and causally linked with
the present level of BiodiversityProtect.
Finally, we control for the size of the country (Land) and the share
of agriculture, forestry and fishing over the GDP (AgricultureReliance).
Agriculture, forestry and fishing are all activities that have a direct im-
pact on flora and fauna diversity. They could hamper the protection
of wild biodiversity. Furthermore, in countries that are economically
reliant on agriculture, forestry and fishing, the incentives for legal pro-
tection of biodiversity sites could be curbed. Last but not least, Land
— the surface of the country in thousand of squared kilometres — ac-
counts for the fact that larger nations are more likely to contain many
important biodiversity sites and could behave differently from small
nations that only contain few sites.
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Environmental research (EnvInventions)
EnvInventions measures the relative specialisation in environmental
R&D compared to the rest of the world. Innovation is measured with
the number of deposited patents that are related to the environment.
Usually, the development of patents is explained by scrutinising com-
pany data. The knowledge capital of the firm, investment in R&D,
and the market pull are some of the salient determinants of patented
innovation at the firm level (Rave et al. 2011, Mazzanti & Zoboli 2005).
Whereas at the country level a central role is played by resources and
incentives to innovate.
Our main control variables account for the income and institutional
differences among nations. The dummy AnnexI is included to control
for the level of economic and financial development. In more developed
nations companies can rely on better infrastructures. Developed na-
tions are also most likely to be leading the way in term of research
and have an accumulated stock of knowledge capital that could facilit-
ate innovation in environmental domains. In addition, we also include
FreedomHousePR as a general control for the political and institu-
tional situation of the country.
Guloglu et al. (2012) and Bayar (2015) point out that economic
growth is a fundamental determinant of innovation at the country
level. Private companies are willing to invest more in research when
there is higher economic growth because they anticipate higher returns.
∆logIncome is the first difference of the logarithm of GDP per capita
expressed in current USD. It is approximately equal to the growth rate
of GDP per capita.
Several environmental innovations are linked to more efficient use of
energy resources. We include the variable EnergyDepletion to control
for the demand-side incentives to innovate. EnergyDepletion is the ra-
tio of the value of the stock of energy resources to the remaining reserve
lifetime (capped at 25 years). The resources taken into consideration
are coal, crude oil, and natural gas. EnergyDepletion captures the
volume of available non-renewable resources weighted on the expected
duration of these reserves. Countries that have no reserves, or that are
closer to exhausting their reserves, are stimulated to improve energy ef-
ficiency and invest into innovation in alternative energy solutions based
on renewable technologies.
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Table 7.2: Summary statistics
Variables Obs. Mean SD IPS test
∆EnergyMix 6859 0.123 1.123 -27.893***
EnvPolicyScore 922 3.114 0.555 assumed
FossilSupport 449 0.783 1.181 -1.911***
BiodiversityProtect 3365 39.700 26.056 -2956.907***
EnvInnovation 10450 0.652 1.762 -50.428***
ENGO 10838 5.595 8.679 –
ResourceRent 7996 7.250 11.149 -12.462***
ShareIndustry 8057 23.230 12.895 -7.433***
FreedomHousePR 8331 3.770 2.235 assumed
AnnexI 10642 0.224 0.417 –
∆logIncome 7905 0.052 0.139 -47.352***
Export 7836 34.874 24.774 -5.453***
∆logCrudeOil 7308 0.004 0.261 -65.3252***
IMFresourcerich 10642 0.324 0.468 –
∆ThreatenedSpecies 4421 -0.001 0.002 -22.714***
Corruption 4822 2.993 1.364 assumed
FossilExports 5843 24.919 34.650 -4.481***
AgricultureReliance 6312 18.390 15.447 -8.738***
EnergyDepletion 6797 2.465 6.726 -12.517***
Land 9531 765.401 2118.136 assumed
Notes: The last column reports the W-statistics for the Im,
Pesaran and Shin (2003) unit root test. The test null hypothesis is
that the individual series have a unit root process. The selection
of lags is based on Schwarz Information Criterion. ***, ** and *
indicate p-values respectively lower than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10. “–”
designates time-invariant variables while “assumed” indicates the
variables that are assumed stationary.
7.4 Results
The results of the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) unit root test are repor-
ted in Table 7.2. Stationary series are used to avoid spurious results.
In the case of EnvPolicyScore, FreedomHousePR, Corruption and
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Land, the results of the test are not reported because the variables
are assumed to be stationary. Except for Land — which is nearly
constant — the other processes assumed to be stationary are discrete
scores; typically bounded, they tend to remain stable for long periods
of time with occasional step-like shifts. Unit root tests over-identify
unit-roots in this type of data, and results are unreliable especially
for shorter time series samples. Furthermore, IPS test cannot be per-
formed on the time-invariant series of the panel. Therefore, for Land
and FreedomHousePR the results are particularly misleading because
they ignore the fact that most of the panel exhibits constant scores.
The regression results are summarised in Table 7.3. Poisson models
are log-linear, hence the coefficients they yield are usually exponen-
tiated to obtain incidence rate ratios (IRR). We do not follow this
practice because we are interested in the direction of the effect more
than interpreting the order of magnitude. Also, the output of the other
models is not in terms of ratios, so a comparison across the table would
be less intuitive. Moreover, for model 7 and 8 we report the marginal
effects, hence the absence of coefficients for the constants cons. The
estimates for Mundlak devices are presented at the bottom of the table.
Our main variables are proxies for industrial lobbying. It would
not be very instructive to interpret the magnitude of coefficients as
precise effects of lobbying because lobbying is a concept hard to define
and quantify. Thus, the scope of the analysis is to understand the
relationship between lobbying and environmental policies rather than
generating precise predictions. For four out of the five variables, in-
dustrial pressure has a significant effect on domestic policies. The only
policy variable for which industrial pressure is uninfluential is the pro-
tection of biodiversity sites. The protection of biodiversity sites heavily
depends on the level of development (proxied by AnnexI) but it is also
significantly influenced by environmental lobbying. As expected, the
reliance on agriculture, fishing and forestry has a negative impact on
the protection of biodiversity sites.
According to the results of model 3 and 4, industrial pressure has
a general negative impact on the sustainability of the enacted policies,
albeit for ShareIndustry the effect is significant only at the 10% level.
Environmental lobbying has similar results in the opposite direction:
stronger lobbying, proxied by the number of ENGOs, leads to generally
more sustainable policies. These results are for a sample of low-income
countries and we obtained them after controlling for the level of demo-
cracy (FreedomHousePR), income growth, the share of exports, the
abundance of natural resources (IMFresourcerich), and the change
in the quality of environment (∆ThreatenedSpecies). In model 3-6 we
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do not include a control for the level of income because the estimates
are for samples of nations in the same income group.
Industrial lobbying, together with the changes in oil price and the
richness in natural resources (IMFresourcerich), are the main drivers
of the variable ∆EnergyMix. In fact, industrial lobbying strongly cor-
relates with increases in the share of fossil sources in the energy produc-
tion mix. Industrial pressure also leads to a higher government support
for the consumption and production of fossil energy (FossilSupport)
and a reduction in the research and technological innovation related
to the environment (EnvInventions). With regard to innovation, the
results indicate that countries with higher economic growth innovate
more in environment related technologies. In addition to that, the de-
pletion, or complete lack, of fossil resources increases the environmental
research effort: an increase in EnergyDepletion acts as a stimulus for
innovation.
Finally, democracy often plays an important role too. More demo-
cratic nations, having a lower score on the Freedom House political
rights index, tend to implement more sustainable polices, channel less
resources into the support of fossil energy and specialise more on envir-
onmental innovation. It is likely that the results for democratic states
are driven by the larger degree of transparency and accountability over
governments’ policies.
7.5 Discussion and conclusion
Altogether, the results indicate that industrial pressure bears an ef-
fect on domestic policies. Our measures for industrial pressure ex-
hibit a significant impact on 4 out of 5 policy variables. Moreover,
the results obtained with ShareIndustry are consistent with the ones
of ResourceRent; the conclusions on the effect of industrial lobbying
are preserved. These results contrast with what is observed for the
ratification of environmental treaties, where industrial pressure does
not seem to be significantly linked to reduced probabilities of ratifying.
All this is consistent with the hypothesis that the pressure is exerted
during the implementation stage, rather than the ratification stage of
the environmental agreements.
Environmental lobbying is linked to a stronger protection of biod-
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iversity sites with the status of protected areas (BiodiversityProtect),
and it is generally associated with tighter environmental commitments
in developing countries (EnvPolicyScore). However, environmental
lobbying is not found to be a significant factor in promoting envir-
onmental innovation, in reducing the support to fossil fuels and it is
also not significantly linked to higher shares of renewable energy in the
production mix.
The measures employed in our models are rough proxies for the
strength of interest groups, nonetheless they suggest that industrial
lobbying focuses on specific types of policies, particularly the ones more
rewarding in economic terms. On the other hand, environmental lob-
bying seems to focus on governmental action but struggles to produce
an effect on factors related to the economy and industry — such as
subsidies to fossil energy or the share of renewables in the energy mix.
These findings are explained by the fact that industrial action is dir-
ected toward economic outcomes that are tightly linked to industrial
interests. In contrast, environmental pressure groups usually do not
possess the same economic means of industrial lobbies. The efforts of
environmental groups focus on policy makers because they provide the
legitimisation for their action and have the enforcing power to bring the
desired change. The action of environmental groups is harder to exert
on decentralised organisations and non-unitary agents such as private
firms. Hence, putting pressure on political institutions is often the
only way to influence economic outcomes. For example, environmental
groups may aim at protecting biodiversity by pushing for the status
of protected area (BiodiversityProtect); this form of legal protection
is more effective and affordable than direct interventions. Conversely,
industrial lobbies have less incentive to fight the creation of protected
areas, whereas they reap an immediate return from lenient environ-
mental regulation (EnvPolicyScore) or by lobbying for subsidies (e.g.
FossilSupport).
Furthermore, the results reveal a dichotomy in the strategy that
pressure groups adopt with regards to international environmental agree-
ments. In the previous chapter we discussed how environmental lob-
bying increases the likelihood of ratifying environmental treaties, while
industrial lobbying is not associated with a significant effect on ratific-
ation. The results vividly contrast the findings of this chapter which
illustrate that industrial lobbying exercises an effect on a large num-
ber of domestic environmental policy outcomes. This seems to sug-
gest that industrial lobbies concentrate on the implementation stage
of treaties rather than ratification. Their action targets outcomes that
are directly related to their economic interests. On the contrary, envir-
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onmental groups consider the ratification of environmental agreements
as an important tool to force governmental action, hence the focus on
ratification.
The present analysis contributes to the debate surrounding the ef-
fect of pressure groups and highlights the dichotomy of their action at
the domestic and international level. The findings suggest that environ-
mental and industrial lobbies have different priorities in their actions,
and approach the five policy areas we examined in different ways. The
analysis confirms the influence of industrial and environmental lobbies
on environmental outcomes and provides evidence of lobbying activity
that is in line with the prevalent findings in the literature. The ma-
jor limitation of this study is common across most studies of lobbying.
That is, since it is such an elusive practice, lobbying is hard to quantify
and measure. Our measures for industrial lobbying serve as a rough
proxy for lobbying potential and cannot be used to make predictions
on the size and relative strength of pressure groups. Future research
could benefit from more detailed data that qualifies and measures more
accurately the phenomenon of lobbying. In addition to the measure-
ment difficulty, the scope of the analysis could be expanded to cover a
broader spectrum of environmental policy indicators.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
The introductory chapter of this thesis presented a map reporting the
number of ratifications for every country. The map showed that ratific-
ations tend to cluster geographically and that developed countries, in
general, ratified a larger number of agreements than developing coun-
tries. This suggests that economic factors affect the decision to ratify.
In fact, it would seem that ratification is simply a function of average
income, but a deeper investigation reveals that many other factors are
at play. Figure 8.1 displays a map of the ratification rates across the
world, which — unlike the map in the introduction — takes into ac-
count the number of agreements a country can potentially ratify. The
image is very different, and suggests that income is not the exclusive
driver of ratification. Many large developing nations have relatively
high ratification rates, while some rich nations (e.g. United States,
Switzerland or Austria) have lower rates than expected by the sole
level of income. The objective of our work is to build a better un-
derstanding of ratification. In the course of the study we analysed in
detail the determinants of ratification, focusing on the following re-
search questions:
Do domestic pressure groups influence the ratification of en-
vironmental agreements? And how is this relationship af-
fected by the quality of institutions? Are good institutions
facilitating international cooperation?
To answer the research questions we assembled the largest data set
on ratification in the literature. We also sought to correct the limita-
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tions of previous works, in particular by identifying the potential ratifi-
ers for every treaty in the data set. It is the first time this is done. We
then estimated a binary multilevel model for duration data with cross-
classified random effects. The multilevel structure emerges from the
structure of the data, which is characterised by the correlation between
the observations within the same country and same treaty. The model
is estimated with MCMC and yields several interesting results on the
determinants of ratification. This modelling strategy corrects several
shortcomings of the existing empiricical literature. Furthermore, in
chapter 7 we complemented our analysis of treaty participation with
an investigation of the effects of interest groups on the implementation
phase of treaties. We investigated the impact of environmental and in-
dustrial lobbying on different types of environmental policies. We now
pull together all the elements of the thesis to provide a comprehensive
answer to the research questions.
8.1 Discussion of the main results
8.1.1 The role of domestic pressure groups and in-
stitutions
The main variables in our analysis are proxies for environmental and
industrial lobbying. These variables, together with a measure for the
quality of institutions, are used to evaluate the influence of interest
groups on ratification choices. In chapter 4 we formulated a series of
hypotheses on the effect of lobbying and institutions, which we now
confront with our results.
The influence of domestic pressure groups
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of ratifying environmental agree-
ments decreases when industrial lobbies are
stronger
In sharp contrast with our hypothesis, we find an insignificant asso-
ciation between industrial lobbying and the reduction in ratification
probabilities. We experimented with five different proxies for indus-
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Figure 8.1: Ratification rates across the world
Notes: The ratification rate is calculated as the number of ratified treaties
in 2017 over the number of treaties the country can potentially ratify. For
more information on the ratification data and a detailed explanation of the
notion of potential ratifiers, refer to section 5.2.2.
trial lobbying in order to assess the robustness of this finding. The
results remain consistent. In contrast with expectations, we do not
find a significant effect of industrial lobbying on ratification. A thor-
ough analysis of previous empirical works reveals that the same result
was reported in other works which include some proxy for industrial
lobbying (Fredriksson & Ujhelyi 2006, Fredriksson et al. 2007, von Stein
2008, Yamagata et al. 2013, Sauquet 2014, Yamagata et al. 2017). Even
in widely different models, employing different measurements and dif-
ferent samples, the findings point in the same direction: industrial
lobbying is insignificantly linked to lower probabilities of ratifying en-
vironmental agreements.
The reason for this counter-intuitive result has never been adequately
explored. The explanation we tentatively advance is that stronger in-
dustrial lobbying does not translate into lower probabilities of rati-
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fication because industrial lobbying practices do not directly target
ratification. We suggest that, in general, industrial lobbies prefer to
target the implementation phase rather than the ratification of environ-
mental agreements. This hypothesis was tested in chapter 7, where we
evaluated the impact of lobbying on different environmental domestic
policies. Unfortunately, it is impossible to directly link these domestic
policies to specific international environmental agreements. However,
we use variables that reflect a broad range of environmental policies to
measure the overall national response to environmental commitments.
The following five variables are studied: i) the change in the share of
renewable energy in the energy mix, ii) a score on the environmental
commitment of the government, iii) the economic support provided to
fossil sector as percentage of tax revenues, iv) the share of important
biodiversity sites in the country that have the status of protected area,
and v) the relative specialisation in environmental research. These five
variables are selected to reflect a broad spectrum of domestic policies.
They intend to capture the effort invested in promoting sustainability,
green energy, as well as environmental research and protection.
The results on domestic policies seem to validate our explanation.
For four out of the five variables, industrial pressure has a statistic-
ally significant effect on domestic policies. The only policy variable
for which industrial pressure is uninfluential is the protection of biod-
iversity sites. The protection of biodiversity sites heavily depends on
the level of income and the strength of environmental lobbying. These
results are obtained after controlling for environmental lobbying and
other confounding effects. We also account for countries’ idiosyncratic
factors by using Correlated Random Effects (CRE). Two different prox-
ies for industrial lobbying are used to ensure the results are robust.
Our results for domestic policies suggest that industrial lobbying has
a negative effect on the quality of environmental policies; this result is
consistent across the wide range of policies considered. All of this seems
to substantiate our argument that industrial pressure is exerted during
the implementation stage of agreements, rather than on ratification.
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of ratifying environmental agree-
ments increases when environmental pressure
groups are stronger
As hypothesised, we find that environmental lobbying has a posit-
ive and significant effect on the likelihood of ratifying an agreement.
When using the number of Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) as proxy
for environmental lobbying, we find that an additional ENGO increases
the hazard of ratification by 1.6%, and by 2.1% in correspondence of
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the average quality of institutions. The effect is significant even when
different proxies are used, and it corroborates the results obtained on
smaller samples by Fredriksson & Ujhelyi (2006), von Stein (2008) and
Bernauer et al. (2013a). Regarding the implementation stage of envir-
onmental commitments, we find that environmental lobbying is able
to influence specific areas of government regulation, but struggles to
impact broader economic variables. In chapter 7, environmental lob-
bying, together with income, are found to be the two key determinants
of the share of biodiversity sites that have protected area status. Fur-
thermore, environmental lobbying seems to improve the general quality
of environmental policies enacted by a country. Nevertheless, it fails
to influence the other measures of domestic policies, such as environ-
mental research, support to fossil industry, and the share of renewable
energy in the energy mix.
The explanation we put forward is based on the lobbying preferences
of environmental and industrial groups. Environmental groups target
treaties because it is seen as a necessary step to legitimise their actions,
and treaties constitute an effective tool to build consensus over environ-
mental issues. Environmental treaties can be used to back the claims of
ENGOs and force governments to act on environmental matters. Since
transboundary environmental problems involve several countries, for
ENGOs environmental agreements are also the most effective way of
addressing large environmental issues. Lobbying on national govern-
ment could also be part of a coordinated effort to address the problem
globally. In fact, countries are generally reluctant to abate unilaterally
(because of the free-riding incentive that it creates for other countries);
hence, countries are more likely to engage in environmental regulation
if they expect other countries to follow suit. Environmental agreement
can guarantee this reciprocity. In addition to that, the ratification of
environmental agreements is a single legal act, which makes it easier
to check and verify progress compared to other types of regulations1.
Conversely, industrial lobbies target the implementation phase because
it is relatively easier to slow down, it often draws less attention, and it
is possibly easier to influence by local industrial groups. Rather than
focusing on governmental regulation, the action of industrial lobbying
is directed toward economic outcomes that are tightly linked to indus-
trial interests.
It is harder for environmental groups to influence decentralised or-
ganisations and non-unitary agents such as private firms, hence, put-
1For example, the compliance with the Kyoto targets is much harder to assess than the
ratification of the protocol itself. Implementation often is a diffuse process that entails a
large number of measures; hence, it is frequently hard to evaluate the global impact of
large governmental policies.
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ting pressure on political institutions is often the only way to impact
economic outcomes. Our domestic policies results seem to validate this
argument: environmental groups protect biodiversity by pushing for
the protected area status (BiodiversityProtect). For environmental
groups, this form of legal protection is generally more effective and af-
fordable than other forms of interventions. The same principle applies
to the ratification of environmental agreements because it is a legal
act that could be used to force governmental action. Conversely, in-
dustrial lobbies have only a scarce interest in disputing the creation of
protected areas, while they reap an immediate return from lenient en-
vironmental regulation (EnvPolicyScore) or by lobbying for subsidies
(e.g. FossilSupport). The measures employed in our models are crude
proxies for the strength of interest groups, but they suggest that in-
dustrial lobbying focuses on specific types of policies, particularly the
ones more rewarding in economic terms. On the other hand, environ-
mental lobbying seems to focus on governmental action but struggles
to produce an effect on factors related to the economy and industry
— such as subsidies to fossil energy or the share of renewables in the
energy mix.
In many ways, our work corroborates the conclusions of Hagen et al.
(2016) who use a game-theoretical approach to show that domestic in-
terest groups may have a strong impact on the size, depth and sta-
bility of international coalitions. They find that environmental lob-
bying is able to positively influence a country’s propensity to ratify
agreements; while, the effect of industrial lobbying entails lower abate-
ment levels, but has an ambiguous effect on ratification. Our study
shows that industrial lobbying indeed does not directly influence rati-
fication. This finding is consistent with the structure of the theoretical
models, which postulate that industrial lobbying is exerted during the
abatement stage. However, the opposite is found for environmental
lobbying. Environmental lobbying appears to focus on the ratification
of agreements, but in the existing theoretical literature environmental
and industrial lobbies are both assumed to offer contributions to influ-
ence abatement levels instead of participation (Haffoudhi 2005, Habla
& Winkler 2013, Hagen et al. 2016). There is scope for further re-
search on how conclusions would change if the dichotomy in lobbying
strategies were accommodated in theoretical models.
Quality of institutions and interactions with domestic groups
Hypothesis 3: Countries with better institutions are more
likely to join environmental agreements
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Our findings suggest that the quality of institutions plays an import-
ant role in fostering participation in environmental agreements. It is
estimated that a 1 s.d. increase in the quality of institutions leads to an
8% increase in the probability of ratifying environmental agreements.
This result is obtained after ruling-out possible effects from correlated
variables, such as the level of income and democracy. The quality of in-
stitutions also affects the implementation of environmental agreements.
In the second part of our empirical analysis we find that countries with
better institutions — in particular lower levels of corruption — tend
to provide less support and subsidies to the fossil sector. Again, these
findings are in line with previous evidence on the quality of institutions
(Pellegrini & Gerlagh (2006), Fredriksson et al. 2007, Cheon et al. 2013,
Gallego-Alvarez et al. 2014, Seelarbokus 2014).
Hypothesis 4: The effect of environmental and industrial
pressure increases when the quality of institu-
tions is lower
With regards to the interaction with industrial and environmental
pressure, we find that indeed the effect of environmental lobbying in-
creases when the quality of institutions is lower. However the interac-
tion with industrial lobbying is insignificant. This conclusion is con-
sistent with the above-mentioned findings for the effect of industrial
lobbying on ratification: the quality of institutions does not alter the
strategy of industrial lobbies, which still prefer to target the imple-
mentation rather than ratification stage. On the contrary, environ-
mental lobbying seems to be more effective in countries with poorer
institutions. Two reasons are advanced to explain this relationship.
Firstly, in the presence of good institutions, environmental demands
are channelled more effectively without the need of pressure from en-
vironmental groups. Hence, good quality institutions substitute the
effect of environmental groups. A similar conclusion is reached by
Bernauer et al. (2013a) on the interaction between environmental lob-
bying and the quality of democracy. Secondly, lobbying practices tend
to be more effective in the presence of corruption. This argument is
proposed by Fredriksson et al. (2007) who find that the effectiveness
of environmental lobbying on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
increases with corruption.
Regarding the role played by institutions, our work confirms the
theoretical predictions formulated at the beginning of the analysis.
Our study also supports previous empirical results on the interaction
between lobbying practices and institutional quality (Fredriksson &
Ujhelyi 2006, Fredriksson et al. 2007, Bernauer et al. 2013a). In terms
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of policy recommendations, our findings suggest that measures aimed
at improving the quality of institutions — notably by fighting cor-
ruption, increasing transparency or bureaucratic efficiency — offer the
added benefit of improving a state’s capacity to cooperate over en-
vironmental issues. Moreover, we conclude that when the quality of
institutions is lower, environmental lobbying becomes a more effective
tool to apply pressure on ratification choices. This relationship sug-
gests that action by civil society could be used as a vector to improve
participation in less developed nations, which are often characterised
by comparatively worse quality institutions.
8.1.2 Additional evidence from the study
Income and democracy
In our results, income is positively correlated with ratification of envir-
onmental agreements. However, the effect is smaller than anticipated
and statistically significant only at the 10% level. Moreover, we find
no trace of the supposed non-linearity in the relationship with income
(Bernauer et al., 2013a). After accounting for the quality of institu-
tions and democracy, the residual effect of income is relatively weak.
We suspect that the impact is mitigated by the differentiated terms of-
ten present in environmental agreements. In other words, treaties often
include facilitating measures for developing nations that participate in
the agreement such as technical assistance, technological transfers or
financial aids. According to the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility, developed nations are expected to take the lead on en-
vironmental action and shoulder most of the initial costs of the treaty.
This could explain why the level of income does not drastically affect
ratification probabilities, especially after we separately account for the
quality of institutions and democracy. Both institutions and democracy
are found to be important determinants of ratification and strongly
correlated with the level of income. Income and democracy have been
extensively treated in the ratification literature (e.g. Congleton 1992,
Fredriksson & Gaston 2000, Neumayer 2002a, Schulze 2014), however
never in conjunction with institutional quality and on a large sample of
treaties. The effect of institutional and political variables also extends
to the implementation of environmental commitments. For example,
we find that democratic nations tend to implement more sustainable
polices, channel less resources into the support of fossil energy and
specialise more in environmental innovation. It is likely that the res-
ults for democratic states are driven by the greater transparency and
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accountability of governments’ policies.
International linkage
Our model allows us to gather evidence on the international interde-
pendence in ratification. We find that a country’s choice of ratifying
environmental agreements is tightly linked to the ratification of for-
eign nations. From a theoretical perspective, it is unsurprising that
ratifications are interdependent. After all, the benefits and costs of a
treaty are inherently associated with the action taken by other nations.
Nevertheless, ratifications are not interacting in the way anticipated
by game-theoretical models. In game theory the free-ride incentive
leads to negative correlation in ratifications, unless a grand coalition is
achievable (Marrouch & Chaudhuri, 2015). Instead, we find that if all
geographic neighbours ratify the agreement, the hazard of ratification
increases by as much as 80%. Our results corroborate previous works
on this topic (Perrin & Bernauer 2010, Bernauer et al. 2010, Schulze &
Tosun 2013, Schneider & Urpelainen 2013, Yamagata et al. 2013, Sau-
quet 2014, Davies & Naughton 2014, Wagner 2016, Yamagata et al.
2017), all of which seem to suggest that ratifications are positively re-
lated to each other. There is scope for more theoretical research on
the reason why free-riding incentives could be overpowered. Empirical
contributions often suggest that the result could be due to the link-
age of ratification with other forms of cooperation or more simply to
reputational gains. Both factors are not traditionally modelled in the
theoretical literature.
Moreover, the ratification of key nations can single-handedly boost
or hinder participation in environmental agreements. Large nations like
China or India increase the likelihood of ratification because they are
pivotal for the success of environmental agreements. We estimate that
ratification from China increases the hazard of ratification by 43% and
India by 29%. In a similar fashion, ratification by European countries
also increases ratification probabilities (by 38%), although the estimate
is partially pulled up by the strong correlation in the ratifications of
the different European states. In contrast, ratifications by the United
States and Russia have the opposite effect, leading respectively to a
reduction of 51% and 18% in the hazard of ratification. These results
could be explained by the polarising effect that Russia and the United
States have on the choice of other countries. Despite the fall of the
Soviet Union, both countries still have a competing area of influence.
The ratification by one of the two countries highly reduces the ratifica-
tion likelihood by countries in the opposite area of influence, although
the effect of Russia’s ratification is significant only at the 10% level.
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Furthermore, United States’ preponderant diplomatic power could im-
pact the terms of the agreements during the negotiation phase, making
treaties they ratify less appealing to other nations. All in all, our results
bring additional evidence of the strong interdependence in ratifications
and reveals the influence of individual big nations on foreign choices.
We find that ratifications tend to reinforce each other, with a handful
of key nations exerting a particularly strong effect. Our study high-
lights the importance of securing the ratification of key players, indeed
their action alone could potentially kick-start a domino effect.
Treaty characteristics
Hypothesis 5: Regional agreements are more likely to be rati-
fied than global agreements
Regionality is the single most important factor explaining ratification
rates in our model. On average, the ratification hazard of a regional
agreement is 2.37 times greater than the hazard of a global agreement.
This shows that agreements can be a very effective tool to solve regional
environmental issues because they can easily engage small groups of
countries. On the contrary, negotiation of global agreements is more
arduous. Finding a compromise for a large number of nations is a com-
plex task and could end up penalising the participation in the agree-
ment or the abatement levels of the agreement (Perman et al., 2003).
This is is the first time regional agreements are studied contextually to
global treaties. This is made possible by the identification of potential
ratifiers in our data set.
Everything considered, the characteristics of the treaty are respons-
ible for the largest share of the variance in ratification. A hypothetical
average treaty has approximately 45% chances of being eventually rat-
ified. Nevertheless, participation varies widely among treaties. Our
model highlights that treaty characteristics are responsible for a much
larger share of the variance than country factors. Differences among
treaties are the fundamental cause of disparity in ratification rates.
This result is not surprising: the success or failure of a treaty depends
chiefly on the content of the treaty itself, and only secondarily on coun-
try characteristics or strategical interaction. In addition to that, we
also find that, on average, the hazard of ratification peaks around the
third year from the opening to ratifications. Thereafter, the treaties
become less and less likely to be ratified. Hence, earlier years are fun-
damental for the success of environmental agreements. The bimodal
distribution in ratifications means that treaties tend to end up either
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with high or low ratification rates. In this context, the credibility of
the agreement (according to theoretical literature) and the action of
domestic interest groups or foreign countries can play a fundamental
role in tilting the balance and triggering ratifications.
8.1.3 Main contributions
This thesis presents a number of innovative aspects and yields import-
ant contributions to the literature on environmental agreements. First
of all, we assembled a new data set on ratifications. The data regards
only agreements strictly related to the environment. This is the largest
in the literature and the first to include both regional and global agree-
ments. This feature makes it more representative of the population of
treaties. A unique characteristic of our data set is the identification of
the potential ratifiers for every treaty. This allows to correct the identi-
fication bias and consequential overestimation of survival probabilities
in previous works. In the course of our analysis we use a multilevel
survival methodology. This allows us to extract a larger amount of
information from ratification. In fact, it captures information both on
the occurrence and timing of ratifications. Timing is very important in
treaties with a high ratification rate because they have low heterogen-
eity in terms of occurrence. Survival analysis also allows to deal with
right-censoring and eliminates the cut-off problem. While survival ana-
lysis is not a novelty in the empirical ratification literature (e.g. von
Stein 2008, Bernauer et al. 2010, Sauquet 2014), it is the first time
a multilevel strategy is used to account for unobserved heterogeneity
both at the treaty and country level2.
Our unit of analysis is the country-treaty dyad. We track choices
individually and take into account both country and treaty character-
istics. This is an improvement over studies that employ ratification
counts because a great amount of information is lost in the bundling
of treaties or countries (e.g. Recchia 2002, Roberts et al. 2004, Egger
et al. 2011, Davies & Naughton 2014). Unlike studies of single treaties
(e.g. Fredriksson et al. 2007 or Beron et al. 2003), we pool together
a large number of agreements. This strategy permits to generate gen-
eral inferences on ratification determinants. This approach is powerful,
but it introduces a number of challenges: chiefly the treatment of un-
observed heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity is an aspect often
2A cross-classified multilevel survival model is used also in Leinaweaver (2012). How-
ever, the sample of the study is notably smaller, and the results are likely to suffer from
major problems relating to the identification of potential ratifiers in regional agreements.
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overlooked in previous empirical works. In this regard, we use a multi-
level modelling strategy with cross-classified random effects to account
for the structure of the data. This modelling approach allows to deal
with idiosyncratic factors lying at the treaty and country level. We
stress the importance of this approach in modelling treaties because
several treaty characteristics are hard to measure and greatly impact
the probability of ratification (e.g. stringency of the agreement, cost
of participation, preciseness in abatement targets, presence of special
clauses, etc.). As highlighted by the theoretical literature, there is
a substantial incentive to free-ride on stringent agreements (Wangler
et al., 2013). Therefore, it is fundamental to control for unobserved
treaty characteristics in order to obtain unbiased estimates.
Moreover, our study is the first to use MCMC — a Bayesian estim-
ation technique — to estimate the ratification model. We argue that
MCMC is the best suited estimation method for this type of complex
models. Other techniques often fail to converge because of the large
number of observations, the intrinsic low variability in survival data
and the complex structure in random effects. MCMC allows for precise
estimates of the complete marginal distributions and, if desired, allows
to insert prior knowledge through informative priors. The improved
methodological approach, coupled with the larger and more represent-
ative data that for the first time tackles the bias introduced by the
misidentification of potential ratifiers in less-than-global agreements,
consents to generate accurate and general predictions.
Furthermore, we expand the traditional framework of analysis with
an analysis of the implementation stage of treaties. In this respect,
we study five different variables that capture how a country fares in
terms of environmental policies. It is the first time a ratification study
is conducted jointly with the analysis of domestic policies. The results
on domestic polices are obtained with a methodological approach that
controls for unobserved country characteristics. This allows for original
and interesting conclusions on the determinants of international co-
operation and their final impact on environmental commitments. This
framework also led to the identification of a dichotomy in the behaviour
of industrial and environmental pressure groups.
Last but not least, we provide an exhaustive review of all the em-
pirical studies produced on the topic of participation in environmental
agreements. Our hope is that it can inform a more intense dialogue
between the game-theoretical literature on treaty participation and the
empirical literature on the determinants of treaty participation. Des-
pite the proximity of these two areas of research, there is a substantial
lack of communication between the two.
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8.2 Research limitations and future re-
search
Our study develops a framework of analysis that covers both the par-
ticipation and the implementation phase of treaties. However, it has
limitations. First of all, it is hard to establish a direct relationship
between agreements and specific environmental policies enacted do-
mestically. Unfortunately, we are unable to study in what ways ad-
herence to a treaty converts into actual implementation; our best at-
tempt (in chapter 7) was to establish a relationship with the general
level of environmental commitment. The link between ratification and
participation is an element that requires further empirical analysis.
Secondly, it would also be interesting to encompass the negotiation
phase of treaties. The studying of the negotiation phase could contrib-
ute to the understanding of participation and implementation choices.
A complete study of the three phases could provide precious insights
for the development of more realistic game-theoretical models. Unfor-
tunately, data on the negotiation phase is extremely hard to gather.
With regards to data, there is uncertainty surrounding the meas-
urement of some of our key variables. In particular, environmental and
industrial lobbying are two concepts that are hard to quantify and for
which available data is limited and fuzzy. Therefore, we relied on prox-
ies to study the relationship between lobbying and ratification. Even
though we resorted to the best available measures, some of our proxies
have limitations. For example ENGO, one of our main measures for
environmental lobbying, is constant in time. For this reason we also use
alternative time-varying proxies to assess the robustness of our results.
Our study was able to establish the sign of lobbying relationships, but
the uncertainty over the measurement of variables does not allow us to
make exact predictions on the impact of additional “units of lobbying”
on ratification outcomes or the environmental commitment of nations.
Research would greatly benefit from more complete and accurate data
on the activity of interest groups.
Our study is based exclusively on agreements that have taken form.
However, in a number of occasions, negotiation of treaties never take
place or the countries fail to agree on a treaty. In these cases envir-
onmental problems remain unaddressed. Failed cooperation could be
investigated in a more general study of cooperation over transboundary
environmental issues. This type of analysis could improve our under-
standing of when and how treaties are negotiated on a given issue
between certain countries. Several factors could affect the success of
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transboundary cooperation: the characteristics of the environmental
problem, the magnitude of the problem, the quality of relationships
between neighbouring countries, the economic interests linked to the
issue, etc..
Lastly, our model assumes that the ratification of a given treaty is
independent of the ratification of other treaties. In other words, we
ignore the connection that could exist between different environmental
agreements in the moment of ratification. However, there could be
cases in which agreements are directly linked. For example, two agree-
ments could be substitutes because they deal in contrasting ways with
the same issue, hence participation in one of the agreements precludes
participation in the other one. This situation could subsist between
countries that fail to agree on a unified course of action or when com-
peting solutions are offered. A set of agreements could also be linked
in the opposite way, that is to say, having complementary ratifications.
We believe the assumption of independence is reasonable and better de-
scribes the general process of ratification, however there is scope for a
deeper inspection of this assumption. Future research could investigate
the presence and extent of links between agreements.
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Appendix A
Country information
In the following table we list all the countries for which ratification
decisions are tracked in our data set. The time coverage starts in 1950
and ends in 2017. The column “Start” and “End” refer respectively to
the dates in which the countries enter and exit the data set. The year is
reported only in the case the creation of the country is posterior to 1950
or the country undergoes a dissolution process before the end of the
observation period. In a few cases the definitions of the countries have
changed during the observation period, but we decided to maintain the
nation as a single unit. For example, Germany refers to the German
Federal Republic prior to 1991 and to the reunified Germany after 1991.
Details on the changes in definitions are provided in the last column
of the table. Additional information on on the sample can be found in
section 5.2.2.
Table A.1: Country information
Country Start End Region Sub-Region
as defined by
UNSD
Notes and alternative
denominations
Afghanistan Asia Southern Asia
Albania Europe Southern
Europe
Algeria 1962 Africa Northern Africa
250
Country information (continued)
Country Start End Region Sub-Region
as defined by
UNSD
Notes and alternative
denominations
Andorra Europe Southern
Europe
Angola 1975 Africa Middle Africa
Antigua and Barbuda 1981 Americas Caribbean
Argentina Americas South America
Armenia 1991 Asia Western Asia
Australia Oceania Australia and
New Zealand
Austria Europe Western Europe
Azerbaijan 1991 Asia Western Asia
Bahamas 1973 Americas Caribbean
Bahrain 1971 Asia Western Asia
Bangladesh 1971 Asia Southern Asia
Barbados 1966 Americas Caribbean
Belarus 1990 Europe Eastern Europe
Belgium Europe Western Europe
Belize 1981 Americas Central America
Benin 1960 Africa Western Africa Dahomey before 1975
Bhutan Asia Southern Asia
Bolivia Americas South America
Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina
1992 Europe Southern
Europe
Botswana 1966 Africa Southern Africa
Brazil Americas South America
Brunei Darussalam 1984 Asia South-Eastern
Asia
Brunei
Bulgaria Europe Eastern Europe
Burkina Faso 1960 Africa Western Africa Upper Volta until
1984
Burundi 1962 Africa Eastern Africa
Cambodia 1953 Asia South-Eastern
Asia
Khmer Republic
(1970-1975) and
Kampuchea (1975-
1979)
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Country information (continued)
Country Start End Region Sub-Region
as defined by
UNSD
Notes and alternative
denominations
Cameroon 1960 Africa Middle Africa
Canada Americas North America
Cape Verde 1975 Africa Western Africa Cabo Verde
Central African Re-
public
1960 Africa Middle Africa
Chad 1960 Africa Middle Africa
Chile Americas South America
China Asia Eastern Asia PRC acquires UN re-
cognition as China in
1971, until 1971 the
ROC/Taiwan is recog-
nised as China
Colombia Americas South America
Comoros 1975 Africa Eastern Africa
Congo, Democratic
Republic of
1960 Africa Middle Africa Previously Zaire
(1971-1991)
Congo, Republic of
the
1960 Africa Middle Africa Congo-Brazeville
Costa Rica Americas Central America
Cote d’Ivoire 1960 Africa Western Africa Ivory Coast
Croatia 1991 Europe Southern
Europe
Cuba Americas Caribbean
Cyprus 1960 Asia Western Asia
Czech Republic 1993 Europe Eastern Europe Czechia
Czechoslovakia 1993 Europe Eastern Europe
Denmark Europe Northern
Europe
Djibouti 1977 Africa Eastern Africa
Dominica 1978 Americas Caribbean
Dominican Republic Americas Caribbean
Ecuador Americas South America
Egypt 1953 Africa Northern Africa
El Salvador Americas Central America
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Country information (continued)
Country Start End Region Sub-Region
as defined by
UNSD
Notes and alternative
denominations
Equatorial Guinea 1968 Africa Middle Africa
Eritrea 1993 Africa Eastern Africa
Estonia 1991 Europe Northern
Europe
Ethiopia Africa Eastern Africa
Fiji 1970 Oceania Melanesia
Finland Europe Northern
Europe
France Europe Western Europe
Gabon 1960 Africa Middle Africa
Gambia 1965 Africa Western Africa
Germany Europe Western Europe Until 1991 West Ger-
many or German Fed-
eral Republic
Georgia 1991 Asia Western Asia
Ghana 1957 Africa Western Africa
Greece Europe Southern
Europe
Grenada 1974 Americas Caribbean
Guatemala Americas Central America
Guinea 1958 Africa Western Africa
Guinea-Bissau 1973 Africa Western Africa
Guyana 1966 Americas South America
Haiti Americas Caribbean
Holy See Europe Southern
Europe
Honduras Americas Central America
Hungary Europe Eastern Europe
Iceland Europe Northern
Europe
India Asia Southern Asia
Indonesia Asia South-Eastern
Asia
Iran Asia Southern Asia
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Country information (continued)
Country Start End Region Sub-Region
as defined by
UNSD
Notes and alternative
denominations
Iraq Asia Western Asia
Ireland Europe Northern
Europe
Israel Asia Western Asia
Italy Europe Southern
Europe
Jamaica 1962 Americas Caribbean
Japan Asia Eastern Asia
Jordan Asia Western Asia
Kazakhstan 1991 Asia Central Asia
Kenya 1963 Africa Eastern Africa
Kiribati 1979 Oceania Micronesia
Korea, Democratic
People’s Republic
Asia Eastern Asia Also known as North
Korea
Korea, Republic of Asia Eastern Asia Also known as South
Korea
Kosovo 2008 Europe Southern
Europe
Kuwait 1961 Asia Western Asia
Kyrgyzstan 1991 Asia Central Asia
Laos 1953 Asia South-Eastern
Asia
Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic
Latvia 1990 Europe Northern
Europe
Lebanon Asia Western Asia
Lesotho 1966 Africa Southern Africa
Liberia Africa Western Africa
Libya 1951 Africa Northern Africa
Liechtenstein Europe Western Europe
Lithuania 1990 Europe Northern
Europe
Luxembourg Europe Western Europe
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Country information (continued)
Country Start End Region Sub-Region
as defined by
UNSD
Notes and alternative
denominations
Macedonia 1991 Europe Southern
Europe
FYROM (Former
Yougoslavian Repub-
lic of Macedonia),
North Macedonia
since 2019
Madagascar 1960 Africa Eastern Africa Previously Malagasy
republic until 1975
Malawi 1964 Africa Eastern Africa
Malaysia 1957 Asia South-Eastern
Asia
Formerly Malaya until
1963
Maldives 1965 Asia Southern Asia
Mali 1960 Africa Western Africa
Malta 1964 Europe Southern
Europe
Marshall Islands 1986 Oceania Micronesia
Mauritania 1960 Africa Western Africa
Mauritius 1968 Africa Eastern Africa
Mexico Americas Central America
Micronesia 1986 Oceania Micronesia
Moldova 1991 Europe Eastern Europe
Monaco Europe Western Europe
Mongolia Asia Eastern Asia
Montenegro 2006 Europe Southern
Europe
Morocco 1956 Africa Northern Africa
Mozambique 1975 Africa Eastern Africa
Myanmar Asia South-Eastern
Asia
Burma until 1989
Namibia 1990 Africa Southern Africa
Nauru 1968 Oceania Micronesia
Nepal Asia Southern Asia
Netherlands Europe Western Europe
New Zealand Oceania Australia and
New Zealand
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Country information (continued)
Country Start End Region Sub-Region
as defined by
UNSD
Notes and alternative
denominations
Nicaragua Americas Central America
Niger 1960 Africa Western Africa
Nigeria 1960 Africa Western Africa
Norway Europe Northern
Europe
Oman Asia Western Asia Muscat and Oman
Pakistan Asia Southern Asia
Palau 1994 Oceania Micronesia
Panama Americas Central America
Papua New Guinea 1975 Oceania Melanesia
Paraguay Americas South America
Peru Americas South America
Philippines Asia South-Eastern
Asia
Poland Europe Eastern Europe
Portugal Europe Southern
Europe
Qatar 1971 Asia Western Asia
Romania Europe Eastern Europe
Russian Federation 1991 Europe Eastern Europe Russia
Rwanda 1962 Africa Eastern Africa
Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983 Americas Caribbean
Saint Lucia 1979 Americas Caribbean
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
1979 Americas Caribbean
Samoa 1962 Oceania Polynesia
San Marino Europe Southern
Europe
Sao Tome and Prin-
cipe
1975 Africa Middle Africa Sa˜o Tome e Principe
Saudi Arabia Asia Western Asia
Senegal 1960 Africa Western Africa
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Country information (continued)
Country Start End Region Sub-Region
as defined by
UNSD
Notes and alternative
denominations
Serbia 1992 Europe Southern
Europe
Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia until
2003 and Serbia and
Montenegro until
2006
Seychelles 1976 Africa Eastern Africa
Sierra Leone 1961 Africa Western Africa
Singapore 1965 Asia South-Eastern
Asia
Slovakia 1993 Europe Eastern Europe
Slovenia 1991 Europe Southern
Europe
Solomon Islands 1978 Oceania Melanesia
Somalia 1960 Africa Eastern Africa
South Africa Africa Southern Africa
South Sudan 2011 Africa Eastern Africa
Spain Europe Southern
Europe
Sri Lanka Asia Southern Asia Ceylon before 1972
Sudan 1956 Africa Northern Africa
Suriname 1975 Americas South America
Swaziland 1968 Africa Southern Africa
Sweden Europe Northern
Europe
Switzerland Europe Western Europe
Syria Asia Western Asia From 1958 to 1961
united with Egypt in
the United Arab Re-
public
Tajikistan 1991 Asia Central Asia
Tanzania 1961 Africa Eastern Africa Known as Tanganyika
until 1964, when it
merges with Zanzibar
(1963-64)
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Country information (continued)
Country Start End Region Sub-Region
as defined by
UNSD
Notes and alternative
denominations
Thailand Asia South-Eastern
Asia
Timor-Leste 2002 Asia South-Eastern
Asia
Togo 1960 Africa Western Africa Also Togolese Repub-
lic
Tonga 1970 Oceania Polynesia
Trinidad and Tobago 1962 Americas Caribbean
Tunisia 1956 Africa Northern Africa
Turkey Asia Western Asia
Turkmenistan 1991 Asia Central Asia
Tuvalu 1978 Oceania Polynesia
Uganda 1982 Africa Eastern Africa
Ukraine 1991 Europe Eastern Europe
United Arab Emirates 1971 Asia Western Asia
United Kingdom Europe Northern
Europe
United States Americas North America
Uruguay Americas South America
USSR 1991 Europe Eastern Europe Soviet Union
Uzbekistan 1991 Asia Central Asia
Vanuatu 1980 Oceania Melanesia
Venezuela Americas South America
Viet Nam Asia South-Eastern
Asia
Also known as Viet-
nam. North Vietnam
or Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam until
1976
Yemen Asia Western Asia North Yemen or Ye-
men Arab Republic
until 1990
Yugoslavia 1992 Europe Southern
Europe
Zambia 1964 Africa Eastern Africa
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Country information (continued)
Country Start End Region Sub-Region
as defined by
UNSD
Notes and alternative
denominations
Zimbabwe 1980 Africa Eastern Africa
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Appendix B
Treaty information
The following table details the complete sample of treaties included in
our data set. For every treaty we report the signature year, the sec-
retariat of reference, as well as some identifiers for the subject and the
group of treaties (lineage) to which the agreement belongs. Most of
the data derives from Mitchell (2017). The number of ratifiers corres-
ponds to the number of distinct entities that deposited a ratification
or accession document to the treaty. In some cases the count includes
supranational bodies — such as the EU — or states that do not posses
full sovereignty — e.g. Maldives, American Samoa or French Polyne-
sia. Information on the number of ratifiers was gathered in 2017; the
current number of ratifiers may have changed. The last column takes
the value of 0 if it is a global agreement, that is to say a treaty po-
tentially open for ratification to any nation in the world. It takes the
value of 1 if the agreement is “less-than-global”, i.e. regional agree-
ment. The coding criteria for determining regionality are discussed in
section 5.2.2.
260
Treaty information (continued)
Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Table B.1: Treaty information
Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Third ACP-EEC Conven-
tion
ACP-EEC General Sec-
retariat of the
African, Carib-
bean and Pacific
Group of States
Energy,
Habitat,
Land,
Nature
1984 77 1
Fourth ACP-EEC Conven-
tion
ACP-EEC General Sec-
retariat of the
African, Carib-
bean and Pacific
Group of States
Nature 1989 80 1
Convention on the Ban of
the Import into Africa and
the Control of Transbound-
ary Movement and Manage-
ment of Hazardous Wastes
within Africa
African
Hazardous
Wastes
African Union
(formerly Or-
ganisation of
African Unity)
Africa,
bound-
ary, haz-
ardous
waste,
waste
1991 25 1
African Convention on the
Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources
African
Nature
African Union
(formerly Or-
ganisation of
African Unity)
Africa,
conser-
vation,
conser-
vation of
nature,
natural
resources
1968 31 1
African Convention on the
Conservation of Nature
and Natural Resources
(Revised)
African
Nature
African Union
(formerly Or-
ganisation of
African Unity)
Africa,
conser-
vation,
conser-
vation of
nature,
natural
resources
2003 13 1
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Treaty information (continued)
Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Convention Concerning the
Protection of the Alps
Alps Permanent Sec-
retariat for the
Alps Convention
Habitat 1991 9 1
Protocol for the Imple-
mentation of the Alpine
Convention Concerning
Town and Country Plan-
ning and Sustainable
Development, Protocol
for the Implementation
of the Alpine Convention
Concerning Nature Pro-
tection and Landscape
Conservation, Protocol
for the Implementation
of the Alpine Convention
Concerning Mountain
Agriculture
Alps Permanent Sec-
retariat for the
Alps Convention
Habitat,
Nature
1994 7 1
Protocol for the Implement-
ation of the Alpine Conven-
tion Concerning Mountain
Forests
Alps Permanent Sec-
retariat for the
Alps Convention
Habitat,
Species,
Flora
1996 8 1
Protocol for the Implement-
ation of the Alpine Conven-
tion Concerning Tourism
Alps Permanent Sec-
retariat for the
Alps Convention
Habitat 1998 8 1
Protocol for the Implement-
ation of the Alpine Conven-
tion Concerning the Protec-
tion of Soils
Alps Permanent Sec-
retariat for the
Alps Convention
Habitat,
Land
1998 6 1
Treaty for Amazonian Co-
operation
Amazon
Coopera-
tion
Amazon Co-
operation Treaty
Organisation
Habitat 1978 8 1
Protocol of Amendment to
the Treaty for Amazonian
Cooperation
Amazon
Coopera-
tion
Amazon Co-
operation Treaty
Organisation
Habitat 1998 8 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Antarctic Treaty Antarctic Antarctic Treaty
Secretariat
Habitat 1959 56 0
Convention for the Conser-
vation of Antarctic Seals
Antarctic Antarctic Treaty
Secretariat
Habitat,
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Mam-
mals,
Marine,
Fish
1972 16 0
Convention on the Conser-
vation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources
Antarctic Commission for
the Conserva-
tion of Antarctic
Marine Living
Resources
Habitat,
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Ocean
1980 37 0
Convention on the Regula-
tion of Antarctic Mineral
Resource Activities
Antarctic Antarctic Treaty
Secretariat
Habitat,
Envir-
onment,
Nature
1988 0 0
Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic
Treaty
Antarctic Antarctic Treaty
Secretariat
Habitat,
Nature
1991 35 0
Annex V to the Protocol
on Environmental Protec-
tion to the Antarctic Treaty
(area protection and man-
agement) - Acceptance of
Annex V
Antarctic Antarctic Treaty
Secretariat
Habitat,
Nature
1991 17 0
Annex VI to the Protocol
on Environmental Protec-
tion to the Antarctic Treaty
(liability arising from envir-
onmental emergencies)
Antarctic Antarctic Treaty
Secretariat
Habitat,
Nature
2005 13 0
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Agreement on Cooperation
in the Field of Joint Wa-
ter Resources Management
and Conservation of Inter-
state Sources
Aral Sea Interstate Com-
mission for Wa-
ter Coordination
Freshwater,
Nature
1992 5 1
Agreement on Joint Activ-
ities in Addressing the Aral
Sea and the Zone Around
the Sea Crisis, Improving
the Environment, and En-
suring the Social and Eco-
nomic Development of the
Aral Sea Region
Aral Sea International
Fund for Saving
the Aral Sea
Freshwater,
Nature,
Ocean
1993 5 1
Agreement on Cooperation
on Marine Oil Pollution,
Preparedness and Response
in the Arctic
Arctic
Environ-
mental
Protection
Strategy
Arctic Council Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil
2013 8 1
ASEAN Agreement on the
Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources
ASEAN Association
of South-East
Asian Coun-
tries (ASEAN)
Secretariat
Nature 1985 6 1
ASEAN Agreement on
Transboundary Haze Pollu-
tion
ASEAN Association
of South-East
Asian Coun-
tries (ASEAN)
Secretariat
Pollution,
Territory
2002 10 1
Agreement on the Estab-
lishment of the ASEAN
Centre for Biodiversity
ASEAN ASEAN Re-
gional Centre
for Biodiversity
Conservation!
Species 2005 9 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Agreement Between the
Governments of the Mem-
ber States of the Associ-
ation of Southeast Asian
Nations and the Repub-
lic of Korea on Forest
Cooperation
ASEAN Association
of South-East
Asian Coun-
tries (ASEAN)
Secretariat
Habitat,
Nature
2011 9 1
Convention Establishing
the Sustainable Tourism
Zone of the Caribbean
Association
of Carib-
bean
States
Association
of Caribbean
States
Nature,
Region
2001 17 1
Protocol to the Conven-
tion Establishing the Sus-
tainable Tourism Zone of
the Caribbean
Association
of Carib-
bean
States
Association
of Caribbean
States
Nature,
Region
2004 5 1
International Convention
for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas
Atlantic
Tuna
International
Commission for
the Conserva-
tion of Atlantic
Tunas
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Ocean
1966 59 0
Protocol Amending the In-
ternational Convention for
the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas
Atlantic
Tuna
International
Commission for
the Conserva-
tion of Atlantic
Tunas
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Ocean
1984 33 0
Protocol Amending the In-
ternational Convention for
the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas
Atlantic
Tuna
International
Commission for
the Conserva-
tion of Atlantic
Tunas
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Ocean
1992 50 0
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living
Resources in the Baltic Sea
and the Belts
Baltic Sea
Fishing
International
Baltic Sea Fish-
ery Commission
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Ocean,
Region
1973 11 1
Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Marine Environ-
ment of the Baltic Sea Area
Baltic Sea
Marine
Environ-
ment
Helsinki Com-
mission
Nature,
Ocean,
Region
1974 11 1
Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Marine Environ-
ment of the Baltic Sea Area
Baltic Sea
Marine
Environ-
ment
Helsinki Com-
mission
Nature,
Ocean,
Region
1992 10 1
Convention on Biological
Diversity
Biological
Diversity
Secretariat for
the Convention
on Biological
Diversity
Species 1992 195 0
Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety to the Convention
on Biological Diversity
Biological
Diversity
Secretariat for
the Convention
on Biological
Diversity
Species 2000 170 0
Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur
Supplementary Protocol on
Liability and Redress to
the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety to the Convention
on Biological Diversity
Biological
Diversity
Secretariat for
the Convention
on Biological
Diversity
Species 2010 37 0
Nagoya Protocol on Ac-
cess to Genetic Resources
and the Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising
from their Utilisation to
the Convention on Biolo-
gical Diversity
Biological
Diversity
Secretariat for
the Convention
on Biological
Diversity
Species 2010 84 0
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Convention on the Pro-
tection of the Black Sea
Against Pollution Harm-
ful Substances in Emer-
gency Situations, Protocol
on Cooperation in Combat-
ing Pollution of the Black
Sea Marine Environment
by Oil and Other, Pro-
tocol on the Protection of
the Black Sea Marine En-
vironment Against Pollu-
tion by Dumping, Protocol
on the Protection of the
Black Sea Marine Envir-
onment Against Pollution
From Land-Based Sources
Black Sea
Pollution
Commission on
the Protection
of the Black
Sea Against
Pollution
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil
1992 6 1
Black Sea Biodiversity and
Landscape Conservation
Protocol to the Convention
on the Protection of the
Black Sea Against Pollution
Black Sea
Pollution
Commission on
the Protection
of the Black
Sea Against
Pollution
Habitat,
Land,
Nature,
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil,
Species
2002 4 1
Protocol on the Protection
of the Marine Environment
of the Black Sea from Land-
Based Sources and Activit-
ies
Black Sea
Pollution
Commission on
the Protection
of the Black
Sea Against
Pollution
Nature,
Ocean,
Pollution,
Oil
2009 1 1
Agreement Establishing the
Caribbean Community Cli-
mate Change Centre
Caribbean
Com-
munity
Climate
Change
Centre
Caribbean Com-
munity Climate
Change Centre
Pollution,
Air,
Organ-
isation,
Region
2002 8 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Agreement Establishing the
Caribbean Environmental
Health Institute
Caribbean
Environ-
mental
Health
Institute
Caribbean En-
vironmental
Health Institute
Nature,
Region
1980 14 1
Convention for the Protec-
tion and Development of the
Marine Environment of the
Wider Caribbean Region
Caribbean
Marine
Protection
UNEP Carib-
bean Envir-
onment Pro-
gramme
Nature,
Ocean,
Region
1983 25 1
Protocol Concerning Co-
operation in Combating Oil
Spills in the Wider Carib-
bean Region
Caribbean
Marine
Protection
UN EP Carib-
bean Envir-
onment Pro-
gramme
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil,
Region
1983 25 1
Protocol Concerning Spe-
cially Protected Areas and
Wildlife to the Convention
for the Protection and De-
velopment of the Marine
Environment of the Wider
Caribbean Region
Caribbean
Marine
Protection
UNEP Carib-
bean Envir-
onment Pro-
gramme
Habitat,
Nature,
Ocean,
Species,
Region
1990 16 1
Protocol Concerning Pol-
lution From Land-Based
Sources and Activities to
the Convention for the Pro-
tection and Development of
the Marine Environment of
the Wider Caribbean Re-
gion
Caribbean
Marine
Protection
UNEP Carib-
bean Envir-
onment Pro-
gramme
Pollution 1999 10 1
Agreement E stablishing
the Caribbean Regional
Fisheries Mechanism
Caribbean
Regional
Fisheries
Caribbean Re-
gional Fisheries
Mechanism
Secretariat
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Region
2002 11 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Framework Convention on
the Protection and Sustain-
able Development of the
Carpathians
Carpathian
Sustain-
able Devel-
opment
Interim Sec-
retariat of the
Framework
Convention on
the Protection
and Sustainable
Development of
the Carpathians
Nature 2003 7 1
Protocol on Conservation
and Sustainable Use of Bio-
logical and Landscape Di-
versity to the Framework
Convention on the Protec-
tion and Sustainable Devel-
opment of the Carpathians
Carpathian
Sustain-
able Devel-
opment
Interim Sec-
retariat of the
Framework
Convention on
the Protection
and Sustainable
Development of
the Carpathians
Species 2008 7 1
Protocol on Sustainable
Forest Management to the
Framework Convention on
the Protection and Sustain-
able Development of the
Carpathians
Carpathian
Sustain-
able Devel-
opment
Interim Sec-
retariat of the
Framework
Convention on
the Protection
and Sustainable
Development of
the Carpathians
Species,
Flora
2011 6 1
Protocol on Sustainable
Tourism to the Frame-
work Convention on the
Protection and Sustain-
able Development of the
Carpathians
Carpathian
Sustain-
able Devel-
opment
Interim Sec-
retariat of the
Framework
Convention on
the Protection
and Sustainable
Development of
the Carpathians
Nature,
Region
2011 6 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Protocol on Sustainable
Transport to the Frame-
work Convention on the
Protection and Sustain-
able Development of the
Carpathians
Carpathian
Sustain-
able Devel-
opment
Interim Sec-
retariat of the
Framework
Convention on
the Protection
and Sustainable
Development of
the Carpathians
Nature,
Region
2014 3 1
Framework Convention for
the Protection of the Mar-
ine Environment of the
Caspian Sea
Caspian
Sea
Caspian En-
vironment
Programme
Nature,
Ocean,
Region
2003 5 1
Protocol concerning Re-
gional Preparedness, Re-
sponse and Co-Operation
in combating Oil Pollution
Incidents to the Frame-
work Convention on the
Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Caspian
Sea
Caspian
Sea
Caspian En-
vironment
Programme
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil
2011 5 1
Protocol for the Protection
of the Caspian Sea against
Pollution from Land based
Sources and Activities to
the Framework Convention
on the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the
Caspian Sea
Caspian
Sea
Caspian En-
vironment
Programme
Pollution,
Accident,
Ocean,
Region
2012 3 1
Protocol for the Conserva-
tion of Biological Diversity
to the Framework Conven-
tion on the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the
Caspian Sea
Caspian
Sea
Caspian En-
vironment
Programme
Nature,
Ocean
2014 1 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Constitutional Agreement
of the Central American
Commission on Environ-
ment and Development
CCAD Comision
Centroameric-
ana de Ambiente
y Desarrollo
Nature,
Organisa-
tion
1989 6 1
Protocol to the Constitu-
ent Agreement of the Cent-
ral American Commission
on Environment and Devel-
opment
CCAD Comision
Centroameric-
ana de Ambiente
y Desarrollo
Nature,
Organisa-
tion
1991 5 1
Constitutional Agreement
of the Central American
Interparliamentary Com-
mission for Environment
and Development
CCAD Comision
Centroameric-
ana de Ambiente
y Desarrollo
Nature,
Organisa-
tion
1991 2 1
Convention for the Conser-
vation of the Biodiversity
and the Protection of Pri-
ority Wilderness Areas in
Central America
CCAD Comision
Centroameric-
ana de Ambiente
y Desarrollo
Nature,
Species
1992 6 1
Central American Regional
Agreement on the Trans-
boundary Movement of
Hazardous Wastes
CCAD Comision
Centroameric-
ana de Ambiente
y Desarrollo
Pollution,
Wastes,
Territory
1992 6 1
Protocol on cooperation in
natural resources between
member states of the Eco-
nomic Community of Cent-
ral African States
Central
African
States
Economic Com-
munity of
Central African
States
Nature,
Organ-
isation,
Region
1983 10 1
Treaty on the Conserva-
tion and Sustainable Devel-
opment of the Forest Eco-
systems of Central Africa
Central
African
States
Economic Com-
munity of
Central African
States
Nature,
Species,
Flora,
Region
2005 8 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Agreement for Cooperation
and Consultation Between
the Central African States
for the Conservation of
Wild Fauna
Central
African
Wild
Fauna
Organisation
pour la Con-
servation de la
Faune Sauvage
en Afrique Cent-
rale (Conseil de
l’Entente)
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Region
1983 0 1
Regional Convention on Cli-
mate Change
Central
American
Climate
Change
Secretar´ıa Gen-
eral del Sistema
de la Integracion
Centroameric-
ana
Pollution,
Air
1993 7 1
Regional Convention for the
Management and Conserva-
tion of the Natural Forest
Ecosystems and the Devel-
opment of Forest Planta-
tions
Central
American
Conser-
vation
Natural
Forest
Ecosys-
tems
Consejo
Centroamer-
icano de Bosques
y Areas Protegi-
das
Nature,
Species,
Flora
1993 5 1
Agreement on Cooperation
in the Area of Environment
and Rational Nature Use
Central
Asia
Environ-
mental
Coopera-
tion
No Secretariat
established
Nature 1998 3 1
Accord establishing a uni-
form river regime and cre-
ating CICOS
CICOS Commission In-
ternationale du
Bassins Congo-
Oubangui-
Sangha
Freshwater,
Nature
1999 6 1
Protocol to the Accord es-
tablishing a uniform river
regime and creating CICOS
CICOS Commission In-
ternationale du
Bassins Congo-
Oubangui-
Sangha
Freshwater,
Nature,
Pollution,
Air
2007 0 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Agreement on cooperation
in the field of ecology and
environmental protection
CIS Envir-
onmental
Agree-
ments
Secretariat
of the Com-
monwealth of
Independent
States
Nature 1992 11 1
Agreement on Cooperation
in the Field of Prevention of
and Response to Emergen-
cies of Natural and Techno-
logical Disasters
CIS Envir-
onmental
Agree-
ments
Secretariat
of the Com-
monwealth of
Independent
States
Pollution,
Accident
1993 12 1
Agreement on information
cooperation in the area
of ecology and environ-
ment protection and Agree-
ment on cooperation in the
forestry sector and forestry
CIS Envir-
onmental
Agree-
ments
Secretariat
of the Com-
monwealth of
Independent
States
Nature,
Species,
Flora
1998 7 1
Agreement on basic prin-
ciples of mutual activity in
the area of the rational
use and protection of trans-
boundary water bodies
CIS Envir-
onmental
Agree-
ments
Secretariat
of the Com-
monwealth of
Independent
States
Freshwater,
Territory
1998 4 1
Agreement on cooperation
in the area of environmental
monitoring
CIS Envir-
onmental
Agree-
ments
Secretariat
of the Com-
monwealth of
Independent
States
Nature,
Enforce-
ment,
Organisa-
tion
1999 6 1
Agreement on cooperation
in the area of preservation
and use of genetic resources
of cultured plants of mem-
ber states of the CIS
CIS Envir-
onmental
Agree-
ments
Secretariat
of the Com-
monwealth of
Independent
States
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Flora
1999 9 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Agreement on cooperation
in the field of active in-
fluence of meteorological
and other geophysical pro-
cesses (environmental modi-
fication)
CIS Envir-
onmental
Agree-
ments
Secretariat
of the Com-
monwealth of
Independent
States
Pollution,
Air
2001 7 1
Agreement on Interstate hy-
drometeorological network
of the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States
CIS Envir-
onmental
Agree-
ments
Secretariat
of the Com-
monwealth of
Independent
States
Nature 2001 8 1
Agreement on cross-border
cooperation in the field of
research, development and
protection of natural re-
sources
CIS Envir-
onmental
Agree-
ments
Secretariat
of the Com-
monwealth of
Independent
States
Nature 2001 5 1
Agreement on cooperation
in the field of industrial
safety of hazardous produc-
tion facilities
CIS Envir-
onmental
Agree-
ments
Secretariat
of the Com-
monwealth of
Independent
States
Nature 2001 8 1
Agreement on cooperation
in the field of environ-
mental protection among
the member-states of the
Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States
CIS Envir-
onmental
Agree-
ments
Secretariat
of the Com-
monwealth of
Independent
States
Nature 2013 3 1
Protocol amending the
Agreement on cooperation
in the field of ecology and
environmental protection
CIS Envir-
onmental
Agree-
ments
Secretariat
of the Com-
monwealth of
Independent
States
Nature 2002 5 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Protocol amending the
Agreement on cooperation
in the area of environmental
monitoring
CIS Envir-
onmental
Agree-
ments
Secretariat
of the Com-
monwealth of
Independent
States
Nature,
Enforce-
ment,
Organisa-
tion
2005 0 1
Agreement on the Con-
trol of Transboundary
Shipments of Hazard-
ous and Other Wastes
Between States Members
of the Commonwealth of
Independent States
CIS Envir-
onmental
Agree-
ments
Secretariat
of the Com-
monwealth of
Independent
States
Pollution,
Wastes,
Ocean,
Territory
1996 7 1
Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora
CITES CITES Secret-
ariat
Species,
Fauna,
Flora
1973 184 0
Convention on Civil Liab-
ility for Damage Resulting
From Activities Dangerous
to the Environment
Civil Li-
ability
Activities
Dangerous
to the En-
vironment
Council of
Europe
Nature,
Pollution,
General
1993 0 1
International Convention
on Civil Liability for Bunker
Oil Pollution Damage
Civil Li-
ability
Bunker Oil
Pollution
International
Maritime Or-
ganisation
(IMO)
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil,
General
2001 81 0
United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate
Change
Climate
Change
Secretariat of
the UN Conven-
tion of Climate
Change
Pollution,
Air
1992 197 0
Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate
Change
Climate
Change
Secretariat of
the UN Conven-
tion of Climate
Change
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil,
General
1997 181 0
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Paris Agreement under the
United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate
Change
Climate
Change
Secretariat of
the UN Conven-
tion of Climate
Change
Pollution,
Air
2015 125 0
Convention on the Conser-
vation of Migratory Species
of Wild Animals
Conservation
Migratory
Species
UNEP CMS
Secretariat
Nature,
Species,
Fauna
1979 79 0
Agreement on the Conser-
vation of Populations of
European Bats
Conservation
Migratory
Species
Eurobats Secret-
ariat
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Mammals
1991 36 1
Agreement on the Conser-
vation of Small Cetaceans of
the Baltic and North Seas
Conservation
Migratory
Species
ASCOBANS Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Mam-
mals,
Region
1992 10 1
Agreement on the Conser-
vation of African-Eurasian
Migratory Waterbirds
Conservation
Migratory
Species
African-
Eurasian Water-
bird Agreement
Secretariat
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Mam-
mals,
Marine,
Fish
1995 76 1
Agreement on the Conser-
vation of Cetaceans of the
Black Sea, Mediterranean
Sea and Contiguous At-
lantic Area
Conservation
Migratory
Species
ACCOBAMS
Secretariat
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Mam-
mals,
Marine,
Fish,
Ocean,
Region
1996 23 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Agreement on the Conser-
vation of Gorillas and Their
Habitats
Conservation
Migratory
Species
UNEP CMS
Secretariat
Species,
Fauna,
Mammals
1996 7 1
Convention on Cooperation
for Protection and Sustain-
able Use of the Danube
River
Danube International
Commission for
the Protection
of the Danube
Freshwater,
Nature
1994 15 1
Convention Between the
Governments of the Hun-
garian People’s Republic
and the Czechoslovakian
Socialist Republic, the
Executive Council of the
Yugoslav Socialist Federal
Republic, the Governments
of the Romanian Socialist
Republic and of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics on Measures to Combat
Pollution of the Tisza River
and Its Tributaries
Danube International
Commission for
the Protection
of the Danube
Freshwater,
Pollution,
Organisa-
tion
1986 0 1
Convention to Combat
Desertification in Those
Countries Experiencing
Serious Drought and, or
Desertification, Particularly
in Africa
DesertificationSecretariat of
the UN Conven-
tion to Combat
Desertification
Habitat,
Land,
Region
1994 196 0
Amendment Adding Annex
V to the Convention to
Combat Desertification in
Those Countries Experien-
cing Serious Drought and,
or Desertification, Particu-
larly in Africa
DesertificationSecretariat of
the UN Conven-
tion to Combat
Desertification
Habitat,
Land,
Region
2000 199 0
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Convention for the Prohib-
ition of Fishing With Long
Driftnets in the South Pa-
cific
Driftnet
Fishing
South Pacific
Forum Fisheries
Agency
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Ocean,
Region
1986 13 1
Convention on the Preven-
tion of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter
Dumping
of Wastes
and Other
Matter
London Conven-
tion Secretariat
Pollution,
Ocean,
Wastes
1972 7 0
Protocol to the Convention
on the Prevention of Mar-
ine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter
Dumping
of Wastes
and Other
Matter
London Conven-
tion Secretariat
Pollution,
Ocean,
Wastes
1996 46 0
Protocol for Sustainable
Development of Lake Vic-
toria Basin to the Treaty
for the Establishment of the
East African Community
East
African
Com-
munity
East African
Community
Freshwater,
Nature,
Organ-
isation,
Region
2003 3 1
Protocol on Environment
and Natural Resources
Management to the Treaty
for the Establishment of the
East African Community
East
African
Com-
munity
East African
Community
Nature 2006 2 1
Convention for the Protec-
tion, Management and De-
velopment of the Marine
and Coastal Environment of
the Eastern African Region
Eastern
African
Marine
Environ-
ment
UNEP Regional
Coordinating
Unit for the
Eastern African
Action Plan
(EAF, RCU)
Nature,
Ocean,
Region
1985 10 1
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Amended Convention for
the Protection, Manage-
ment and Development of
the Marine and Coastal En-
vironment of the Western
Indian Ocean (formerly the
Eastern African Region)
Eastern
African
Marine
Environ-
ment
UNEP Regional
Coordinating
Unit for the
Eastern African
Action Plan
(EAF, RCU)
Nature,
Ocean,
Region
2010 0 1
Agreement on the Regional
Contingency Plan for Pre-
paredness for and Response
to major Marine Pollution
Incidents in the Western In-
dian Ocean
Eastern
African
Marine
Environ-
ment
UNEP Regional
Coordinating
Unit for the
Eastern African
Action Plan
(EAF, RCU)
Pollution,
Accident,
Ocean,
Region
2011 9 1
Convention on the Prohib-
ition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of En-
vironmental Modification
Techniques
ENMOD United Nations
Department of
Disarmament
Affairs
Nature 1977 80 0
Convention on Environ-
mental Impact Assessment
in A Transboundary Con-
text
Environmental
Impact As-
sessment
UN Economic
Commission
for Europe
(UNECE)
Nature,
Territory
1991 45 1
Protocol on Strategic En-
vironmental Assessment to
the Convention on Environ-
mental Impact Assessment
in a Transboundary Con-
text
Environmental
Impact As-
sessment
UN Economic
Commission
for Europe
(UNECE)
Nature,
Territory
2003 30 1
European Convention for
the Protection of Animals
Kept for Farming Purposes
European
Animals
Farming
Council of
Europe
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Fauna,
Region
1976 33 1
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Protocol of Amendment to
the European Convention
for the Protection of Anim-
als Kept for Farming Pur-
poses
European
Animals
Farming
Council of
Europe
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Fauna,
Region
1992 18 1
European Convention for
the Protection of Animals
for Slaughter
European
Animals
Slaughter
Council of
Europe
Species,
Fauna,
Region
1979 25 1
European Agreement on
the Restriction of the Use
of Certain Detergents in
Washing and Cleaning
Products
European
Detergents
Council of
Europe
Freshwater,
Pollution,
Region
1968 10 1
Protocol Amending the
European Agreement on
the Restriction of the Use
of Certain Detergents in
Washing and Cleaning
Products
European
Detergents
Council of
Europe
Freshwater,
Pollution,
Region
1983 6 1
European Convention for
the Protection of Vertebrate
Animals Used for Experi-
mental and Other Scientific
Purposes
European
Experi-
mental
Animals
Council of
Europe
Species,
Fauna,
Region
1986 22 1
Protocol of Amendment to
the European Convention
for the Protection of Verteb-
rate Animals Used for Ex-
perimental and Other Sci-
entific Purposes
European
Experi-
mental
Animals
Council of
Europe
Species,
Fauna,
Region
1998 19 1
Convention on the
European Forest Insti-
tute
European
Forest
Institute
European Forest
Institute
Species,
Flora,
Organisa-
tion
2003 25 1
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European Landscape Con-
vention
European
Landscape
Council of
Europe
Habitat,
Land,
Region
2000 38 1
Convention for the Estab-
lishment of the European
and Mediterranean Plant
Protection Organisation
European
Plant
Protection
European and
Mediterranean
Plant Protection
Organisation
(EPPO)
Species,
Flora,
Ocean,
Region,
Organisa-
tion
1951 52 1
Convention on the Conser-
vation of European Wildlife
and Natural Habitats
European
Wildlife
Habitat
Council of
Europe Secret-
ariat for the
Bern Conven-
tion
Habitat,
Nature,
Species,
Region
1979 51 1
Agreement on Port State
Measures to Prevent, Deter
and Eliminate Illegal, Un-
reported and Unregulated
Fishing
FAO Un-
regulated
Fisheries
Food and Ag-
riculture Organ-
isation (FAO)
Species,
Fauna,
Fish
2009 36 0
Agreement to Promote
Compliance With Interna-
tional Conservation and
Management Measures by
Fishing Vessels on the High
Seas
Fisheries
Compli-
ance High
Seas
Food and Ag-
riculture Organ-
isation (FAO)
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Fish
1993 40 0
Convention on the Control
of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal
Hazardous
Wastes
Secretariat
of the Basel
Convention
Pollution,
Wastes,
Territory
1989 184 0
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Treaty information (continued)
Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Convention on the Conser-
vation and Management of
the Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks of the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean
Highly
Migrat-
ory Fish
Stocks
Western
Central
Pacific
Western and
Central Pacific
Ocean Fisheries
Commission
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Ocean,
Region
2000 26 1
Agreement Establishing the
Inter-American Institute for
Global Change Research
Inter-
American
Institute
for Global
Change
Research
Organisation of
American States
(OAS)
Nature 1992 19 1
Inter-American Convention
for the Protection and Con-
servation of Sea Turtles
Inter-
American
Turtles
IAC SeaTurtle Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Ocean
1996 15 1
Convention on the Interna-
tional Hydrographic Organ-
isation
International
Hydro-
graphic
Organisa-
tion
International
Hydrographic
Organisation
Ocean,
Organisa-
tion
1967 85 0
Statutes of the Intergov-
ernmental Oceanographic
Commission
International
Oceano-
graphic
Commis-
sion
International
Oceanographic
Commission
Ocean,
Organisa-
tion
1960 148 0
International Plant Protec-
tion Convention
International
Plant Pro-
tection
International
Plant Protec-
tion Convention
Secretariat
Species,
Flora
1951 99 0
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
International Plant Protec-
tion Convention (1979 Re-
vised Text)
International
Plant Pro-
tection
International
Plant Protec-
tion Convention
Secretariat
Species,
Flora
1979 141 0
International Plant Protec-
tion Convention, Regional
South Cone
International
Plant Pro-
tection
South
Cone
South Cone
Plant Protection
Commission
Species,
Flora
1989 7 1
Statute of the International
Renewable Energy Agency
International
Renewable
Energy
Agency
International
Renewable
Energy Agency
Energy 2009 149 0
Agreement establishing the
International Tropical Tim-
ber Bureau
International
Tropical
Timber
International
Tropical Timber
Organisation
Species,
Flora
1977 0 0
International Tropical Tim-
ber Agreement
International
Tropical
Timber
International
Tropical Timber
Organisation
Species,
Flora
1983 53 0
International Tropical Tim-
ber Agreement
International
Tropical
Timber
International
Tropical Timber
Organisation
Species,
Flora
1994 70 0
International Tropical Tim-
ber Agreement
International
Tropical
Timber
International
Tropical Timber
Organisation
Species,
Flora
2006 75 0
Protocol to the Interna-
tional Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling
International
Whaling
International
Whaling Com-
mission
Species,
Fauna,
Mam-
mals,
Marine,
Fish
1956 90 0
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Treaty information (continued)
Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Kuwait Regional Conven-
tion for Cooperation on the
Protection of the Marine
Environment From Pollu-
tion
Kuwait
Marine
Pollution
Regional Organ-
isation for the
Protection of the
Marine Environ-
ment (ROPME)
Nature,
Ocean,
Pollution
1978 8 1
Protocol Concerning
Marine Pollution Res-
ulting From Exploration
and Exploitation of the
Continental Shelf to the
Kuwait Regional Con-
vention for Cooperation
on the Protection of the
Marine Environment From
Pollution
Kuwait
Marine
Pollution
Regional Organ-
isation for the
Protection of the
Marine Environ-
ment (ROPME)
Pollution,
Ocean
1989 8 1
Protocol for the Protec-
tion of the Marine Envir-
onment Against Pollution
From Land-Based Sources
to the Kuwait Regional
Convention for Cooperation
on the Protection of the
Marine Environment From
Pollution
Kuwait
Marine
Pollution
Regional Organ-
isation for the
Protection of the
Marine Environ-
ment (ROPME)
Nature,
Ocean,
Pollution
1990 6 1
Protocol on the Control
of Marine Transboundary
Movements and Disposal
of Hazardous Wastes
and Other Wastes to the
Kuwait Regional Con-
vention for Cooperation
on the Protection of the
Marine Environment From
Pollution
Kuwait
Marine
Pollution
Regional Organ-
isation for the
Protection of the
Marine Environ-
ment (ROPME)
Nature,
Ocean,
Pollution,
Wastes,
Territory
1998 6 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Agreement for the Estab-
lishment on A Permanent
Basis of A Latin-American
Forest Research and Train-
ing Institute
Latin-
American
Forest Re-
search and
Training
Institute
Instituto
Forestal Lat-
inoAmericano
Species,
Flora
1959 18 1
International Convention
on Liability and Com-
pensation for Damage
in Connection With the
Carriage of Hazardous and
Noxious Substances by Sea
Liability
Com-
pensation
Hazard-
ous and
Noxious
Substances
International
Maritime Or-
ganisation
(IMO)
Pollution,
General
1996 14 0
Protocol to the Interna-
tional Convention on Li-
ability and Compensation
for Damage in Connection
With the Carriage of Haz-
ardous and Noxious Sub-
stances by Sea
Liability
Com-
pensation
Hazard-
ous and
Noxious
Substances
International
Maritime Or-
ganisation
(IMO)
Pollution,
General
2010 1 0
Convention on the Conser-
vation of the Living Re-
sources of the Southeast At-
lantic
Living Re-
sources of
Southeast
Atlantic
International
Commission for
the Southeast
Atlantic Fisher-
ies (ICSEAF)
Nature 1969 17 0
Protocol Modifying the In-
ternational Convention for
the Permanent Control of
Outbreak Areas of the Red
Locust
Locusts International
Red Locust
Control Or-
ganisation for
Central and
Southern Africa
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Flora
1953 4 1
Convention for the Estab-
lishment of the Desert Lo-
cust Control Organisation
for Eastern Africa
Locusts Desert Locust
Control Or-
ganisation for
Eastern Africa
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Flora
1962 9 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Convention on the African
Migratory Locust
Locusts International
Red Locust
Control Or-
ganisation for
Central and
Southern Africa
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Flora,
Organ-
isation,
Region
1962 8 1
Agreement for the Estab-
lishment of A Commission
for Controlling the Desert
Locust in the Near East
(Central Region)
Locusts Commission for
Controlling the
Desert Locust in
the Central Re-
gion (formerly
Near East)
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Flora,
Organisa-
tion
1965 16 1
Agreement for the Estab-
lishment of A Commission
for Controlling the Desert
Locust in Northwest Africa
Locusts Commission for
Controlling the
Desert Locust
in Northwest
Africa
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Flora,
Organ-
isation,
Region
1970 5 1
Agreement for the Estab-
lishment of A Commission
for Controlling the Desert
Locust in the Western Re-
gion
Locusts Food and Ag-
riculture Organ-
isation (FAO)
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Flora,
Organisa-
tion
2000 10 1
Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion
LRTAP LRTAP Secret-
ariat of UNECE
Pollution,
Air,
Territory
1979 55 1
Protocol on the Reduc-
tion of Sulphur Emissions
or Their Transboundary
Fluxes by At Least 30 Per
Cent to the Convention on
Long-Range Transbound-
ary Air Pollution
LRTAP LRTAP Secret-
ariat of UNECE
Pollution,
Air,
Territory
1985 55 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Protocol Concerning the
Control of Emissions of
Nitrogen Oxides or Their
Transboundary Fluxes to
the Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air
Pollution
LRTAP LRTAP Secret-
ariat of UNECE
Pollution,
Air,
Territory
1988 56 1
Protocol Concerning the
Control of Emissions of
Volatile Organic Com-
pounds or Their Trans-
boundary Fluxes to the
Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion
LRTAP LRTAP Secret-
ariat of UNECE
Pollution,
Air,
Territory
1991 24 1
Protocol on Further Reduc-
tion of Sulphur Emissions
to the Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air
Pollution
LRTAP LRTAP Secret-
ariat of UNECE
Pollution,
Air,
Territory
1994 29 1
Protocol on Heavy Metals
to the Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air
Pollution
LRTAP LRTAP Secret-
ariat of UNECE
Pollution,
Air,
Territory
1998 32 1
Protocol on Persistent Or-
ganic Pollutants to the
Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion
LRTAP LRTAP Secret-
ariat of UNECE
Pollution,
Air,
Territory
1998 32 1
Protocol to Abate Acidific-
ation, Eutrophication and
Ground-Level Ozone to the
Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion
LRTAP LRTAP Secret-
ariat of UNECE
Freshwater,
Pollution,
Air,
Territory
1999 26 1
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Treaty information (continued)
Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Convention for Cooperation
in the Protection and Devel-
opment of the Marine and
Coastal Environment of the
West and Central African
Region
Marine
Environ-
ment West
Central
Africa
Regional Co-
ordinating
Unit for West
and Central
African Action
Plan (WACAF,
RCU)
Nature,
Ocean,
Region
1981 18 1
Protocol Concerning Co-
operation in Combating
Pollution in Cases of
Emergency
Marine
Environ-
ment West
Central
Africa
Regional Co-
ordinating
Unit for West
and Central
African Action
Plan (WACAF,
RCU)
Pollution,
accident
1981 13 1
Additional Protocol to the
Abidjan Convention Con-
cerning Cooperation in the
Protection and Develop-
ment of Marine and Coastal
Environment from Land-
Based Sources and Activit-
ies in the Western, Central,
and Southern African Re-
gion
Marine
Environ-
ment West
Central
Africa
Regional Co-
ordinating
Unit for West
and Central
African Action
Plan (WACAF,
RCU)
Pollution,
accident
2012 2 1
International Convention
for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil
MARPOL International
Maritime Or-
ganisation
(IMO)
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil
1954 75 0
International Conven-
tion for the Prevention
of Pollution From Ships
(MARPOL)
MARPOL International
Maritime Or-
ganisation
(IMO)
Pollution,
Ocean
1973 32 0
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Protocol to the Interna-
tional Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution
From Ships - Protocol and
Annexes I and II
MARPOL International
Maritime Or-
ganisation
(IMO)
Pollution,
Ocean
1978 152 0
Protocol Adopting Annex
VI - Regulations for the
Prevention of Air Pollu-
tion From Ships to the In-
ternational Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution
From Ships
MARPOL International
Maritime Or-
ganisation
(IMO)
Pollution,
Air,
Ocean
1997 87 0
International Convention
on the Control of Harmful
Anti-Fouling Systems on
Ships
MARPOL International
Maritime Or-
ganisation
(IMO)
Pollution,
Ocean
2001 73 0
International Convention
for the Control and Man-
agement of Ships’ Ballast
Water and Sediments
MARPOL International
Maritime Or-
ganisation
(IMO)
Pollution,
Fresh-
water,
Ocean
2004 52 0
International Convention
for the Safe and Environ-
mentally Sound Recycling
of Ships
MARPOL International
Maritime Or-
ganisation
(IMO)
Pollution,
Ocean,
Wastes
2009 5 0
Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Mediterranean
Sea Against Pollution
MedPlan UNEP Mediter-
ranean Action
Plan
Pollution,
Ocean,
Region
1976 23 1
Protocol for the Preven-
tion and Elimination of
Pollution of the Mediter-
ranean Sea by Dumping
From Ships and Aircraft
MedPlan UNEP Mediter-
ranean Action
Plan
Pollution,
Ocean,
Region
1976 23 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Protocol Concerning Co-
operation in Combating
Pollution of the Mediter-
ranean Sea by Oil and
Other Harmful Substances
in Cases of Emergency
MedPlan UNEP Mediter-
ranean Action
Plan
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil,
Wastes,
Accident,
Region
1976 23 1
Protocol for the Protec-
tion of the Mediterranean
Sea Against Pollution From
Land-Based Sources
MedPlan UNEP Mediter-
ranean Action
Plan
Pollution,
Ocean,
Region
1980 23 1
Protocol Concerning Medi-
terranean Specially Protec-
ted Areas
MedPlan UNEP Mediter-
ranean Action
Plan
Habitat,
Ocean,
Region
1982 21 1
Protocol for the Protection
of the Mediterranean Sea
Against Pollution Resulting
From Exploration and Ex-
ploitation of the Contin-
ental Shelf and the Seabed
and Its Subsoil
MedPlan UNEP Mediter-
ranean Action
Plan
Pollution,
Ocean,
Region
1994 6 1
Protocol Concerning Spe-
cially Protected Areas and
Biological Diversity in the
Mediterranean
MedPlan UNEP Mediter-
ranean Action
Plan
Habitat,
Species,
Ocean,
Region
1995 18 1
Protocol on the Prevention
of Pollution of the Mediter-
ranean Sea by Transbound-
ary Movements of Hazard-
ous Wastes and Their Dis-
posal
MedPlan UNEP Mediter-
ranean Action
Plan
Pollution,
Wastes,
Ocean,
Region,
Territory
1996 7 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Protocol Concerning Co-
operation in Preventing
Pollution From Ships and,
in Cases of Emergency,
Combating Pollution of the
Mediterranean Sea
MedPlan UNEP Mediter-
ranean Action
Plan
Pollution,
Ocean,
Accident,
Region
2002 15 1
Protocol on Integrated
Coastal Zone Management
in the Mediterranean
MedPlan UNEP Mediter-
ranean Action
Plan
Pollution,
Wastes,
Ocean,
Region,
Territory
2008 9 1
Minamata Convention on
Mercury
Mercury Minamata Mer-
cury Secretariat
Nature 2013 72 0
Convention for the Conser-
vation of Salmon in the
North Atlantic Ocean
NASCO North At-
lantic Salmon
Conservation
Organisation
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Ocean
1982 10 1
Protocol Open for Signa-
ture by States not Parties to
the Convention for the Con-
servation of Salmon in the
North Atlantic Ocean
NASCO North At-
lantic Salmon
Conservation
Organisation
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Ocean
1992 0 1
Agreement on the Estab-
lishment of the Near East
Plant Protection Organisa-
tion
Near East
Plant Pro-
tection
Near East Plant
Protection
Organisation
Species,
Flora,
Organisa-
tion
1993 12 1
International Convention
for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants
New Vari-
eties of
Plants
International
Union for the
Protection of
New Varieties of
Plants (UPOV)
Species,
Flora
1961 8 0
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Convention on the Law
of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International
Watercourses
Non-
Navigational
Uses of In-
ternational
Water-
courses
United Nations
International
Law Commis-
sion
Freshwater,
Pollution,
Nature
1997 35 0
Convention for A North Pa-
cific Marine Science Organ-
isation
North
Pacific
Marine
Science
Organisa-
tion
North Pacific
Marine Science
Organisation
Ocean,
Organisa-
tion
1990 6 1
Agreement for Cooperation
in Dealing With Pollution of
the North Sea by Oil
North Sea
Oil
Bonn Agreement
Secretariat
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil
1969 8 1
Agreement for Cooperation
in Dealing With Pollution of
the North Sea by Oil and
Other Harmful Substances
North Sea
Oil
Bonn Agreement
Secretariat
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil,
Wastes
1983 10 1
Convention on the Conduct
of Fishing Operations in the
North Atlantic
North Seas
Fishery
Species,
Fauna,
Fish
1967 16 1
Convention for Cooperation
in the Protection and Sus-
tainable Development of the
Marine and Coastal Envir-
onment of the Northeast
Pacific
Northeast
Pacific
Marine
Environ-
ment Sus-
tainable
Develop-
ment
Central Amer-
ican Com-
mission for
Maritime Trans-
portation
Nature,
Ocean
2002 2 1
International Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage
Oil Pollu-
tion Civil
Liability
IOPC Funds
Secretariat
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil,
General
1969 104 0
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Protocol to the Interna-
tional Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage
Oil Pollu-
tion Civil
Liability
IOPC Funds
Secretariat
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil,
General
1976 59 0
Protocol to Amend the In-
ternational Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion Damage
Oil Pollu-
tion Civil
Liability
IOPC Funds
Secretariat
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil,
General
1984 10 0
Protocol to Amend the In-
ternational Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion Damage
Oil Pollu-
tion Civil
Liability
IOPC Funds
Secretariat
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil,
General
1992 136 0
International Convention
on the Establishment of
An International Fund
for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage
Oil Pollu-
tion Fund
IOPC Funds
Secretariat
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil
1971 72 0
Protocol to Amend the In-
ternational Convention on
the Establishment of An In-
ternational Fund for Com-
pensation for Oil Pollution
Damage (replacing the 1971
Convention)
Oil Pollu-
tion Fund
IOPC Funds
Secretariat
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil
1992 113 0
Protocol to Amend the
1992 International Conven-
tion on the Establishment
of An International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollu-
tion Damage
Oil Pollu-
tion Fund
IOPC Funds
Secret
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil
2003 31 0
International Convention
Relating to Intervention on
the High Seas in Cases of
Oil Pollution Casualties
Oil Pollu-
tion Inter-
vention
International
Maritime Or-
ganisation
(IMO)
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil
1969 88 0
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Protocol Relating to Inter-
vention on the High Seas in
Cases of Pollution by Sub-
stances Other Than Oil
Oil Pollu-
tion Inter-
vention
International
Maritime Or-
ganisation
(IMO)
Pollution 1973 57 0
Cooperation Agreement for
the Protection of the Coasts
and Waters of the North-
East Atlantic Against Pol-
lution
Oil Pol-
lution
Northeast
Atlantic
Centro Inter-
nacional de
Luta contra
a Poluic¸a˜o
mar´ıtima
no Atlaˆntico
Nordeste (In-
ternational
Center for pol-
lution combat
in the Northeast
Atlantic)
Pollution,
Freshwa-
ter
1990 4 1
Additional Protocol to the
Cooperation Agreement for
the Protection of the Coasts
and Waters of the North-
East Atlantic Against Pol-
lution
Oil Pol-
lution
Northeast
Atlantic
Centro Inter-
nacional de
Luta contra
a Poluic¸a˜o
mar´ıtima
no Atlaˆntico
Nordeste (In-
ternational
Center for pol-
lution combat
in the Northeast
Atlantic)
Pollution,
Freshwa-
ter
2008 5 1
International Convention
on Oil Pollution Pre-
paredness, Response and
Cooperation
Oil Pol-
lution
Prepared-
ness
International
Maritime Or-
ganisation
(IMO)
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil
1990 107 0
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Protocol on Preparedness,
Response and Cooperation
to Pollution Incidents by
Hazardous and Noxious
Substances
Oil Pol-
lution
Prepared-
ness
International
Maritime Or-
ganisation
(IMO)
Pollution 2000 37 0
Convention on Civil Liabil-
ity for Oil Pollution Dam-
age Resulting From Ex-
ploration for and Exploita-
tion of Seabed Mineral Re-
sources
Oil Pol-
lution
Seabed
Minerals
Depositary:
UKFCO
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil,
Envir-
onment,
Nature,
General
1977 0 1
Convention for the Preven-
tion of Marine Pollution by
Dumping From Ships and
Aircraft
Oslo-Paris
Marine
Pollution
Joint Secretariat
of PARCOM
and OSCOM
Pollution,
Ocean
1972 13 1
Convention on the Preven-
tion of Marine Pollution
From Land-Based Sources
Oslo-Paris
Marine
Pollution
Joint Secretariat
of PARCOM
and OSCOM
Pollution,
Ocean
1974 12 1
Protocol Amending the
Convention for the Preven-
tion of Marine Pollution by
Dumping From Ships and
Aircraft
Oslo-Paris
Marine
Pollution
Joint Secretariat
of PARCOM
and OSCOM
Pollution,
Ocean
1983 10 1
Protocol to the Convention
on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution From Land-Based
Sources
Oslo-Paris
Marine
Pollution
Joint Secretariat
of PARCOM
and OSCOM
Pollution,
Ocean
1986 13 1
Protocol Amending the
Convention for the Preven-
tion of Marine Pollution by
Dumping From Ships and
Aircraft
Oslo-Paris
Marine
Pollution
Joint Secretariat
of PARCOM
and OSCOM
Pollution,
Ocean
1989 11 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Marine Environ-
ment of the North East At-
lantic
Oslo-Paris
Marine
Pollution
Joint Secretariat
of PARCOM
and OSCOM
Nature,
Ocean
1992 16 1
Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Ozone Layer
Ozone
Protection
Ozone Secret-
ariat
Pollution,
Air
1985 190 0
Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances That Deplete the
Ozone Layer
Ozone
Protection
Ozone Secret-
ariat
Pollution,
Air
1987 197 0
Plant Protection Agree-
ment for the Asia and
Pacific Region
Pacific
Plant
Protection
Asia and Pacific
Plant Protection
Commission
Species,
Flora,
Region
1956 23 1
Agreement on the Organisa-
tion of the Permanent Com-
mission of the Conference
on the Exploitation and
Conservation of the Mari-
time Resources of the South
Pacific
Permanent
Commis-
sion South
Pacific
Permanent
Commission
of the South
Pacific
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Ocean,
Organ-
isation,
Region
1952 4 1
Agreement Relating to the
Issue of Permits for the Ex-
ploitation of the Maritime
Resources of the South Pa-
cific
Permanent
Commis-
sion South
Pacific
Permanent
Commission
of the South
Pacific
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Ocean,
Region
1954 3 1
Agreement Relating to Reg-
ulations Governing Whal-
ing in the Waters of the
South Pacific Under the
Permanent Commission of
the South Pacific
Permanent
Commis-
sion South
Pacific
Permanent
Commission
of the South
Pacific
Species,
Fauna,
Mam-
mals,
Marine,
Fish,
Fresh-
water,
Region
1954 1 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Marine Environ-
ment and Coastal Area of
the Southeast Pacific
Permanent
Commis-
sion South
Pacific
Permanent
Commission
of the South
Pacific
Nature,
Ocean
1981 5 1
Protocol for the Protec-
tion of the Southeast Pa-
cific Against Pollution From
Land-Based Sources
Permanent
Commis-
sion South
Pacific
Permanent
Commission
of the South
Pacific
Pollution 1983 5 1
Protocol for the Conserva-
tion and Management of
the Protected Marine and
Coastal Areas of the South-
east Pacific
Permanent
Commis-
sion South
Pacific
Permanent
Commission
of the South
Pacific
Nature,
Ocean
1989 5 1
Framework Agreement for
the Conservation of the Liv-
ing Marine Resources of the
High Seas of the Southeast
Pacific
Permanent
Commis-
sion South
Pacific
Permanent
Commission
of the South
Pacific
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Ocean,
Region
2000 3 1
Protocol Amending the
Framework Agreement for
the Conservation of the
Living Marine Resources of
the High Seas of the South
Pacific
Permanent
Commis-
sion South
Pacific
Permanent
Commission
of the South
Pacific
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Fish,
Ocean,
Region
2003 2 1
Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants
Persistent
Organic
Pollutants
UNEP Chemic-
als
Pollution 2001 167 0
Phytosanitary Convention
for Africa South of the
Sahara
Phytosanitary
South of
Sahara
InterAfrican
Phytosanitary
Council
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Flora,
Region
1954 26 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Phytosanitary Convention
for Africa
Phytosanitary
South of
Sahara
InterAfrican
Phytosanitary
Council
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Flora,
Region
1967 10 1
Agreement on the Estab-
lishment of the Interna-
tional Plant Genetic Re-
sources Institute
Plant
Genetic
Resources
Commission
on Genetic Re-
sources for Food
and Agriculture
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Flora
1991 11 0
International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture
Plant
Genetic
Resources
Commission
on Genetic Re-
sources for Food
and Agriculture
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Flora
2001 139 0
Agreement on Conservation
of Polar Bears
Polar Bear Norwegian Min-
istry for the En-
vironment
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Mammals
1973 5 1
Convention Placing the In-
ternational Poplar Commis-
sion Within the Framework
of the Food and Agriculture
Organisation of the United
Nations
Poplar
Commis-
sion in
FAO
Food and Ag-
riculture Organ-
isation (FAO)
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Flora,
Organisa-
tion
1959 38 0
Convention Concerning the
Prevention of Major Indus-
trial Accidents
Preventing
Major
Industrial
Accidents
International
Labour Organ-
isation (ILO)
Pollution,
Accident
1993 18 0
Convention on the Prior
Informed Consent Proced-
ure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in
International Trade
Prior In-
formed
Consent
Chemic-
als and
Pesticides
Prior Informed
Consent Interim
Secretariat
Pollution 1998 154 0
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
International Convention
for the Protection of Birds
Protection
of Birds
United Nations Species,
Fauna,
Bird
1950 16 1
Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Environment
Through Criminal Law
Protection
of the En-
vironment
Through
Criminal
Law
Council of
Europe
Nature 1998 1 1
Convention on the Protec-
tion and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and
International Lakes
Protection
Trans-
boundary
Water-
courses
UN Economic
Commission
for Europe
(UNECE)
Freshwater,
Pollution,
Territory
1992 41 1
Protocol on Water and
Health to the Convention
on the Protection and Use
of Transboundary Water-
courses and International
Lakes
Protection
Trans-
boundary
Water-
courses
UN Economic
Commission
for Europe
(UNECE)
Freshwater,
Pollution,
Territory
1999 26 1
Convention on Access to In-
formation, Public Participa-
tion in Decision-Making and
Access to Justice in Envir-
onmental Matters
Public
Particip-
ation and
Justice
in Envir-
onmental
Matters
UN Economic
Commission
for Europe
(UNECE)
Nature 1998 47 1
Protocol on Pollutant Re-
lease and Transfer Registers
to the Convention on Ac-
cess to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to
Justice in Environmental
Matters
Public
Particip-
ation and
Justice
in Envir-
onmental
Matters
UN Economic
Commission
for Europe
(UNECE)
Nature,
Pollution
2003 32 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Regional Convention for the
Conservation of the Red Sea
and Gulf of Aden Environ-
ment
Red Sea
Environ-
ment
UNEP Regional
Organisation
for the Conser-
vation of the
Environment of
the Red Sea and
Gulf of Aden
(PERGSA)
Nature,
Ocean
1982 8 1
Protocol Concerning Re-
gional Cooperation in Com-
bating Pollution by Oil and
Other Harmful Substances
in Cases of Emergency
Red Sea
Environ-
ment
UNEP Regional
Organisation
for the Conser-
vation of the
Environment of
the Red Sea and
Gulf of Aden
(PERGSA)
Pollution,
Ocean,
Oil,
Wastes,
Accident
1982 7 1
Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Rhine Against
Pollution by Chlorides
Rhine Pol-
lution
International
Commission for
the Protection
of the Rhine
Freshwater,
Pollution
1976 5 1
Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Rhine Against
Chemical Pollution
Rhine Pol-
lution
International
Commission for
the Protection
of the Rhine
Freshwater,
Pollution
1976 6 1
Protocol Additional to the
Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Rhine From Pol-
lution by Chlorides
Rhine Pol-
lution
International
Commission for
the Protection
of the Rhine
Freshwater,
Pollution
1991 7 1
Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Rhine
Rhine Pol-
lution
International
Commission for
the Protection
of the Rhine
Freshwater,
Pollution
1999 6 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Convention Establishing
A Permanent Inter-State
Drought Control Commit-
tee for the Sahel
Sahel
Drought
Control
Permanent
Interstate Com-
mittee for
Drought Control
in the Sahel
Habitat,
Land,
Organisa-
tion
1973 6 1
Revised Convention of
the Permanent Inter-State
Drought Control Commit-
tee for the Sahel
Sahel
Drought
Control
Permanent
Interstate Com-
mittee for
Drought Control
in the Sahel
Habitat,
Land,
Organisa-
tion
1994 6 1
Articles of Association of
the South Asia Cooperative
Environment Programme
South
Asia Co-
operative
Environ-
ment Pro-
gramme
South Asia
Cooperative
Environment
Programme
(SACEP)
Nature,
Organ-
isation,
Region
1981 8 1
Convention to Ban the Im-
portation into the Forum Is-
land Countries of Hazard-
ous and Radioactive Wastes
and to Control the Trans-
boundary Movement and
Management of Hazardous
Wastes Within the South
Pacific Region
South
Pacific
Hazardous
Wastes
South Pa-
cific Regional
Environment
Program
Energy,
Nuclear,
Pollution,
Wastes,
Region,
Territory
1995 12 1
Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Natural Re-
sources and Environment of
the South Pacific Region
South
Pacific
Natural
Environ-
ment
South Pa-
cific Regional
Environment
Program
Nature,
Region
1986 12 1
Protocol for the Prevention
of Pollution of the South
Pacific Region by Dumping
South
Pacific
Natural
Environ-
ment
South Pa-
cific Regional
Environment
Program
Pollution,
Region
1986 11 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Protocol Concerning Co-
operation in Combating
Pollution Emergencies in
the South Pacific Region
South
Pacific
Natural
Environ-
ment
South Pa-
cific Regional
Environment
Program
Pollution,
Region
1986 12 1
Convention on Conserva-
tion of Nature in the South
Pacific
South
Pacific
Nature
South Pa-
cific Regional
Environment
Program
Nature,
Region
1976 5 1
Agreement Establishing the
South Pacific Regional En-
vironment Programme
South
Pacific
Regional
Environ-
ment Pro-
gramme
South Pa-
cific Regional
Environment
Program
Nature,
Region
1993 19 1
Protocol on Wildlife Con-
servation and Law Enforce-
ment to the Treaty of the
Southern African Develop-
ment Community
Southern
African
Devel-
opment
Com-
munity
Southern
African De-
velopment
Community
Nature,
Species,
Enforce-
ment,
Organ-
isation,
Region
1993 10 1
Protocol on Forestry to
the Treaty of the Southern
African Development Com-
munity
Southern
African
Devel-
opment
Com-
munity
Southern
African De-
velopment
Community
Species,
Flora,
Organ-
isation,
Region
2002 10 1
Convention on the Trans-
boundary Effects of Indus-
trial Accidents
Transboundary
Effects of
Industrial
Accidents
UN Economic
Commission
for Europe
(UNECE)
Pollution,
Accident,
Territory
1992 41 1
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Name Lineage Secretariat Subject Year Ratifiers Regional
Convention for the Conser-
vation of Vicuna
Vicun˜a
Manage-
ment
Comision
Tecnico-
Administradora
del Convenio de
la Vicun˜a
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Mammals
1969 3 1
Convention for the Conser-
vation and Management of
the Vicuna
Vicun˜a
Manage-
ment
Comision
Tecnico-
Administradora
del Convenio de
la Vicun˜a
Nature,
Species,
Fauna,
Mammals
1979 3 1
Convention on Wetlands
of International Importance
Especially As Waterfowl
Habitat
Wetlands Ramsar Conven-
tion Bureau
Habitat,
Land,
Species,
Fauna,
Bird,
Freshwa-
ter
1971 170 0
Convention for the Protec-
tion of the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage
World Her-
itage
UNESCO World
Heritage Center
Nature,
Culture
1972 192 0
World Trade Organisation
Agreement on the Ap-
plication of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures
World
Trade Or-
ganisation
WTO Phytosan-
itary Secretariat
Species,
Agri-
culture,
Flora,
Region
1994 164 0
Agreement on the Action
Plan for the Environment-
ally Sound Management of
the Common Zambezi River
System
Zambezi
Water-
course
Commis-
sion
Southern
African De-
velopment
Community
Freshwater,
Nature
1987 5 1
Agreement on the Estab-
lishment of the Zambezi
Watercourse Commission
Zambezi
Water-
course
Commis-
sion
Zambezi Water-
course Commis-
sion
Freshwater,
Nature
2004 7 1
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Appendix C
Codebook
The table includes a complete list the of variables used in the disser-
tation. The entries are sorted in alphabetical orders, for each variable
the definition and source are provided.
Table C.1: Definitions and sources
Variables Definitions and sources
AgricultureReliance Value added by agriculture, forestry and fishing as a share of GDP.
Data from WDI (World Bank, 2017a).
AnnexI Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the country is in the Annex I
of the UNFCCC (1992).
BiodiversityProtect Proportion of the important sites for biodiversity that are covered
by protected area status. Data from the Goal 15.1 of the SDG (UN,
2017)
Corruption Corruption score from the International Country Risk Guide (Polit-
ical Risk Service, 2011).
EnergyDepletion “Energy Depletion” variable from WDI dataset (World Bank,
2017a). Calculated as the “ratio of the value of the stock of energy
resources to the remaining reserve lifetime (capped at 25 years)”.
The resources taken into consideration are coal, crude oil, and nat-
ural gas.
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Definitions and sources (continued)
Variables Definitions and sources
∆EnergyMix Percentage point variation in the electricity production from re-
newable sources. The energy sources taken into account are geo-
thermal, solar, tides, wind, biomass, and biofuels. International
Energy Agency (IEA, 2017).
EnergyUse Energy use per capita, in kg of oil equivalent. Data from the Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA, 2017).
EnvConcern Percentage of population that reports being concerned about cli-
mate change. Data from Tien et al. (2015) based on a survey con-
ducted in 2007-2008 that covers 119 countries, with 500 to 8000
respondents per country.
EnvInnovation Relative advantage in environment-related technologies. A value of
1 indicates that the country develops environmental technologies as
much as the average world invention rate. OECD (2017b).
EnvPolicyScore Score attributed to the sustainability of policies. The score ranges
from 1 to 6, with 6 indicating higher levels of importance attrib-
uted to sustainability. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
(CPIA) database (International Development Association, 2017)
ENGO Number of ENGOs memberships to the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature by country in 2017. We assume a constant
value over the entire time period. Data from IUCN website.
ENGO.Institutions Interaction term between ENGO and Institutions
Export Total exports of goods and services, measured as share of GDP.
Data from WDI (World Bank, 2017a).
FossilExports Export of fossil fuels, ores and metals over the total value of the
merchandise export. Data from WDI (World Bank, 2017a).
FossilSupport Government support to fossil fuels (consumption and production)
in percentage of tax revenues. “Total fossil support” in OECD
Green Growth Indicators dataset (OECD, 2017a).
FrameworkAgreement Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the agreement is a
framework agreement (typically with non-binding obligations) ac-
cording to classification from Mitchell (2017).
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Definitions and sources (continued)
Variables Definitions and sources
FrameworkAgreement Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the agreement is a
framework agreement (typically with non-binding obligations) ac-
cording to classification from Mitchell (2017).
FreedomHouseCL Freedom House index of civil liberties. On a scale from 1 to 7,
where a lower score indicates greater freedom. Data from Freedom
House (2017).
FreedomHousePR Freedom House index of political rights. On a scale from 1 to
7, where a lower score indicates stronger rights. Freedom House
(2017).
GreenParty Share of votes received by the national green party at last elec-
tions of the lower house. Own elaboration from data of the Global
Election Database (Brancati, 2017). The database contains data
for 57 countries. We consider environmental parties all political
parties or coalition of parties that contain one of the following
words in their name: Green (224), forest (3), climate (0), sustain-
able (1), earth (8), ecology/ecological (156), nature (14) or envir-
onment/environmental/environmentalist (25). In total we selected
381 parties and coalitions.
IMFresourcerich Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country is on the
IMF list of resource rich countries (IMF, 2012). The IMF identifies
resource-rich countries mainly on the basis of their reliance on the
export of natural resources.
Institutions Control of Corruption indicator from the World Governance In-
dicators (World Bank, 2017b). Expressed in units of a standard
normal distribution.
Institutions2 Government effectiveness indicator from the World Governance In-
dicators (World Bank, 2017b). Expressed in units of a standard
normal distribution.
Institutions3 Economic Freedom Index by Fraser Institute Fraser Institute
(2017). Score ranges from 0 to 10. Data is annual from 2000,
between 1970 and 2000 only available on a 5 years basis. The miss-
ing years are filled by linear interpolation.
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Definitions and sources (continued)
Variables Definitions and sources
∆logCrudeOil Differneced logarithm of the Global price of Brent Crude oil on
the first of January. Original data expressed in Dollars per barrel.
Federal Reserve (2017).
Land Total land surface in thousands squared kilometres. Data from
FAO (2017).
logForest Natural logarithm of the forest area, expressed in thousands of
squared kilometres. Own calculations from data on the total land
surface (FAO, 2017) and the percentage of land covered by forest
(World Bank, 2017a).
logIncome Natural logarithm of the GDP per capita in current USD. Data
from the UN National account estimates (UNSD, 2017).
∆logIncome First difference of the logarithm of GDP per capita in current USD.
Data from UN National account estimates (UNSD, 2017).
RatChina Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if China already ratified
the agreement.
RatGermany Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Germany already rati-
fied the agreement.
RatIndia Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if India already ratified
the agreement.
RatRegion Share of countries in the same region that ratified the agreement.
RatRussia Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Russia already ratified
the agreement.
RatUS Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the United States
already ratified the agreement.
Regional Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the treaty is not open
to all countries or if the scope of the agreement is regional (e.g.
a treaty on the protection of a river basin or EU environmental
agreements). The variable has been coded on the basis of the text
of the agreement as reported in the IEA Database Mitchell (2017).
ResourceRent Sum of fossil fuels rent in percentage of GDP. “Total natural re-
sources rent (%GDP)” in WDI dataset (World Bank, 2017a)
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Definitions and sources (continued)
Variables Definitions and sources
ResourceRent.Instit Interaction term between ResourceRent and Institutions
ShareIndustry Share of GDP value added from manufacturing, mining and utilities
at current prices. National accounts data (UNSD, 2017).
t Duration: number of years the treaty-country combination has
spent in the risk set.
ThreatenedSpecies Red List Index. The index indicates the conservation status of
species groups in a territory. A higher risk of extinction is associated
with lower scores. Data from IUCN website (IUCN, 2017).
∆ThreatenedSpecies Yearly change in the Red List Index; the index indicates the con-
servation status of species groups in a territory. A higher risk of
extinction is associated with lower scores. Data from IUCN website
(IUCN, 2017).
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